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ABSTRACT

Yilmaz, Yasir. Ph.D., Purdue University, December 2015. The Road to Vienna:
Habsburg and Ottoman statecraft during the time of Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa Paşa
(1676-1683). Major Professor: Charles W. Ingrao.

This dissertation comparatively analyzes Habsburg and Ottoman decision-making and
statecraft during the time of Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa Paşa (1676-1683). I synthesize
Habsburg diplomatic reports and Ottoman chronicles to show that during the peace
negotiations between the Habsburg envoys and Kara Mustafa Paşa’s court before the
second Turkish siege of Vienna in 1683, the two state’s diplomatic postures were shaped
by their different court structures. At the end, in response to the religiously-oriented
explanations of early modern Habsburg-Ottoman confrontations, I argue that the
monumental encounter in 1683 was a product of the difference between the two states’
governmental priorities and administrative mindsets formed within peculiar geopolitical
conditions. This conclusion transforms our understanding of not only a specific moment
in 1683, but also of early modern European-Islamic world confrontations by showing that
a full comprehension of the two world’s relations can be achieved primarily through
comparative case studies of tangible phenomena, such as governmental structures,
strategic objectives, and personal ambitions.

1

INTRODUCTION

On the night of May 11, 1683 the Habsburg courier Adam Schönberger arrived in
Istanbul. He had brought to the Austrian delegation in the Ottoman capital the good news
of the alliance signed between Emperor Leopold I (1658-1705) and Polish King Jan
Sobieski III (1674-1696). Johann Giovanni Benaglia, who had joined the Austrian
delegation as the secretary of the Hofburg’s special envoy Alberto Caprara, noted in his
journal that “one has to thank the fatherly providence and the diligence of Innocent XI for
this alliance.” This was a “wonderful treaty from which great benefits sprang.” However,
he added, “the Turks do not believe the same as they are very haughty; they would not be
afraid even if the entire Christendom united against them. The truth is,” Benaglia
remarked, “their arrogance is so high that it will be the cause of their collapse and
decline.”1 Two months later, the Ottoman armies under the command of Grand Vizier
Kara Mustafa Paşa (1676-1683) appeared in front of the walls of the Habsburg capital
Vienna for the second Turkish siege of the city. The grand vizier had forced the Austrian
delegation to march with the Ottoman main army into the outskirts Vienna.

1

Johann Giovanni Benaglia, Außführliche Reiß-Beschreibung von Wien nach Constantinopel und wieder
zurück in Teutschland, auch was sich Merckwürdiges dabey zugetragen: deß Hoch-Gebohrnen Grafen und
Herrn, Herrn Albrecht Caprara etc. etc., welche er als Ihro Römisch-Keyserl. Maj. ExtraordinariGesandter und Gevollmächtigter den Stillstand mit der Ottomannis. Pforten zu verlängern, verrichtet
(Franckfurt: Matth. Wagner, 1687), 116–117.
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What the Austrians witnessed as they approached the city was distressing: “As we
approached, our sorrow multiplied in seeing so deplorable spectacles…We only felt the
highest displeasure when we saw the [Kaiser]Ebersdorf, the imperial pleasure and
amusement ground where hunting sessions were held in the falls. The Turks, to the
memory of Süleyman who had established his pavilion there, knew well to use the
building for their convenience.”2 The siege began on July 14, but Kara Mustafa Paşa
failed to capture the city. On September 12, a European coalition army, commanded by
Jan Sobieski III, inflicted a heavy defeat on the Ottoman forces at the Battle of
Kahlenberg. Named after one of the hills overseeing Vienna from the northwest of the
city where the coalition army’s attack on the Ottoman lines had begun, Kahlenberg
marked the onset of the Ottoman territorial retreat from Europe after three centuries of
expansion.
Students of Austrian and Ottoman history know that Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa
Paşa singlehandedly formulated and executed the Vienna campaign in 1683.
Accordingly, studies on the grand vizier stressed his ambitious personality and character.
Indeed, one could read Benaglia’s remarks about the haughtiness of the Ottomans mainly
as Kara Mustafa Paşa’s arrogance, which had permeated the Ottoman court during his
term and diffused into the capillaries of the Ottoman decision-making processes and
statecraft. But, what had changed after the Köprülü grand viziers? Köprülü Mehmed Paşa
(1656-1661) and his son Fazıl Ahmed Paşa (1661-1676) had governed the empire for two
decades preceding Kara Mustafa Paşa’s assumption of office. Both of the Köprülü grand
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Ibid., 150. Süleyman I (1520-1566), known also as the Lawgiver, was the first besieger of the city in
1529.
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viziers gained the admiration of contemporary Ottoman and foreign observers as wise
and sagacious statesmen. Kara Mustafa Paşa was a protégé of the father Köprülü and also
the deputy grand vizier during the term of his step-brother, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa, with
whom he had good relations. However, Kara Mustafa Paşa’s governmental style greatly
differed from his predecessors. This dissertation is the story of Grand Vizier Kara
Mustafa Paşa’s rise to power as a protégé of the Köprülüs and the diplomatic talks held
between the Habsburg envoys and Kara Mustafa Paşa government during the years
preceding the Ottoman declaration of war on Austria in 1682.
I argue that Kara Mustafa Paşa’s administrative style and his ambitious policies
were a natural derivative of the governmental practices the father and son Köprülüs
established during the two decades they ruled the empire. When Fazıl Ahmed Paşa died,
Kara Mustafa Paşa inherited an executive power and authority that no grand viziers in the
history of the empire inherited from his predecessors. The Vienna campaign in 1683 was
the product of that executive authority which equipped Kara Mustafa Paşa with
unforeseen decision-making power.
I employ decision-making to refer to specific moments and processes when the
the Viennese court, Köprülü grand viziers, and Kara Mustafa Paşa determined policies,
strategies, and objectives of their governments. Such moment and processes were deeply
influenced by a certain governmental mindset, or statecraft, which was a function of the
idiosyncratic historical traditions and geopolitical conditions surrounding each state.
Within the framework of the present study, the discrepancy between Vienna and
Istanbul’s statecraft was observed remarkably in diplomatic manners of the two courts in
the late 1670s and early 1680s. The Viennese envoys at the Ottoman capital constantly
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received orders to protect the status quo with the Porte as a result of the Monarchy’s
precarious geopolitical condition. On the contrary, Kara Mustafa Paşa adopted a
negligent diplomatic attitude toward Austria and Poland’s peace request and welcomed
Transylvanian envoys despite remonstrations by the Habsburg ambassadors. What
enabled such a reckless diplomatic manner was primarily the lack of immediate threats to
the integrity and security of the Ottoman Empire.
The early modern Ottoman decision-making and statecraft relied on an individual,
often a grand vizier. Across Europe, no court knew this better than the Hofburg, the
primary victim of Kara Mustafa Paşa’s pretensions. An Austrian document from the late
seventeenth century that outlined the duties of the Ottoman courtiers described the power
of the grand vizier as unmatched in European courts: “Vezir-i azam, or the grand vizier, is
the prime minister of the Turkish Empire. His power extends so far that his peer at
another court is unknown. It is true that he has to pay attention to every point
cooperatively with the Sultan, who at the same time conceded an unlimited power [to the
grand vizier] through responsibility of his seal and consigned absolutely all imperial
affairs without exception to his discretion. He is the only state and war minister, the
superintendent of finances, and in general supervises everything which he then presents
to the sultan as he sees fit. For the most part, the sultan agrees with him.”3 In fact, the
relationship between Mehmed IV and Köprülü grand viziers and Kara Mustafa Paşa
greatly resembled to the relationships between many early modern European monarchs
and their ministers and favorites. Mercurino Gattinara in Charles V’s court, Cardinal
Richelieu and Cardinal Mazarin in the courts of Louis XIII and XIV, Count-Duke of
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Olivares in Phillip IV’s court, or Prince Lobkowicz in Leopold I’s court, all fulfilled
duties similar to that of the Köprülüs and Kara Mustafa Paşa.

Kara Mustafa Paşa and Vienna campaign
Much research has been published in English, German, and Turkish about Grand Vizier
Kara Mustafa Paşa and his motives and goals in undertaking the siege of Vienna in the
summer of 1683. Except for a few studies, Anglophone and Germanophone scholarship
on the Ottoman grand vizier has relied almost exclusively on European sources and
offered only monodimensional analysis from the European and Austrian perspective.
Moreover, much of that literature was written on or before the tercentennial anniversary
of the campaign in 1983, when orientalist premises determined the writing of the
Ottoman history. Accordingly, most historians writing about1683 and Kara Mustafa Paşa
from the western perspective interpreted the campaign as an attempt to reverse the
constant decline of the post-Suleimanic Ottoman Empire, which they considered an alien,
sinister, and irrational polity that succumbed to religious fanaticism. The well-known
experts of the siege including John Stoye, Thomas Barker, Walter Leitsch, and Zygmunt
Abrahamovicz frequently alluded in their works to a purported, inherent cultural
incompatibility between the ‘Christian’ Habsburgs and ‘Muslim’ Ottomans. They did not
hesitate to embellish their narratives occasionally with verses from the Qur’an about
martyrdom or war against non-believers to emphasize the religious-motivations of the
Ottoman court. In addition, their descriptions of the grand vizier were only slightly

“Türckhisch Reichs Ministrorum und Derenselben Dienst Beschreibung” n.d., AVA, Familienarchive,
Harrach, Karton 848, Folio 3.
3
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modified from Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall’s pejorative portrayal of the grand vizier in
the fashion of nineteenth-century orientalism, which harbored a little respect for the
peculiarities of the Ottoman world. Notwithstanding the rigorous research these
historians have undertaken, today their interpretations are outdated.
Turkish scholarship has problems too. Despite the historical reputation of the
grand vizier and the siege of Vienna in Turkish public memory and popular culture,
modern scholarship about the period is conspicuously meager. There is no monograph in
Turkish that analyzes the career of Kara Mustafa Paşa within the broader framework of
early modern Ottoman history or from the onset of the Köprülü regime in 1656. The only
scholarly study devoted to the grand vizier was an international conference organized in
2000 by the municipality of the grand vizier’s hometown, Merzifon. Most of the papers
found a reason to glorify the grand vizier, while few of them highlighted interesting
secondary details; not one offered a novel interpretation of the era. Moreover, whatever
has been written so far in Turkish is based solely on Ottoman sources. Despite
contemporary Austrian documents’ first degree relevance to the siege, no Turkish
historian to date has made use of seventeenth-century Austrian archival documents.4 As a
result, just as its western counterpart, Turkish scholarship about Kara Mustafa Paşa has
been linguistically monodimensional.
Aside from linguistic insufficiencies and interpretative flaws of orientalist
historiography, scholarship on Kara Mustafa Paşa in any language has ignored the
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This shortcoming of the Turkish historiography is but a small fraction of a much bigger deficiency
regarding the use of the Habsburg imperial archives by Turkish historians in studies of the pre-1800
Habsburg-Ottoman relations. No modern Turkish university offers even preliminary level training on
kanzleischrift or kurrentschrift, the scripts used by the Austrian chanceries during much of the monarchy’s
history.
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peculiar geopolitical frameworks and administrative mindsets that shaped the inner
mechanics of the courts in Vienna and Istanbul. Thomas Barker’s Double Eagle and
Crescent came closer than any other work to accomplishing such a contextualization.
However, Barker’s attempt to cover entire continental politics in the 1670s was overly
ambitious and prevented him from crystallizing a comparative perspective on the
decision-making mechanisms of the two courts. As a result, the decision-making patterns
and statecraft in each court in the years preceding 1683 have been examined to date as
two independent phenomena. In reality, the mutual stances of the two courts vis-à-vis
each other regarding the matters they quarreled about before 1683 must have been
reciprocally formative on the course of policy-making in each court. Whether there
existed such interconnectedness between the Habsburg and Ottoman policy-making could
be revealed only through a comparative examination of Austrian and Ottoman archival
sources. In this way, a complete narrative that meshed chronologically could be
established, without the inevitable interpretative gaps that exist when only one half of the
existing record is examined.
Such methodological shortcomings of the literature derived from the unique
paradigmatic trajectories of the Habsburg and Ottoman historiography. Habsburg
scholarship has long overcome declinist assumptions about the Monarchy. Today, the
Monarchy’s history is written from a progressive perspective that stresses unity and
success. The reign of Emperor Leopold I (1658-1705) plays a significant role in that
progressive storyline. Most historians agree that Leopold I set the groundwork for the
great Habsburg Empire of the eighteenth century. One of Leopold’s most cherished
achievements was his recovery of the Hungarian kingdom from the Ottoman Empire,
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following the victory against Kara Mustafa Paşa’s armies in 1683. That is, the Habsburg
victory in 1683 represents a critical juncture in the Monarchy’s history, which often is
assumed to have taken place at the expense of a weakening Ottoman state. Therefore,
articulating a balanced view of 1683 and the grand vizier from the Habsburg (and
western) perspective necessitates working against the prevailing tenets of the field.
Instead, a pejorative image of the grand vizier and the contemporary Ottomans has
proven much handier and more easily integrated into the Habsburg master narrative.
Scholars writing from the Ottoman perspective face inherently different, but
practically similar challenges. Declinist assumptions about the Ottoman state shaped the
literature much longer than in the Habsburg scholarship, but they have been finally
discredited at the theoretical level. New interpretative problems replaced the old ones as
scholars urged to fill the analytical vacuum created by the lack of an overarching
paradigm. Recent research has definitely charted new territory, but new paradigms
formulated about the Ottoman Empire noticeably lack consistency and coherency. On the
one hand, the empire is presented as a pietistic-minded, somewhat of a fanatical entity.
On the other hand, it is considered a practitioner of proto-democracy in line with
contemporary western European states. These are inherently contradictory arguments,
which are not signs of interpretative breadth; they are by-products of a lack of unanimity
about major historical questions concerning motives and intentions, that is, the very
nature of the early modern Ottoman state. Such a picture greatly differs from the
Habsburg field where the scholarly corpus is constructed upon widely shared verdicts
about the nature of the early modern Monarchy (unified, successful, and thus
progressive).

9

Among the new approaches to the early modern Ottoman state, the “renewal of
faith” paradigm most influenced the writing of the second half of the seventeenth century.
The proponents of the paradigm have hypothesized an Islamic pietistic revivalism in the
early modern empire. They argued that the increasing number of conversions to Islam
and catechisms demonstrated that the early modern Ottoman world experienced its own
version of confessionalization as an extension of contemporary confessional movements
in Europe. These contentions inspired one historian to argue that the siege of Vienna in
1683 was a jihad, that is, a religiously motivated enterprise.
The present research is the product of an endeavor to address these manifold,
intertwined problems emanating from the linguistic barriers, outdated interpretations, and
paradigmatic peculiarities of the Habsburg and Ottoman historiography that all too often
handicapped research concerning Kara Mustafa Paşa. Rather than interpret the launching
of the Vienna campaign exclusively through the prism of religious motives, I undertake a
wide-ranging reconsideration of the Köprülü regime and Kara Mustafa Pasha’s grand
vizierate. Based on a pioneering, comparative analysis of the seventeenth-century
Ottoman chronicles and Habsburg diplomatic dispatches to and from Constantinople
between 1676 and 1683, this work surmounts, for the first time, the language barrier. I
construct a new political storyline that addresses analytical problems emanating from the
lack of a master Ottoman narrative that covers the second half of the seventeenth century,
while also surpassing the analytical limits of the mono-linguistic scholarship. The
discussion sheds light on correlations between Kara Mustafa Pasha’s strategic vision,
geopolitical circumstances in the Central Europe that encouraged him to redesign the
region according to Ottoman interests, and the Grand vizier’s level of potency in the
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Ottoman decision-making mechanism. Ultimately, the project responds to the questions
of how Kara Mustafa Pasha dealt with potential ally and enemy nations’ envoys and,
more importantly, how he handled Habsburg envoys’ recurring peace requests before he
declared war on Austria in the summer of 1682.
The study consists of three parts. Part One includes two chapters which
respectively analyze and deconstruct some of the key notions of Ottoman and Habsburg
historiography. Discussion in these chapters shows that the current scholarship on the two
states has many erroneous premises, which predispose investigations of the HabsburgOttoman relations between 1650 and 1700 to misleading, reductionist conclusions about
the motivations and objectives of the two states. The first half of the first chapter focuses
on assumptions about the abstract motivations of the seventeenth-century Ottoman state.
In the second half of the chapter, through a primary-source based discussion of Mehmed
IV’s reign, I illustrate that the Ottoman court, contrary to conventional wisdom, had
successfully taken advantage of the Kadızadeli movement (not vice versa) to repress
social restlessness across the capital. The discussion about Kadızadelis may fırst appear
irrelevant to readers. On the contrary, it is necessary because this section shows that the
Ottoman court effectively capitalized on the Kadızadeli preachers as a means of social
control in the capital, rather than succumbing to their religious discourse. The second
chapter then shifts to Habsburg historiography. The first half tackles the progressive
assumptions about the seventeenth-century Habsburg Monarchy. Here, I show that the
progressive attitude in the literature toward the Monarchy which stresses achievements
over chronic weaknesses, especially during the reign of Emperor Leopold I (1658-1705),
does not necessarily reflect historical reality. It is in fact a product of an historiographical
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reconstruction which derives from historians’ nostalgically-oriented retrospection on this
multi-ethnic empire after experiencing the disasters of nation-states. The remainder of the
study builds upon the conclusions of Part One.
Part Two, formed of a single chapter, rejects the dominant trends in the
Ottomanist literature and reinstitutes politics and diplomacy as analytical tools for
understanding of the Köprülü regime and Kara Mustafa Paşa’s inheritance of the grand
vizierate from his two Köprülü predecessors. The emphasis on these oldest themes of the
historical profession in a bid to contextualize a “great man,” Kara Mustafa Paşa, may
appear obsolete to some readers. It is worth mentioning that Ottoman history remains a
significantly understudied field. Even less understood are the dynamics of Ottoman
political history—presumably the most exploited domain in many other fields including
Habsburg history—because it has undergone a premature death a long time ago. This was
an outcome of the diversion that occurred within the recent decades in historical studies
from the political to the social and cultural, a turn that also influenced the writing of
Ottoman history before Ottomanists began to revise the declinist narrative. As an
unintentional by-product of the historiographical fashion that privileged the apolitical,
Ottomanist scholarship is devoid of paradigms that can shed light onto the inner workings
of the early modern imperial court, hence the earlier mentioned reductionism and
contradictory outlook of new approaches. The Köprülü era (including Kara Mustafa
Paşa’s career) were not immune to the detour from the political, although the period is yet
to be thoroughly illuminated. One could overcome the lack of a definitive narrative only
by constructing a new one. To that end, the third chapter starts with a discussion of the
historical conditions that set the stage for the rise of Köprülü grand vizier family from

12

1656. Afterwards, this section illustrates in the light of contemporary Ottoman and
European sources how Köprülü Mehmed Paşa (1656-1661) and his son Fazıl Ahmed
Paşa (1661-1676) (re)established a grand vizier-centered regime. To date, historians have
ignored how the defining characteristics of Kara Mustafa Paşa’s grand vizierate was
established by that regime. The latter half of this part illustrates that while the father and
son Köprülüs meticulously accumulated executive power at the hands of the incumbent
grand vizier, Kara Mustafa Paşa, as the family’s protégé, climbed to the higher echelons
of bureaucracy. When Fazıl Ahmed Paşa died in November of 1676, Sultan Mehmed IV
did not hesitate to hand his seal to Kara Mustafa Paşa.
Part Three consists of three chapters which demonstrate how the unrivaled
executive power Kara Mustafa Paşa inherited in 1676 led to the catastrophe in Vienna
seven years later. The discussion in this part is based on the reports of three Austrian
diplomats whose stay in Istanbul overlapped Kara Mustafa Paşa’s grand vizierate. Johann
Christoph von Kindsperg (ambassador, 1672-78), Peter Franz von Hoffmann
(internuncio, 1678-79), and Georg Christoph von Kunitz (ambassador, 1680-1683)
incessantly pleaded to extend peace with the Kara Mustafa Paşa government. Chapter
four analyzes Kindsperg’s monumental stay in Istanbul. By the time Kara Mustafa Paşa
took over the sultan’s seal in 1676, Kindsperg was in his fourth year in the Ottoman
capital. His positive remarks about the grand vizier during the early phases of his term
greatly influenced the Hofburg’s optimism to renew peace with the Ottoman court in the
following years. Kindsperg died from plague in 1678 which took the lives of several
other Austrian diplomats in the same year and the next, severely handicapping Austria’s
peace initiatives. The fifth chapter examines the stay of internuncio Peter Franz von
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Hoffmann who replaced Kindsperg. Hoffmann’s instruction had included peace
conditions to be presented to the grand vizier. Neither the internuncio lived long enough
to see the denouement of his mission nor did Kara Mustafa Paşa was willing to gratify
Austria’s peace requests. Hoffmann, too, lost his life due to the plague, causing the
Hofburg to rely on the reports of couriers resident interpreters during much of 1679. The
following year, Georg Christoph von Kunitz, the former council of the Austrian Oriental
Company, was appointed as ambassador. His negotiations in Istanbul form the basis of
chapter six. As the tension between the two courts rose daily and the level of anxiety in
Vienna amplified about a probable Ottoman campaign into Central Europe, the Hofburg
decided to reinforce Kunitz with a special-envoy, Alberto Caprara. The latter arrived in
the Ottoman capital in the spring of 1682. However, Kara Mustafa Paşa, who stipulated
new and impossible conditions at every next meeting with the Austrian agents, declared
war on Austria in August of 1682.
To date, many case studies have analyzed diplomatic negotiations between the
Habsburg Monarchy and Ottoman Empire. Much of that literature has focused on
diplomatic encounters in the context of military encounters or their cultural significance
to show the intensity of exchanges and interconnectedness between two political entities
that were assumed to be archenemies. However, scholars have ignored whether the
course of negotiations were illustrative of the two empire’s unique administrative
mindsets. The present study concludes that the Habsburg-Ottoman encounter in 1683 was
essentially a result of a contest between two imperial systems which possessed
idiosyncratic strengths and weaknesses formed by their peculiar geopolitical
surroundings.
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PART ONE: SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY OTTOMAN AND HABSBURG
HISTORIOGRAPHY
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CHAPTER 1: A CONTESTED FIELD: SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY OTTOMAN
HISTORIOGRAPHY

The Ottoman Empire in a comparative perspective: still “comparing apples and
oranges”5
Systematic comparison is not of interest for most historians,6 while the comparative
literature on early modern European empires rarely surpasses mere juxtaposition of
descriptive or quantitative information with few exceptions that are analytical.7 There are
several reasons. There is a vast scholarship on every empire, but it is difficult for an
historian to develop a reliable command of descriptive and methodological core in more
than one historical field. Also a language barrier exists. Empires ruled over multiethnic
and multilingual territories and have left a copious amount of textual artifacts in various

Virginia H. Aksan, “Locating the Ottomans Among Early Modern Empires,” Journal of Early Modern
History 3, no. 2 (May 1999): 105.
6
Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Jürgen Kocka, “Comparison and Beyond: Traditions, Scope, and Perspectives
of Comparative History,” in Comparative and Transnational History: Central European Approaches and
New Perspectives., eds. Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Jürgen Kocka (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), 1–
30. Both historians favor comparative history as a useful heuristic tool, but the present author benefit from
critiques they brought to comparative methodology.
7
Dominic Lieven, Empire: The Russian Empire and Its Rivals (Yale University Press, 2002); Jane
Burbank, Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 2010); Stephen Frederic Dale, The Muslim Empires of the Ottomans, Safavids, and
Mughals (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Gábor Ágoston, “Military
Transformation in the Ottoman Empire and Russia, 1500–1800,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and
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languages. Scholarly literature concerning empires is composed of many different
languages, requiring comparative historians to work with various languages. Yet, few
historians can work with multiple languages; therefore, most comparative literature relies
on secondary sources. The greatest challenge for comparative historians of empires,
however, comes from the multitude of conflicting narratives and paradigms in
scholarship.
Philosophers of history have asserted that narratives and paradigms in a historical
field are direct functions of historian’s ideology, aesthetic and ethical aspirations, and
unique spatial and temporal context in which historical text is produced. In other words,
scientific and scholarly narratives and paradigms are produced by highly subjective
processes.8 A careful comparative reader in Ottoman, Habsburg, and Russian history will
note that narratives and paradigms produced via such subjective processes are abundant
in each field.9 This is a natural outcome of multi-spatial and multi-temporal formative
defining moments in the twentieth century which cyclically influenced historians’
perspectives on empires. The intense interaction between the Ottoman, Habsburg, and
Russian empires make these states more worthy of comparison with each other than with
many others. Nonetheless, it is difficult for a comparative historian to harness factual and
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(London; New York: Routledge, 1997), 11.
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Monarşisi ve Rus Çarlığı Tarihyazımı,” İnsan ve Toplum 3, no. 6 (2013): 245–69.
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interpretive data from such a large body of literature; it is even a greater challenge to
synthesize diverse arguments from the three fields into a new analytical narrative. As a
result, reductionist and arbitrary comparisons prevail in comparative studies concerning
the three empires. Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Jürgen Kocka classified such comparative
works, which fail to suggest a holistic comparative synthesis, as “asymmetrical
comparisons”, characterized by sketchy homogenization of historical cases, concepts, and
paradigms.10
Recently, a comparative trend has become popular among Ottomanists, who use
comparative methodology to replace declinist assumptions about the Ottoman Empire
with a “positive narrative”.11 In the new works concerning the early modern Ottoman
Empire, many scholars have transferred concepts and paradigms such as ‘Second Empire’
or ‘confessionalization’ from European historiography and applied them liberally to
Ottoman history. However, these recent comparative approaches to the Ottoman Empire
are also asymmetrical, and, hence, argumentatively flawed. They are not paying attention
to the considerably distinct historical circumstances in early modern Europe and the
Ottoman Empire. Therefore, the parallels these works draw between Europe and the
Ottoman Empire are superficial and unconvincing. Ottoman historiography needs its own
concepts derived from the vocabulary in Ottoman textual artifacts to overcome the
shortcomings of the decline paradigm and more recent problems posed by the
asymmetrical comparisons.
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The first part of this chapter one is a critical analysis of Ottomanists’ most recent
contributions to the seventeenth century Ottoman studies. The most noteworthy
commonalities of the works examined are their comparative methodology and religioncentered approach which have produced various historiographical shortcomings. The
second part of the chapter first reemphasizes some of the important findings in earlier
researches on the seventeenth century, because they are ignored in most recent works.
Then, I propose a new interpretative framework for the role religious movements played
(especially the Kadızadelis) in the processes of decision-making in the pre-1683 Ottoman
Empire.

New frameworks for the seventeenth century
The roots of comparative approaches to Ottoman history may be traced back to Rifa’at
‘Ali Abou-El-Haj’s seminal essay published in 1991.12 Abou-El-Haj had argued that
Ottoman historians should look for parallelisms between early modern Europe and the
contemporary Ottoman Empire. He was motivated by a basic observation: Ottoman
historiography focused on “peculiarities, oddities, and particularism” of Ottoman history
and civilization. The decline paradigm, an explanatory framework historians used for
decades assuming that the post-1600 Ottoman Empire underwent permanent structural
decay, was an outcome of such an attitude. Abou-El-Haj argued, instead, that historians
should approach Ottoman history as “comparable and commensurable with other
histories”.13 Two leading Ottomanists, Suraiya Faroqhi and Cornell Fleischer had written
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an introduction to Abou-El-Haj’s essay and they generally agreed with the author’s
proposal. Yet, they had also asserted that establishing trans-regional connections for
purposes of comparison should not mean universal application of theories and concepts
designed to define a particular historical phenomenon. Faroqhi and Fleischer asserted that
historical analysis is reliable only when differences are emphasized. Also they noted that
one lesson historians learned from the intensive study of Middle Eastern texts was that
the values and institutions of Renaissance Europe and the Middle East of the same period
were not necessarily the same.14
In the last decade or so there has been an increase in revisionist approaches to the
Ottoman Empire. Many of these studies credited Abou-El-Haj’s works as their inspiration
and suggested new frameworks built upon his ideas. Such literature has abandoned the
decline paradigm and charted new territory in Ottoman studies. Most of these recent
revisionist works have ignored Faroqhi and Fleischer’s cautionary remarks and they took
Abou-El-Haj’s suggestion at face value. This manner has led to setting of many
‘asymmetrical’ connections between early modern Europe and the Ottoman Empire. As a
result, Ottoman historiography—in particular the literature on the seventeenth century—
has become an arena of contesting, and sometimes contradicting arguments.
Among the recent works, Baki Tezcan’s monograph is the most notable.15 In an
aspiring grand narrative of the seventeenth century, Tezcan went beyond merely
opposing declinist assumptions about early modern Ottoman Empire and constructed his
own version of a positive narrative. A central theme in Tezcan’s line of argumentation
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was the gradual monetization of Ottoman economy during the sixteenth century. Tezcan
argued that from the 1560s, an increasing number of commoners (consisting of merchants
and financiers whom contemporary chroniclers called ecnebis-outsiders-due to their
social origins), Janissaries, and members of the Ulema (educated class of Muslim legal
scholars) benefited from opportunities presented by a more market-oriented economy and
increased their wealth.16 From the late sixteenth century, all of these groups progressively
translated their wealth into political power in the court, capital, and provinces. According
to Tezcan, this development pointed to the expansion of a political nation, “the body of
people who could influence or play a legitimate role in the government.” 17 Such
developments marked the formation of a new socio-political setting in the Ottoman
realm, which Tezcan described as the ‘Second Empire’. Between 1603 and 1703, the
Second Empire saw ten reigns by nine sultans; six reigns ended with forceful
dethronement, which typically occurred after a capital-wide rebellion and coups d’état
carried out by different political factions. 18
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One of the key characteristics of the Second Empire was the expansion of the
Ulema’s (‘jurists’ as Tezcan refers to them) sphere of influence. The empowerment of
Ulema and the ‘jurist’s law’ (Islamic rules and
regulations) developed at the expense of kanun. For decades, these developments were
interpreted by historians as emblematic of decentralization and decline in the Ottoman
Empire. Challenging the established understanding and drawing comparisons with
English history, Tezcan posed the following question:
How have we been led to believe that the English Civil War, which led to
the execution of Charles I in 1649, and the “Glorious” Revolution of 1688,
which dethroned Charles I’s son James II, were advances in the history of
limited government, whereas the regicide of the Ottoman Sultan Ibrahim
in 1648 and the deposition of Ibrahim’s son Mehmed IV in 1687, for
instance, were simply signs of decline?19
Tezcan’s question was legitimate just as his observations about the new sociopolitical setting in the seventeenth century Ottoman Empire. Yet, the legitimacy of his
terminology was arguable. Tezcan contended that the expanding political nation
generally consisted of two groups and he devised the early modern Ottoman counterparts
of English “constitutionalists” and “royalists”.20 He suggested that the expansion of
political nation marked “proto-democratization” of the Ottoman Empire. He equated
Ottoman kanun with the feudal law of European middles ages. Finally, he detected
“modern” and “secular” tendencies in the so-called Second Empire. 21 Most of these
concepts connote developments which belong to English history, and they have no
equivalent in the Ottoman realm. Ottoman territories spread over three continents and
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harbored many social and cultural idiosyncrasies, disowning attributes usually associated
with European history. Were there modern and secular tendencies, for instance, in the
seventeenth-century Egypt, Eastern Anatolia, and the Balkans? If not, the parallels
Tezcan drew between English and Ottoman history is highly questionable, along with his
broad generalizations and his terminology.
First, a liberal application of English historical terminology per se to the Ottoman
history denies the Ottoman Empire any historical peculiarity. Tezcan’s line of
argumentation indirectly suggests that an Ottoman “positive narrative” can only be built
upon English historiography. Second, Tezcan undermines the Ottomanists’ ability to
explain Ottoman history with a vocabulary endemic to the Empire. A recent article by
Christine Philliou and Alan Mikhail is enlightening in this regard.22 In their survey of the
comparative literature on empires, Mikhail and Philliou have observed that the Chinese,
Roman, and British empires are considered by historians as the quintessential imperial
structures of their historical eras. According to Mikhail and Philliou, in a world-historical
framework, comparative historians take the existence or absence of these three empires’
characteristics in other imperial structures as a measuring unit. In other words, the
military, political, artistic, and technological conditions possessed by the Chinese, Roman
and British empires define the contemporaries of these three empires. Mikhail and
Philliou determined that “such a framework presents a problem for empires that were not
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the Chinese, Roman, or British, since most of these other empires look like losers to
varying extents.”23
By establishing his positive interpretation of the Ottoman Empire on British
historical terminology, Tezcan has privileged in a like manner the terminology of British
imperial historiography as the supreme authority for historiographies of other early
modern empires—in this case the Ottoman Empire. This was definitely not a goal of
Tezcan. Yet, such a methodology vitiated the authority of his grand narrative which
otherwise successfully revived political history as a heuristic tool for the Ottoman history
and illuminated the role different factions (consisting of networks formed by janissaries,
Ulema and other courtiers) played in Ottoman politics.
To overcome the terminological shortcomings of Ottoman historiography, Marcus
Koller suggested that Ottomanists conduct microstudies focusing on moments rather than
grand narratives interpreting eras.24 Koller’s suggestion was reasonable, because,
although Baki Tezcan’s reliance on British historical vocabulary was primarily a stylistic
preference, it was also necessitated by the insufficiencies of the Ottoman paradigmatic
depository. Some of the recent contributions to the field which are spatially and
temporally well-defined may be interpreted as steps taken toward building such a
depository. These recent works have expanded our understanding of expansion of the
political nation in the provinces, the effects of making war at individual moments and
places across the Empire, and the role guilds played in courtly politics. Scholars have
documented that in provincial towns, such as Ayntab and Aleppo, the population of the
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askeri (military) class continuously grew in the seventeenth century; during the process,
members of the askeri progressively became involved in local economies. The result was
“civilianization” of the Janissaries.25 One study examined seventeenth century guilds in
Istanbul and argued that guilds exercised a certain degree of “leverage” in the capital.
The same study also revealed that “fluidity” defined the inner structure of guilds much
better than “traditionalism”, which was for long assumed to be the characteristic of
guilds.26 The increase in the number of such thematically focused studies will eventually
help the Ottomanist build a vocabulary endemic to the Ottoman history.

“Renewal of faith” literature: Definition and Critique
Another new paradigm that applied comparative methodology is the “renewal of faith”
literature. Proponents of such literature argue that Islamic pietistic revivalism dominated
the social and political processes of the early modern Ottoman Empire. These scholars
argue that early modern European confessionalization stretched to the Ottoman [and
Safavid] domains, and, thus, the early modern Ottoman processes of state and social
formation were involved in the Mediterranean age of confessionalization. Various
scholars have presented different evidence to substantiate this assertion. According to
Tijana Krstić, the conversion of non-Muslims to Islam and also the debates found in early
modern Islamic texts on issues, such as spiritual authority in the Muslim community,
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correct forms of rituals, or authenticity of the Qur’an (through a language resembling the
Catholic-Protestant polemics), have illustrated that European confessionalization theory
and social disciplining are applicable to Ottoman history. Krstić also claimed that the
principle of cuius regio, eius religio was upheld in the Ottoman and Safavid empires.27
Another scholar, Derin Terzioğlu, approved the efforts to rewrite the history of the
Ottoman Empire with recourse to the concept of confessionalization.28 She agreed that
the Ottomans were involved in a global experience of early modernity. Terzioğlu
admitted that there were connections between what she dubbed ‘Ottoman Sunnitization’29
and “broad-based processes such as state-building, territorialization, urbanization and
monetization.”30 She contended that situating the so-called Ottoman Sunnitization within
the European confessionalization provided an analytical framework for studies about
Islamic pietism, which Ottomanists have traditionally analyzed as a timeless phenomenon
detached from spatial and temporal historical contexts which likely produced—and
reproduced—it. Terzioğlu also presented the proliferation of Muslim/Sunnî cathecisms in
the seventeenth century Ottoman Empire as an indication of Ottoman participation in the
age of confessionalization. Judith Pfeiffer, too, argued that the confessionalization
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paradigm was applicable to the seventeenth century Ottoman Empire.31 Her evidence for
the Ottoman version of early modern confessional polarization was a treatise on Judaism
composed in 1651 by a Jewish convert to Islam, a text based on a similar treatise written
a century earlier by the famous Ottoman scholar Taşköprülüzade (d. 1561). Most
recently, Guy Burak has also agreed with Krstić, Terzioğlu, and Pfeiffer. Burak posited
that early modern Ottoman rulers belonged to an age where an important duty of
monarchs was to defend the orthodoxy of their respective religion.32
Mark David Baer’s proposition that conversion is best understood within
concentric contexts of war, conquest, and power-relations also echoed the hypotheses of
the “renewal of faith” literature. Though rejecting in his review of Krstić’s Contested
Conversions to Islam the broad application of the confessionalization theory to the
Ottoman [and Safavid] contexts,33 Baer used the concept of “turn to piety”: he alluded to
a purported Islamic reformism supported by the queen mother, grand vizier, and sultan.
Kadızadeli pietism (discussed below), Baer argued, was the driving force behind the
policies of the early modern Ottoman court.34
The logic that guided the efforts to detect parallelisms between European
confessionalization and the contemporary Ottoman Empire partially originates in the
works Reinhard Schulze. He had earlier attempted to establish associations within a
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larger framework between early modern Europe and the contemporary Islamic world.
The purported goal of Schulze was to reconstruct Islamic history through a positive
storyline as a dynamic and creative process to liberate Islam from its position “between
Scylla and Charybdis”.35 The inspiration of Schulze, who coined the concept of
“Islamische Aufklärung” and speculated about an Islamic version of modernism, was
German intellectuals’ ideas on Enlightenment. Schulze contextualized his perspective
within Horkheimer and Adorno’s argument that Aufklärung was not merely an eighteenth
century phenomenon but a perpetual human experience. He asked “why would Islam not
experience its own rationalization?”36 Schulze argued that at least the historiography of
the Ottoman Empire, if not that of entire Islamic world, could benefit from insights
derived from such reinterpretations and revisions.37 Nonetheless, Schulze’s arguments
and responses to his seemingly innovative approach did not find their way into the
Ottomanist scholarship until the proponents of the “renewal of faith” literature draw
parallelisms between confessionalization Europe and the Ottoman Empire.38 However,
just as in Baki Tezcan’s grand narrative, the historical links established within the
“renewal of faith” literature between confessionalization Europe and the contemporary
Ottoman Empire are historically unproven and show shortcomings. Many major
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developments that were characteristic of the European confessionalization did not occur
in the Ottoman Empire.
Within the European historical framework, the confessionalization thesis argued
that the intensive processes of early modern confession building and social disciplining
gradually paved the way for emergence of modern European states. First articulated by
Heinz Schilling and Wolfgang Reinhard, the confessionalization thesis produced vast
literature in which scholars rigorously tested the historiographical applicability of the
confessionalization thesis to the European history and debated numerous confession
building processes, periodizations, and terminology. 39
In European historiography it is a well-documented fact that there were numerous
Reformatory and Counter-Reformatory moments and processes across Europe associated
with confessions and a myriad of particular names and institutions. In his review of
Tijana Krstić’s Contested Conversions, Baer alluded to this aspect of European
confessionalization which used propaganda, censorship, catechizing, preaching,
pilgrimage, and inquisitions, while also triggering new processes in many areas of social
and political life.40
In many studies historians have analyzed these issues. In Bohemia, artists and
architects served the Habsburg Emperor in creating a Catholic baroque landscape and
constructing and renovating pilgrimage complexes and monasteries. Conversion to
Catholicism meant for the Bohemian nobility new paths to climb in the social hierarchy,
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while those in the lower strata frequently faced confession-based coercion and violence.41
Jesuit priests took influential positions—often as confessors—in Catholic courts. Many
personal letters, diaries, and other types of textual artifacts document the finer details of
relationships between Habsburg, Bavarian, and French monarchs and their Jesuit court
confessors.42 In Prussia during Frederick William I’s rule (1713-1740), pietist reformists
were greatly influential. Inspired by the ideas of Lutheran scholars (Phillip Spener and
August Herman Francke), Halle Pietism became an important catalyzer in the
institutionalization of the Prussian state. Frederick William I appointed pietists to high
ranking clerical positions in Pomerania and East Prussia, by making them army
chaplains. Pietists also established universities and founded small schools outside of the
countries where they lived.43 Ultimately, confessionalization is one of the most
persuasively argued themes in early modern European historiography.
Yet convincing evidence is deficient in the case of the Ottoman Empire and
Islamic history. Neither the hyperactive Prussian mobilization reinforced by pietistic
ideals was paralleled in the Ottoman Empire, nor did an authoritarian drive toward
uniformity occur as in post-confessionalization Europe. On the contrary, seventeenth and
eighteenth-century Ottoman history is marked with decentralization. Whereas central
states were gaining ground in Europe, the Ottoman Empire was enduring the challenges
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of centrifugal forces. Therefore, the argument that the Ottoman Empire partook in the
Mediterranean age of confessionalization is merely speculation due to the lack of
evidence showing connections between Islamic pietism and politics, social movements,
and institutional changes as in the case of Europe. Nevertheless, the present author does
not deny the Ottoman participation in the age of confessionalization to reinforce the
historically stagnant and decadent image of Islam and the Ottoman Empire. That image
does not derive from history itself but rather from the inadequacies of scholarship: the
poor evaluation and assessment of sources. Due to the unsatisfactory amount of research,
as Reinhard Schulze noted, the Islamic past still looks like a “bricolage” and has a
relatively “unlesbares Bild”, whereas European history is “lesbar”. The former needs to
be further analyzed; whereas the latter, sufficiently analyzed, allows syntheses and
formulation of paradigms.44 For Ottomanist scholarship, the outcome of insufficient
primary source analysis is a vicious cycle. Even when source-reading and critiquing are
satisfactory, contextualizing problems awaits Ottomanists: early modern Ottoman history
remains a contested research field lacking its own paradigmatic depository. An
“alternative paradigm that enables the fitting of disparate data into one coherent narrative
thread” has yet to be produced; hence the experimental connections Ottomanists establish
between the early modern European historiography and contemporary Ottoman Empire.45
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Instead, historians have reproduced orientalist assumptions on Islam and religion’s role
concerning the Ottoman administrative mentality.

Religion and rationality in the Ottoman Empire
Islam in the Ottoman Empire may be analyzed by various political, social, and cultural
levels. However, historians have lately shown interest in three phenomena when
analyzing religion in the Ottoman Empire: (1) the sultans’ devotion to Islam; (2) religious
motivations behind campaigns and the troops’ devotion to a religious cause; and (3) the
role of Islam as an abstract source of inspiration and political instrument in what
historians have dubbed “Ottoman official ideology”. The Kadızadeli movement of the
seventeenth century has especially attracted interest within the framework of the latter. In
the following part of this chapter, I first examine the important aspects of the literature on
Islam in the Ottoman Empire. Then, he suggests a brief template for analysis of the
interaction between the Ottoman state and seventeenth century Islam.
A recent study focusing on a sultan’s dubious commitment to the cause of Islam is
Marc David Baer’s Honored by the Glory of Islam. In a narrative of Mehmed IV’s reign
(1648-1687) focusing on conversion and holy war, Baer suggested that Islam was the
most powerful catalyzer in the Ottoman Empire during the second half of the seventeenth
century. Baer disagreed with the widespread application of confessionalization theory to
the Ottoman Empire, but he also interpreted religion as the major inspiration of the
Ottoman decision-making mechanism in the second half of the seventeenth century. Baer
argued that a “turn to piety”, an assumed pietistic Islamic revivalism, informed many
developments in the seventeenth century, such as the protracted siege of Crete (1644-
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1649), the campaigns on Poland (1672-1676), Russia (1676-1681), and Austria (1683) as
well as the purported “Islamization of infidel space” in Istanbul through mosque
constructions. He also explained the forced conversion of Sabbatai Zevi, a Sephardic
Rabbi who proclaimed himself the long-awaited Jewish Messiah, and his followers to
Islam within the framework of Islamic revivalism. 46 One piece of evidence Baer
presented was the eulogies and glorifications addressed to Mehmed IV by contemporary
Ottoman chroniclers such as Hajji Ali Efendi who praised Mehmed IV as “deliverer of
conquest and ghaza [holy war], the powerful sultan who causes fear and dread”, and
Yusuf Nabi who extolled the Sultan as “defender of Islam”. Relying on such statements,
Baer situated the Sultan at the center of an alleged process of what he called “turn to
piety”.47 Even the hunting expeditions of the “convert maker” Mehmed IV had an
objective within this regard as the mobile court “served as a travelling conversion
maker”.48
Marc Baer also failed to convince his readers due to his speculative reasoning and
reductionist inferences from contemporary chronicles. The appellations attributed to
sultans in chronicles are rhetorical patterns used both in Ottoman bureaucracy and by all
Ottoman men of letters. Any reader of Ottoman documents and chronicles will easily
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detect accolades of Ottoman sultans as gazi49 warriors. Through their narratives of
glorification, chronicle writers assumed a reconstructive role for the rule of the reigning
sultan. By placing emphasis on such commonplace conceptualizations, Baer gave the
faulty impression that these concepts are unique definitions and descriptions awaiting
interpretation. Dominic LaCapra labeled such insufficient questioning of factual or
referential quality of chronicles and taking the primary sources at their face value as “the
absolute dominance of the documentary paradigm that stifles the historical
imagination.”50
Even when one assumes that the glorification of Mehmed IV was not rhetorical,
to what extent he deserved the eulogies attributed to him is questionable. The lengthy
records of the palace chronicler Silahdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa about the Sultan’s
condition in the fall of 1686, a year before his eventual dethronement, are telling in that
regard. Mehmed IV, also known as the Hunter, was obsessed by hunting. Even at times
of war, he is known to have marched with his chief lieutenants only as far as the closest
hunting grounds and let his viziers command the army.51 By September 1686, the
Sultan’s obsession had turned into utter disregard for state affairs. During the three years
following the defeat at the Battle of Kahlenberg on September 12, 1683, the Ottomans
lost many strategic frontier fortresses in Hungary and Buda was under siege. Polish
armies had laid siege to Kamaniçe (Kamieniec Podolski) and threatened Boğdan (the
Principality of Moldavia), while Venice made significant incursions into the
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Peloponnese. On September 20, 1686, during a hunting expedition the Sultan dispatched
a courier to scholar Hüseyin Efendi and invited him to lead the Friday prayer at the
mosque nearby the hunting grounds. According to Silahdar, Hüseyin Efendi gave the
following response to the courier:

Whoever wants to listen to a sermon comes to the mosque just as ordinary people
do. A religious functionary is not obliged to obey such an order, whereas the
Sultan himself is obliged to stop hunting, return to his throne, and engage in
prayer and worship. The country is in ruins and the servants of God need someone
to look after them. It is not permissible in Islam to obey a man who disregards
advice. The true words [told to the Sultan] go in one ear and out the other.52
When the words of Hüseyin Efendi were reported to him, the Sultan ordered
another religious functionary, Himmetzade Abdullah Efendi, to be brought to the mosque
to lead the prayer. Abdullah Efendi eventually led the prayer, but he allegedly gave an
even more vituperative sermon than Hüseyin Efendi as Mehmed IV was listening to him
in the congregation:

The Ummah (Islamic community) and state has no possessor. Many lands and
fortresses are lost to enemies; countless mosques have become the houses of
idols. Alter your deeds and repent. Henceforth, what we need is you to stay in
prostration and weep until grass springs up from the ground with your tears...For
long you are in a sleep of heedlessness. Though Sultans are known to go hunting,
it is not the time as everything has a season.”53
According to Silahdar, the Sultan walked out of the mosque in the midst of the
sermon and went again to hunting, ordering that no sermon should be preached at the
mosques where he prayed.54
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Frustrated at the Sultan’s imprudence and disregard for state affairs, the notables
among the Ulema, Janissaries, and judges have visited Şeyhülislam (the Grand Müfti) Ali
Efendi on September 21 to discuss the Sultan’s condition. Such a council among the
notables could easily lead to the dethronement of a Sultan; Mehmed IV should have been
aware of the danger. Feeling uneasy about the situation, he skipped hunting on Sunday
and participated in public prayer on Monday at the New Mosque. However, on Thursday
of that week, the news arrived and echoed around the that the Habsburg army had
captured the capital of the Ottoman province of Budin, the most important Ottoman city
in Central Europe and the Balkans since 1541. In the midst of capital-wide anxiety,
Mehmed IV ordered counsel to be held at his mansion on the hunting grounds and invited
the Şeyhülislam and the governor of the capital. However, Şeyhülislam Ali Efendi
ignored the invitation because the leading members of the Ulema did not have consent for
him to go to the Sultan’s hunting mansion. Mehmed IV responded to this act of
disobedience by expelling Ali Efendi to Bursa and appointing Ankaravî Mehmed Efendi,
the supreme judge of Rumelia, as the new Şeyhülislam. Silahdar continued that to
dissuade the Sultan from his obsession, the new Şeyhülislam gave up his predecessor’s
dissenting manner and tried to calm situation by using a conciliatory language when
speaking to the Sultan:

My Sultan, please withdraw from hunting for a few days and honor with
your presence the New Palace (Topkapı) or one of the mansions; let the
gossip quell, then return to your pleasures. Unless you stop hunting,
people will continue chitchatting [about the current situation]. The public
is especially downhearted because of the condition at the frontier;
otherwise, they seek for your protection against any unrest. [If you do not

36

deter from hunting now] it will be even harder later to repel [the
discontent] and [the people] will do whatever they want.”55
Everyone should have thought that the Sultan finally woke up from his “sleep of
heedlessness” when he responded to Ankaravî Mehmed Efendi that he will stop hunting
and relocate to the shipyards to inspect preparations, which he did on September 30.
However, as Silahdar noted in an astonishing passage, Mehmed IV, the “gazi warrior
Sultan”, could only endure being away from hunting for four weeks. On October 28,
when all high officials gathered for a holiday prayer at Ayasofya (Hagia Sophia), it was
reported to the statesmen that the Sultan was suffering from restless sleep at nights
because he was constantly dreaming of hunting. Finally, Mehmed IV was given
permission to go hunting again.56
It is not possible for the modern reader to know for sure whether the Sultan and
the statesmen pronounced word by word the statements recorded by Silahdar. Yet, one
can reasonably assume that the passages attributed to the Şeyhülislams are representative
of the feelings of many people in the capital. These passages communicate that Mehmed
IV ignored state affairs like one would never expect from an Ottoman Sultan. Mehmed
IV, whom Marc David Baer placed at the heart of a purported Ottoman “turn to piety”,
was indifferent toward unprecedented threats posed to his realms. Which portrayal is
more accurate? Can one expect such dramatic change in the attitudes of a Sultan, who
once supposedly inspired “conversion of space and individuals” and holy war against
non-Muslims; and then later in his life obsessively immersed in his pleasures and utterly
disregarded state affairs? Most probably, neither of these images is true. The exaltations
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addressed at Sultans by chroniclers were typical panegyrics found in any Ottoman
chronicle. The etiquette of the time required that, as the greatest authority, a Sultan
deserved respect and glorification of his subjects and the men of letters. Therefore,
presenting Sultans as spiritual leaders raises many questions.
While it would be wrong to present the Sultans’ lives as blind devotion to an
ideological cause, it is at least equally misleading and reductionist to approach early
modern Ottoman campaigns as religiously motivated undertakings in general. Baer
called, for instance, the Vienna campaign the “failed final jihad”.57 Such a description of
the Vienna campaign contradicted previous research which had shown inaccuracy of
presenting Ottoman wars and the depressing lives of Ottoman warriors as merely spiritual
adventures. In his authoritative discussion on troop motivation and the role of ideology
and religious inspiration in Ottoman warfare, Rhoads Murphey asserted that much of
what has been written on “the role of the Ottoman warrior’s faith and religious
commitment as a source of his dedication” is “heavily reliant on simplistic cultural
stereotypes and caricatured fixed assessments of the Ottoman psyche, without the least
reference to changing historical circumstances during the empire’s centuries-long
existence.”58 Murphey asserted that this misconception was a result of the assumption
that jihad was a widespread and infinite responsibility for all Muslims at all times. He
argued that jihad fully fulfilled its assumed role in the Ottoman Empire when the Muslim
community itself was at risk of invasion (which did not occur until after 1683).59
Murphey also noted that, from the sixteenth century on, the Ottoman expansion could not
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rely on jihad against a Christian foe as the Empire had to motivate both Muslim and nonMuslim subjects around a “co-operative ethos” that stretched beyond purely Islamic
ideals.60
Another significant aspect of Murphey’s observations was his comparison of
religious faith and religiosity. Murphey argued that the religious faith of the Ottoman
warrior was a personal matter operating within “the internal realms of conscience and
belief where it served as the indispensable source both of spiritual values and individual
piety.”61 Therefore, one can only speculate on the degree of religious motivation of a
soldier on the battlefield. Ottoman histories contain ample evidence showing that the
faith of the Ottoman warrior was most probably not such a primal driving factor and, at
times of war, Ottoman soldiers pursued material goals as did European mercenaries. To
substantiate his argument, Murphey had referred to chronicler Mevkufatî’s observations
dated 1692.
According to Mevkufatî, that year the Ottoman soldiers were deserting the
imperial camp at the Habsburg frontier on the grounds that the end of the campaign
season was nigh, but Mevkufatî argued that the main reason behind widespread troop
desertion was the lack of “delights” the Ottoman soldiers enjoyed before the walls of
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Vienna in 1683.62 For what happened in 1683 and what some of those “delights” were
one again turns to chronicler Silahdar.63

`

In a section where he examines the reasons of defeat at Vienna, Silahdar remarked
that once the army began its march on Habsburg territory in July, 1683 and soldiers found
abundant amounts of wine in the outskirts of Vienna, even non-drinkers among them
started heavily drinking and “committed unimaginable atrocities”.64 Silahdar noted that
the campaign season had coincided with the holy months in the Islamic calendar, that is,
Receb, Şaban, and Ramazan; but it did not restrain the troops from committing “adultery
[and] engaging in homosexual activities”.65 Silahdar added that the horses of the Tatars,
whom modern Turkish literature traditionally hold responsible for defeat at Vienna
because of their arguable treachery and failure to stop the advance of the European
coalition army, were so loaded with booty they had collected from Lower Austria that
they were totally unable to fight back against the enemy.66 The Ottoman army also
included tradesmen whose material concerns were obvious, but Silahdar argued that the
tradesmen were excessively obsessed with protecting their profit. Upon seeing the earliest
indications of military defeat on the morning of September 12, 1683, the tradesmen were
the first to desert the army. Their haste to escape and save their goods disheartened troops
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in the field. Silahdar wished that no such men whose goal was personal gains never again
join the army.67
Silahdar’s commentary could be exaggerations formulated to justify the defeat at
Vienna from an Islamic point of view, but another eyewitness of the siege of Vienna,
Esîrî Hasan bin Hüseyin, reported corresponding details of material concerns from the
very beginning.68 According to Esîrî, the fetvâ (the religious opinion) that permitted the
declaration of war on Austria was grounded on troops’ willingness to launch a new
campaign and, therefore, it was illegitimate as far as Sharia law was concerned.69 Esîrî
also noted that as the main army arrived Győr (Yanıkkale) and began its march in the
enemy territory, the Ottoman troops placed nameplates on the fields to declare possession
of them, assuming that victory was inevitable.70 Newly captured territories were never
divided among the Ottoman troops in such a manner and even if Vienna was captured,
troops would have no control of the allocation of lands.
A reasonable amount of suspicion about the accuracy of Silahdar and Esîrî’s
accounts is not out of question, but their narratives of the Vienna campaign in 1683 are
important. At the operational level, Ottoman wars and troops were not primarily guided
by spiritual concerns. Spiritual motivations attributed to Ottoman Sultans and soldiers
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alike were often manufactured by historians and do not necessarily represent historical
reality. Religion most probably did not motivate Ottoman Sultans more often and
intensely than it could motivate ordinary people. Perhaps a Sultan’s spiritual education in
his youth as an heir might have been conducive to occasional high-spiritedness during his
life, especially after his ascension to the throne. However, in all probability, those were
short-lived moments which soon succumbed to frailties of human nature. Sultans were far
from being superhumans who permanently and unconditionally served an abstract cause.
As with their subjects, they lived lives within the range of normal human condition.
Moreover, the privileges they enjoyed could often lead to excessive pleasure seeking and
negligence of the state. As with sultans, troops were humans first who had material
concerns for themselves and for their families. When all this is considered en bloc,
explaining an entire era in Ottoman history through the prism of immaterial motivations
ascribed to a Sultan or his troops is misleading.
Finally, Murphey’s remark on the use of religiosity by the state raises the
polemical issue of Islam as the ideology of the Ottoman state. Religiosity, according to
Murphey, served the state’s needs for “justification of its efforts to extend its territorial
base by means of expansionist foreign wars”, best observed in the struggle against the
Safavids during the reigns of Selim I (1512-1520) and Süleyman II (1520-1566).71 Now
one can turn to the issue of religiosity and examine it separately within the framework
Ottoman state’s relationship with Islam as an ideology.
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Islam in the Ottoman state and ideology
Placing intangible and immaterial religious motivations at the heart of seventeenth
century Ottoman decision-making mechanism denies, in essence, the power of the
Ottoman Empire’s ability to act rationally and strategically. Historiographically,
therefore, explaining the Ottoman seventeenth century primarily through the prism of
religion will reproduce assumptions of the decline paradigm. However, neither this
statement nor the above discussion of religious motivations of Sultans and troops denies
Islam’s essential place in the formation of the Ottoman state. From the beginning of the
Ottoman Empire, Islam was a central component of the state and the legitimacy of the
Ottoman dynasty was partially obtained through Islam.72 A seventeenth century
chronicler, Hüseyin Hezarfen, pointed to this quality of the Ottoman state when he stated,
“the state was founded on the religious affairs; in fact, religion is fundamental, while the
state was established as its subdivision.”73 However, despite its centrality, Islam fulfilled
a different role in the Ottoman case when compared to other Islamic states. As Ahmet
Yaşar Ocak emphasized, the “Ottoman Islam” was rather instrumental in forming and
maintaining the Ottoman state rather than being uniformly intrinsic.74
Ahmet Yaşar Ocak was one of the first Ottomanists to discuss Islam’s function in
the Ottoman state from a theoretical perspective. Ocak argued that ‘faith’ was the essence
of so-called “Ottoman official ideology.” Concentric circles of politics and Islam, or state
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and religion, coalesced into one unit in the Ottoman Empire unlike in other Islamic states
predating the Ottomans; it gave shape to the Ottoman official ideology.75 Ottoman
ideologues have legitimized the rule of the Ottoman dynasty by identifying sultans’
sovereignty with God’s authority on earth.76 The epithets of Ottoman sultans included
phrases of Zıllullah fi’l-âlem (shadow of God in universe) and el-müeyyed min indillâh
(empowered by God). Unlike in ancient Rome, however, sanctity was not attached to the
person of sultans, but to the power and authority sultans attained and represented after
accession to the throne.77 Ocak argued that compared to previous Islamic states, members
of the Ottoman Ulema did not have independent authority. The principal obligation of the
Ulema was to legally justify the acts of the Ottoman government, illustrating that Islam
was subdued by state and employed as a political instrument. In Karen Barkey’s words,
“religion was subordinated to the administrative needs of the state.”78 The most
remarkable instance of Islam’s utilization by the empire as a political tool was against the
Safavids. From the early years of the sixteenth century on, the Ottoman central
government stressed the Sunni interpretation of Islam in the face of increasing
Safavid/Shia propaganda in Eastern Anatolia. Ocak noted that, in this era, the struggle
against the Safavids led Ottoman officials to relentlessly seek “unbelievers, apostates,
and râfızîs” who were practicing Shia doctrines.79
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The relations between the Ottoman court and Islamic orders also may be
interpreted within the same context. In Ottoman society, the Ulema was representing
Islamic ideals in the court, while religious orders were fulfilling the same at the public
level. The Ottoman court always maintained good relations with religious orders; every
Ottoman Sultan was believed to be a member of an order since the early decades of the
Empire.80 If membership of each sultan to a religious order indicated presence of a
genuine spirituality in the Empire’s governing mentality, the court’s leniency toward
religious orders in general illustrated the pragmatism of that mentality. Ottomanist
Cornell Flesicher alluded to this rationalistic quality of the Ottoman administration when
he asserted that the Ottoman Empire’s rise to its peak of political and cultural greatness
was a product of “Ottoman heterogeneity”, “nurtured and institutionalized by the ruling
house”, and the state’s ability to judge nature and quality of various groups by careful
selection.81
The pragmatism of the Ottoman state is often encapsulated in the concept of
istimâlet, a policy of accommodation that practically affected the lives of Muslims and
non-Muslims in the Empire. In a frequently quoted passage, Halil İnalcık described how
this accommodationist leniency policy operated:

. . . In the early period of their expansion, the Ottomans pursued, primarily
in order to facilitate conquest, or to make the indigenous population
favorably disposed, a policy called istimâlet. It was intended to win over
the population, peasants and townspeople, as well as military and clerics,
by generous promises and concessions, sometimes going beyond the wellIbid., 96; Enver Benhan Şapolyo, Mezhepler ve Tarikatlar Tarihi [History of Sects and Orders] (İstanbul:
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known, tolerant stipulations of Islamic Law concerning non-Muslims who
had submitted without resistance [aman]. Within this policy of istimâlet,
the Ottomans, especially during the first transition period, maintained
intact the laws and customs, the status and privileges, that had existed in
the preconquest times, and what is more unusual, they incorporated the
existing military and clerical groups into their own administrative system
without discrimination, so that in many cases former pronoia holders and
seigneurs in the Balkans were left on their fiefs as Ottoman timarholders.82
A worthwhile application of the istimâlet policy was exhibited in the Ottoman
court’s ability to preserve a certain degree of closeness with the dissident religious
movement of Kadızadeli preachers in the seventeenth century. For a long time, historians
have assumed that, in the second half of the seventeenth century the Ottoman court came
under heavy influence of the Kadızadeli movement. The use of religion as an explanatory
tool in the recent literature partially relies on this contention. Rather, I argue that Sultans
and Grand Viziers alike skillfully exploited the Kadızadeli preachers’ influence on the
masses in the Ottoman capital rather than being influenced by them, pointing to the
rationalistic quality of the Ottoman state.

Kadızadelis
Kadızadelis (lit. Kadızade-lites) were a group of preachers named after Kadızade83
Mehmed Efendi (d. 1635). Kadızadeli movement never became a school of thought or
gained institutional character. The term “Kadizadelis” is used to refer to a certain
interpretation of Islamic matters by a group of Muslim orthodox scholars during the
reigns of Murad IV (1623-1640), Ibrahim (1640-1648), and Mehmed IV (1648-1687).
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During the seventeenth century, the Kadızadelis exerted influence on Istanbul’s
population in three subsequent waves, under charismatic leadership of three preachers:
Kadızade Mehmed himself, Üstüvani Mehmed from Damascus (d. 1661), and Mehmed b.
Bistam of Van (known as “Vani” Mehmed) (d. 1685).
The ideas promoted by the Kadızadelis had been expressed by many other
Muslim scholars before the seventeenth century, most recently in the Ottoman Empire by
Birgivi Mehmed Efendi (d. 1573). Birgivi was born in Balıkesir; he later moved to
Istanbul where he pursued a scholarly career before becoming a teacher in a small village
in Western Anatolia. Birgivi had rejected even the slightest innovation in religious
matters. He argued, for instance, that it was by no means permissible to teach Qur’an for
money or to receive payment for any act of worship. Birgivi also harshly criticized
establishment of monetary foundations or endowment of cash to these foundations. He
disagreed with Ebussuud Efendi, the influential Şeyhülislam of Süleyman the Lawgiver
(1520-1566) about this matter. Ebussuud had allegedly defended the existence of
monetary foundations, arguing that they produced public benefit through charity.84
Birgivi’s disapproval of such administrative and social practices did not make the impact
he would have desired in his own lifetime. Yet, from the early decades of the seventeenth
century on, his ideas grew to span among a wide group of orthodox preachers in the
capital. By the mid-seventeenth century, these orthodox preachers established close
relations with the courtiers.
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Kadızade Mehmed Efendi was the first among these preachers to establish such
close connections with the court. Kadızade Mehmed was a fellow townsman of Birgivi;
also he was also educated in that town by the learned disciples of Birgivi. Following the
ideals of Birgivi, Kadızade Mehmed also moved to Istanbul. Having decisively
established his career as a religious instructor in the capital, he was promoted in 1631—
most likely under auspices of Sultan Murad IV—as preacher to Hagia Sophia (Aya
Sofya), the imperial mosque. Kadızade Mehmed and his disciples argued that the Islamic
community had strayed from the path of the Prophet.85 Inspired most recently by Birgivi,
Kadızadeli preachers especially vindicated what they saw as innovation in religion
(bidʻa). They uncompromisingly attacked Sufis, whose interpretation of Islam focused on
emotions and inner-dimensions of spirituality. Kadızadelis’ hard-line dismissal of Sufi
mysticism was essentially a passionate reemergence of an interpretative discord in
Islamic history between “holy law-defined “orthodoxy” and the methods and claims of
Islamic mysticism.”86 Kadızadelis condemned singing, chanting, musical
accompaniment, dancing, whirling, and similar rhythmic movements, all practices often
attributed to Sufis. Allegedly, the ban on coffeehouses, taverns, tobacco and wine during
the reign of Murad IV was partially inspired by Kadızade Mehmed.87
Kadızadelis and the Ottoman court became even closer during Üstüvani Mehmed
Efendi’s residence in the capital. Üstüvani’s first appointment in the capital was to Hagia
Sophia, where the congregation included imperial courtiers and servants from among
helvacıs (confectioners of sultan), baltacıs (halberdiers), bostancıs (gardeners), and
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students and other members of Enderun (boarding school inside the palace). Through the
mediation of these circles, Üstüvani gained a reputation in the court and cultivated such
intimacy with the Sultan that ultimately he became Mehmed IV’s personal preacher in
the Privy Chamber (Has Oda), leading him to be mentioned among people as “padişah
şeyhi”, the sheikh of the sultan.88 In later years, he also preached at Sultan Ahmed and
Fatih Mosques. Once links to the highest echelons of the court were established, Üstüvani
and his followers began to seek official approval of their ideas by Şeyhülislam. At least
one Sufi lodge was shut down in the capital due to the efforts of Kadızadelis, encouraging
them to increase their pressure on the court—especially on the person of Şeyhülislam—
for a general ban of Sufi activities as well as all religious practices Kadızadelis looked
upon as innovation. After much effort to persuade the court, Üstüvani and Kadızadelis
managed to have the Sultan order a meeting among scholars to discuss the ideas of
Birgivi Mehmed, whose adherence to Islamic orthodoxy had informed the Kadızadeli
movement from the beginning. Although an imperial order eventually forbade criticism
of Birgivi and condemned Sufi denominations, the appointment of Köprülü Mehmed
Paşa (1656-1661) to the grand vizierate marked the end of Üstüvani’s halcyon days.
Historians often reiterate that Köprülü Mehmed Paşa was not necessarily a supporter of
the Sufis. Yet, Kadızadelis’ were displaying militant tendencies as they were involved in
the capital-wide unrest in 1656. An extremely precarious political conjuncture in Istanbul
forced the septuagenarian Grand Vizier to take firm precautions against the rebels in the
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capital and the Kadızadelis. As armed Kadızadeli supporters marched toward Fatih
mosque, Köprülü had Üstüvani and his leading abettors banished to Cyprus.89
The relationship between the Kadızadelis and the Ottoman court took a new turn
with Köprülü Mehmed Paşa’s death and the transfer of the sultan’s seal to Köprülü’s son,
Köprülüzade Fazıl Ahmed Paşa (1661-1676). In September 1659, Ahmed Paşa was
appointed the governor of Erzurum province. In Erzurum, he met Vani Mehmed who was
a resident scholar and preacher in the town as well as a keen follower of Kadızadeli ideas.
Ahmed Paşa, too, had spent the early years of his youth among men of letters—hence the
appellation Fazıl (virtuous)— and he soon became an admirer of Vani Mehmed. Upon
appointment as the grand vizier in November 1661, Fazıl Ahmed took Vani with him to
Istanbul. Soon, like his Kadızadeli predecessors, Vani Mehmed gained the confidence of
the sultan. As previous Kadızadeli preachers, Vani Mehmed targeted Sufis practices, their
hospices, and brethren. The bans of wine and tobacco were renewed and enlarged. Vani
even rejected long-standing Ottoman traditions such as communal prayers at times of
plague and campaigns against Christian powers, eventually winning the latter issue
against the Şeyhülislam of the time. Vani Mehmed’s close relations with Mehmed IV and
Fazıl Ahmed Paşa marked the height of the Kadızadelis which lasted until the notorious
defeat before the walls of Vienna in 1683. Before the Vienna campaign, Grand Vizier
Kara Mustafa Paşa had Vani Mehmed and a number of other preachers give sermons
about necessity and rightfulness of a campaign against Austria. Vani Mehmed personally
participated in the Vienna campaign as the military chaplain and roamed through
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Ottoman trenches during the siege to lift soldiers’ spirits.90 At the end of the disastrous
defeat on September 12, 1683, Vani faced the same denouement as Üstüvani Mehmed
with banishment from the capital. He died in Bursa in 1685.91

Kadızadelis: A middle ground between crisis-ridden masses and court?
The aggressive discourse of Kadızadeli preachers against Sufi practices was also leveled
at the court. Kadızadelis harshly criticized the extravagance of courtiers and lavish
assemblies among dignitaries. It should have been much easier for masses to identify
themselves with the ideas of the dissident Kadızadelis than commitment to dynastic
ideals. Then, how did Kadızadelis manage to receive protection directly from sultans and
grand viziers? I propose that rather than being a sign of the state’s capitulation to
irrational fanaticism, the positive relations between the Kadızadeli preachers and the
court indicated that an administrative acumen informed Ottoman decision-making
mechanism; the establishment of close relations between the two parties from the 1630s
on was not an historical coincidence.
The rise of the Kadızadelis took place within a specific context. Ottoman
historiography repeatedly reiterates that the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries
of the Empire was marked by social and political turmoil accompanied with institutional
reform.92 The protracted wars at the turn of the seventeenth century depleted the treasury
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and set the stage for social change and transformation. The inefficiency of the sipahi
cavalry in the wars against Safavids (1578-1590; 1603-1618) and the Habsburgs (15931606) forced the Ottoman state to form new corps and recruit levends (landless vagrant
peasants of Anatolia) as mercenaries equipped with firearms. When not in service, these
levends were mostly uncontrolled and soon began to terrorize the countryside. In
response, the central government deployed newly-recruited (and non-devşirme origined)
janissary corps in provinces for the protection of subjects against the levends. This
process had two major consequences: First, in major towns and cities across Anatolia, the
janissary population increased, which eventually led to urbanization or “civilization” of
the janissaries who neglected their military duties and participated in the local socioeconomic life. That process has more recently attracted interest of the Ottomanists and it
is yet to be fully comprehended. The second impact of this change was much more
significant within the court. Selected janissary officers were serving inside the palace as
sultan’s household troops and many of them held high offices.93 In 1622, the “janissary
junta”94 in the capital organized a coup which ended with the execution of Osman II.
Until 1656 the Janissaries remained as the most influential clique in courtly politics.95
At a time of such social, political, and economic instability perpetuated by the
lack of authoritative statesmen, possibly the “populism”96 of Kadızadelis and the
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influence they enjoyed on the population of Istanbul served as a middle ground between
masses and the court. Perhaps Murad IV took advantage of Kadızadelis for that purpose.
The first nine years of Murad IV’s reign97 was marked with the control of Murad’s
mother Kösem Sultan (1590-1651). Nonetheless, sipahi despots had become the actual
disposers of state affairs. The sipahis had privileges in tax collection across the empire,
although they had started to abuse those privileges by the first half of the seventeenth
century. Not only their population had swollen unnecessarily, but they took over duties
that did not belong to them, such as collecting tax from sultanic estates. In an effort to
suppress sipahi power, Murad issued a ferman (imperial decree) in the spring of 1632 and
annulled the privileges of the sipahis in tax affairs. Upon hearing of the decree, the
sipahis gathered in Hipodrome square by the Sultan Ahmed (Blue) Mosque. Murad IV
reacted by gathering an ayak dîvanı, an emergency session of the imperial council with
ability to talk to the sultan directly and attended by all high-ranking statesmen and
dignitaries as well as any plaintiff. The Sultan’s goal was to receive support of all
administrative and religious representatives. He openly criticized sipahi leaders who were
present at the meeting, and, at the end, he took written allegiance of the members of the
askerî (janissaries, statesmen and administrators), kapıkulları (sultan’s household troops),
and the Ulema. Murad IV placed himself again at the head of the decision-making
mechanism and restored the court’s authority.98 Kadızade Mehmed, too, was present in
the ayak dîvanı. Given that he had been appointed the preacher of Hagia Sophia a year
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earlier, clearly he was a popular figure in the capital. Murad IV, who wanted to secure
support from all segments of Ottoman subjects, protected Kadızade Mehmed and took
advantage of the latter’s charismatic influence.99 Apparently, the court dictated the
relationship with the Kadızadelis rather than Kadızadelis’ power.
There are many other reasons that justify questioning the actual scope of
Kadızadeli influence on the processes of decision-making within the court. Although the
seventeenth century Ottoman chroniclers argued that there existed a mutually beneficial
relationship between Kadızadeli preachers on the one hand and the sultan, statesmen, and
courtiers on the other, one does not know if the statesmen and sultans had internalized
Kadızadeli ideas. The facts that the Kadızadeli preachers inspired the closure of
coffeehouses or prohibition of tobacco do not directly suggest that the statesmen
incorporated the Kadızadeli ideas into all aspects of administrative affairs. Given that the
movement’s sphere of influence in the courtly processes of decision-making expanded
only when charismatic preachers represented them is significant in that regard. The
movement soon lost its ground. Although it is true that the Kadızadeli preachers
instigated social turmoil, whatever uproar they abetted was largely restricted to the
capital and there is no record of Kadızadeli originated social unrest or violence outside of
Istanbul. One can more realistically suspect widespread Kadızadeli influence on the
actual decision-making mechanism. Moreover, Kadızadeli preachers were neither
appointed as Şeyhülislams (Grand Müfti) nor served as Kadıs (judge). These positions
were usually occupied by the scholars who were trained in the capital and held
professorial positions, whereas Kadızadelis usually competed for preachership in
99
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mosques. Their provincial origins made Kadızadelis in essence ecnebîs
(outsiders/strangers), while the Sufi hospices in Istanbul which raised many Şeyhülislams
and Kadıs were founded decades ago and operated under protection of the Ottoman
dynasty.
Comparative studies will continue to enrich historical perception, but historians
should be careful about the pitfalls of “asymmetric comparisons”. To avoid arbitrary and
reductionist comparisons while building up a “positive narrative” of the Ottoman
seventeenth century, Ottomanists should turn back to Ottoman textual artifacts. This is
not to replicate the narrative in those sources which has actually once played a part in the
formation of the decline paradigm. It is needed to enter a dialogue about the Ottoman past
in the Ottomans’ own language and with their own vocabulary. Any direct application of
foreign conceptualizations to Ottoman history will create new paradigmatic debates in the
literature. More than any other historian, Baki Tezcan has come closer to producing a
new storyline that illuminates macrohistorically the relationship between various factions
in the capital during the seventeenth century. Yet the use of British historical terminology
added a teleological dimension to his account, which—intentionally or unintentionally—
suggests in the final stage that a “positive narrative” should be one that flows toward
Western modernity.
There are many historical and historiographical reasons to question such a
proposal, but they should be discussed in a separate context. Any narrative modeled upon
European/Western historical concepts will reproduce Eurocentrism, while that very
outcome was almost the sole reason behind Ottomanists’ efforts in the last three decades
to eradicate declinist assumptions from the scholarship. Questions of what that new
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terminology could be and which particular archival collection(s) should have priority
over the others in building that terminology are beyond the scope of the discussion in this
chapter.
The second half of the above essay is dedicated to the discussion of religion and
rationality, mainly in response to Marc David Baer’s contention that the second siege of
Vienna was the “failed final jihad”. The most interesting aspect of recent publications on
religion in the Ottoman Empire is the historians’ misleading presentation of Islam as the
absolute source of motivation and inspiration behind political and social developments
during the seventeenth century. Such an approach generates many problems. First, it
contradicts the findings and criticisms of earlier scholars, such as Rhoads Murphey and
others, who have indicated that Islam was subordinated to the state’s interest. Therefore,
it represents a regression from previous scholarly achievements. Second, it denies the
Ottoman state apparatus and Ottoman subjects the ability to think and act rationally. A
full comprehension of both politics and religion in the Ottoman seventeenth century can
be achieved primarily through the analysis of tangible processes, such as the strategic
objectives of the state or the personal ambitions and goals of historical actors under
examination. When one analyzes the state apparatus and statesmen, one is dealing with
an institutional entity and individuals who typically have certain objectives. Some of
those objectives are immaterial, but an accurate understanding of immaterial motives is
only possible through a contextualization within the historical setting that produced them.
The use of subjective concepts such as “renewal of faith”, “Sunnatization”, or “turn to
piety” as universal explanatory paradigms will cloud the historical truth. One needs many
more case studies before one can apply them to entire eras in Ottoman history.
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CHAPTER 2: GOOD OLD MONARCHY: SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
HABSBURG HISTORIOGRAPHY

Historians have often emphasized the paradoxical nature of early modern Austrian
Habsburgs’ purported place as a great European power.100 Throughout much of its
history, there has been a discrepancy between the achievements of the Habsburg
Monarchy101 and its limited resources. From the election of Rudolph I (1273-91) as the
Roman King to the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the end of World War
I, the lands ruled by the House of Habsburg stood at the center of European power
politics. As often reiterated, the Habsburgs owed this somewhat of a privileged position
observed and protected in many occasions by networks of European powers to their
unique condition as neither an overly powerful nor too weak of a political entity:
From beginning to end [the Habsburg] Monarchy’s fate was shaped by the
European practice of balance of power diplomacy, especially by the
assistance of neighboring states that perceived it to be sufficiently strong
to help resist more powerful enemies, yet weak enough not to pose a
serious threat to their own security.102
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Credited to this widespread perception in early modern Europe, the Habsburg
Monarchy survived for centuries recurring threats posed by powerful enemies and
political rivals, violent social upheavals, and severe financial difficulties. Meanwhile, the
ruling Habsburg dynasty also achieved re-election as emperors in the Holy Roman
Empire until 1806 except for a short period in the 1740s. The House of Habsburg was
able to cling to the imperial regalia for so long because of another dimension of the above
conviction that peace within the Holy Roman Empire, or Reichsfriede, so central to the
balance of power in early modern Europe, could only be protected by the Habsburgs or
any other royal house endowed with a similar special condition: hence the famous quote
“if the Habsburg Monarchy did not exist it would have to be created.”103 The assumed
special condition of the Habsburgs, however, did not always function to the benefit of the
Monarchy. In fact, the history of the Habsburg Monarchy is also a history of political,
social, and cultural crises.
A very critical episode in this history of fluctuations was the second half of the
seventeenth century. During much of the second half of the seventeenth century, Leopold
I (1658-1705) ruled the Habsburg Monarchy and the Holy Roman Empire. From the
earliest days of his election as the Emperor to the end of his life, Leopold I wrestled with
many political challenges and fought some of the most consequential wars in Habsburg
(and European) history. Mainly due to developments that occurred during his rule,
Habsburg historiography traditionally approaches the years between the Peace of
Westphalia (1648) and the Treaty of Carlowitz (1699) as a major era of transition from a
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politically confined and insecure position to a new one marked by strong centralized
government and cultural flourishing. Historians unanimously agree that it was during this
period that the Habsburgs elevated to great power status through military victories against
France and the Ottoman Empire especially between 1660s and 1710s. Also, the
Monarchy achieved ambitious imposition of Catholicism in their lands and the
construction boom of the baroque style in Vienna and elsewhere in the Monarchy after
1683. Such observations are based on specific developments in the Monarchy’s history.
Nonetheless, the contention that the Habsburg Monarchy significantly transformed during
the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century in essence replicates a persistent and
seldom challenged progressive assumption in European historiography that the given
period was the political and cultural seedbed of what is to come next, the Enlightenment
and the modern state.104 As I will show in the first part of the following section, many
Habsburg historians have applied this assumption with little modification to the history of
the Habsburg Monarchy.
The most noteworthy military victory the Habsburgs gained during this period
was arguably against the Ottoman Empire. A European coalition army under command of
Polish King Jan III Sobieski (1674-1696) crushed the Ottoman Grand Vizier Kara
Mustafa Paşa’s forces on September 12, 1683 in front of the walls of Vienna. The
disgraceful defeat of the Ottoman army at Vienna was only the beginning of the Holy
League-Ottoman War (Der Große Türkenkrieg) of 1683-1699 that opened the gates of all
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of Hungary and southeastern Europe to the Habsburgs. The war also marked the
beginning of the Ottoman retreat from Europe which lasted more than two centuries.
The significant victory in 1683 and territorial expansion achieved by 1699 have
become important landmarks in the Monarchy’s history and historiography, but the
Habsburgs had tried to avoid this protracted warfare at all costs. Ever since the signing of
the Treaty of Vasvár in 1664, most decision-makers at the Hofburg had seen France as a
more immediate concern than the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, while directing all of their
military attention in years preceding 1683 to the Empire’s western frontier due to the
Dutch War (1672-1679), the Hofburg instructed Austrian ambassadors in the Ottoman
capital to use all means possible and avert an Ottoman campaign into Central Europe.
The anxiety of the Hofburg was not unfounded. In the Ottoman capital, a rather balanced
political atmosphere created by two successive Köprülü grand viziers, Köprülü Mehmed
Paşa (1656-1661) and his son Köprülüzade Fazıl Ahmed Paşa (1661-1676), had begun to
change with Kara Mustafa Paşa’s (1676-1683) assumption of grand vizierate.
When Kara Mustafa Paşa took over the seal of sultan in November of 1676,
Johann Christoph von Kindsperg (1672-1678) was the resident Habsburg ambassador in
the Ottoman capital. During his critical stay in the capital of the Sublime State which
overlapped the first two years of the newly appointed grand vizier’s term of office,
Kindsperg held peace talks to extend the existing peace between the two states, but to no
avail. The ambassador, who left Constantinople in late 1678 due to his deteriorating
health condition, died before he could again see the Austrian capital. The Hofburg
dispatched five other ambassadors to Constantinople until 1683, including four
ambassadors and a plenipotentiary, but three of the ambassadors died before completing
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their missions (two even before arriving in the Ottoman capital). Peace was not renewed.
In the summer of 1683 the Ottoman army laid a siege to Vienna.
Historians have researched the second Ottoman siege of Vienna both militarily
and from the perspectives of international politics, but one has yet to illuminate day to
day details of how hyperactive Habsburg diplomacy operated in the Ottoman capital to
check Kara Mustafa Paşa’s expansionism. The fact that these diplomatic efforts preceded
a key battle that lies at the heart of the progressive narrative I alluded to above generates
further interest about the dynamics of Habsburg diplomacy in Constantinople and how
the Austrian ambassadors and Ottoman statesmen held talks during Kara Mustafa Paşa’s
grand vizierate. In the second half of the following section, I will discuss in light of
Ottoman and European primary sources the rise of the Köprülüs to grand vizierate and
the transition of power from the second Köprülü to Kara Mustafa Paşa. So far, no modern
scholar has contextualized Kara Mustafa Paşa’s assumption of office within the larger
framework of the Köprülü age as I render in this section.
Kara Mustafa Paşa went into the annals of history as a powerful and ambitious,
but also opinionated and somewhat impulsive figure. Nonetheless, had he assumed grand
vizierate at any other time in Ottoman history, Kara Mustafa Paşa most probably would
not have been the same ambitious character he was, because the defining features of his
grand vizierate were actually established by his predecessors. His ambitious and
opinionated personality most remarkably observed in his neglect for recurrent Habsburg
peace requests, his treatment of western envoys, and his eventual undertaking of the
Vienna campaign were all natural extensions of a government style regenerated by the
able hands of the two Köprülü viziers who preceded him.
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The first Köprülü to assume grand vizierate was Mehmed Paşa who was called by
contemporaries a sâhib’ül-seyf (lit. ‘master of sword’), a definition used in early modern
Ottoman chronicles when describing the ideal statesman who is expected to provide
effective leadership and restore authority. As I illustrate, Köprülü Mehmed Paşa’s iron
fist set in when the time was ripe politically and intellectually, yet he was not
unchallenged at his position. On the other hand, the leverage his son Ahmed Paşa
possessed in the decision-making mechanism was mostly unchallenged. In light of
contemporary sources, I show that Fazıl Ahmed Paşa had elevated the executive power a
grand vizier could retain to the highest level. Once the grand vizierate rose to such
prominence in the decision-making mechanism, the personality of the grand vizier
became the key determining factor in state affairs, because the restored authority of grand
vizierate would be conducive to positive outcomes only at the hands of a prudent
individual. As a result, personalities and characters made the difference especially
between Fazıl Ahmed Paşa and his successor, Kara Mustafa Paşa. The former was not
called virtuous without reason; the essentially unrivaled executive power he so cleverly
used produced disastrous consequences at the hands of the latter.
Such contextualization presents a new perspective for understanding the second
half of the seventeenth-century Ottoman history. Earlier, no modern scholar
contextualized Kara Mustafa Paşa’s career and analyzed his rise to grand vizierate within
the larger framework of the Köprülü era. Kara Mustafa Paşa assumed the defining
characteristics of his administration from his predecessors. In that sense, he was another
sâhib’ül-seyf, a powerful and unrivaled man of the sword. The Vienna campaign he
undertook, though overly ambitious, was in fact a product of the atmosphere generated by
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the two men of swords who preceded him. This brings us to the question of whether the
recently growing religion-based approaches to the Köprülü era that I have critically
discussed in the previous chapter offer a reliable explanation. The discussion in that
chapter debunked historical and theoretical shortcomings of assumptions woven into such
approaches. My analysis in this chapter shows that the government styles of the Köprülüs
and Kara Mustafa Paşa in essence were the eventual reaction of the Ottoman court to the
political and social conditions in the pre-1656 period. Therefore, although religious
motives may have played a part in the developments during the second half of the
seventeenth century, we can fully understand the pre-1683 Ottoman Empire only through
a detailed examination of how the administrative patterns of Köprülü era were formed
and how Kara Mustafa Paşa inherited the two Köprülüs’ governance style.
Having reframed the Köprülü restoration and the close relationship that developed
between Kara Mustafa Paşa and the Sultan during Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s term of office, I
then turn at the end this chapter to the curious case of Kara Mustafa Paşa’s grand
vizierate. Based largely on the so-far unexplored finer details of the Austrian diplomatic
reports regarding Kara Mustafa Paşa and the Ottoman court, I analyze the Ottoman
decision-making mechanism starting from the Grand Vizier’s assumption of office upon
the death of Köprülü Fazıl Ahmed Paşa in November 1676. During the first two years of
Kara Mustafa Paşa’s grand vizierate, Johann Christoph von Kindsperg held talks on
behalf of the Hofburg and dispatched detailed reports to Austria, while also receiving
instructions from Vienna on a regular basis. The most striking element in Kindsperg’s
reports was the changing portrayal of Kara Mustafa Paşa from a friendly personality to an
unfriendly one soon after his assumption of office. Also noteworthy are detailed
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descriptions of Kara Mustafa Paşa’s treatment of foreign representatives, in particular the
Polish envoy Jan Gninski. As well known by experts of this era, the most critical strategic
miscalculation of the Ottoman court before 1683 was its loss of Poland as an ally—or
even as a bystander—in case of an Habsburg-Ottoman conflict. Kindsperg’s reports
provide insightful perspectives regarding Kara Mustafa Paşa’s treatment of Jan Gninski.

The Habsburg Monarchy in the second half of the seventeenth century: a
historiographical inquiry
Mainstream Habsburg historiography assumes that the second half of the seventeenth
century and Leopold I’s rule formed the period of incubation for the Heldenzeitalter of
Austria, the so-called heroic age, more recently called the “Second Habsburg Empire.”105
I have already mentioned that the political, military, and cultural developments of the
time inspired such an idea. Indeed, the contention is so strong that a historian who wrote
an extensive critique of the literature on Leopold I began her book by stating that the
Emperor’s “personality and the political culture of his reign allowed, and in fact
demanded, that he be glorified.”106 I argue, however, that this paradigm is a result of
wishful thinking about the early modern Habsburg Monarchy. Based on an “outcomefocused”107 writing of history as much as inspired by the Monarchy’s ability to survive
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many crises in one way or another, the idea is also an extension of an omnipresent
hypothesis in general European historiography that places the second half of the
seventeenth century at the heart of purported European progress. In the following section,
I will discuss this phenomenon and show that the origins of this dominant paradigm in
modern Austrian historiography may be traced to the writings of Austrian historians since
the nineteenth century. In the twentieth century, both Austrian and Anglo-Saxon
historiography on the Habsburg Monarchy elaborated interpretative patterns originally
articulated by earlier scholars. Such an analysis is necessary within the framework of the
present study, because the progressive tone in the Austrian historiography becomes much
bolder for the post-1683 Habsburg history and, in turn, affects—directly and indirectly—
how one approaches contemporary Ottoman Empire in general and Kara Mustafa Paşa in
particular. The discussion in this section is by no means an exhaustive one, yet it is based
on a wide collection of well-known and influential studies representative of the dominant
trends in the field of Habsburg studies.
If one can determine a turning point for early modern Habsburg historiography in
the twentieth century one could point to the seminal monograph of R.J.W. Evans, The
Making of the Habsburg Monarchy.108 This book was a revisionist response to earlier
declinist narratives such as that of Oszkár Jászi, A.J.P. Taylor, Carlyle A. Macartney,
Victor-Lucien Tapié,109 and others who focused with gimlet eyes on the illnesses of the
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Habsburg Monarchy and the political miscalculations of Emperor Franz Joseph (18481916) in the nineteenth century. At a time when these declinist arguments prevailed in
Habsburg historiography, Evans returned to the structural roots of the Habsburg state in
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and reconstructed a positive narrative that
portrayed the Habsburg Monarchy as an administratively efficient and politically
successful enterprise. He articulated the idea that the central apparatus of the Habsburg
Monarchy rested upon an effective, functioning triad of dynasty, aristocracy, and church,
seeds of which had been planted before 1700. Accordingly, there existed an
administrative cooperation between the court, great magnate families across the
Monarchy, and a myriad of confessions serving the Catholic cause. Such cooperation was
efficient even in peripheral regions and generally produced the outcomes desired by the
dynasty vehemently supporting the Counter Reformation. In probably one of the most
cited statements of the Habsburg historiography in the last four decades, Evans described
this efficient system as “a complex, and subtly-balanced organism, not a ‘state’ but a
mildly centripetal agglutination of bewilderingly heterogeneous elements.”110 Since its
publication, R.J.W. Evans’s optimistic perspective about the Monarchy set the stage for
future conceptualizations about the Habsburg state.
The origins of Evans’s optimistic narrative, on the other hand, may be traced to
grand narratives published before the 1970s by leading Austrian historians. These
historians believed that the House of Habsburg was a major power in European politics
since the mid-sixteenth century, but also interpreted the Peace of Westphalia as a major
turning point in the Habsburg Monarchy’s rise to great power status. Indeed, optimistic
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appraisal of the history of German-speaking lands was not a new phenomenon. For
instance, there are remarkable parallels between, for instance, the seventeenth century
German political theorist Samuel von Pufendorf’s (1632-1694) description of the Holy
Roman Empire’s administrative system and R.J.W. Evan’s aforementioned optimism
about the Habsburg Monarchy. Pufendorf, the author of many influential treatises on the
Holy Roman Empire, had perceived the Reich as a structurally effective polity despite
acknowledging its problems, just as R. J. W. Evans presented the Habsburg Monarchy as
an effective political body while also conceding shortcomings of the monarchical system.
In many ways, the former seems to have set for the latter some form of an exegetical
precedent in a larger German framework.
In 1667, Samuel von Pufendorf published his Severini Monzambano Veronensis,
an analysis of the constitution of the Holy Roman Empire (Reichsverfassung) and
structure of the imperial system.111 Pufendorf’s book was not the first study on these
matters, yet it was the first to present a sharp criticism through a “brilliant and direct”
language and had the effect of a “catalyzer” for future debates on the structure of the
empire.112 Pufendorf’s treatise attempted to answer a simple question: “Was this
construction [Holy Roman Empire] only a state; and if so, how could it be classified
among the prevalent theories of state?”113 Apparently, the confederation-like structure of
the Holy Roman Empire posed a difficult problem even for a contemporary observer. In
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the original edition of the book Pufendorf had notoriously called the Reich a monstro
simile, or monstrosity. In a discussion that began immediately after the book’s
appearance, contemporary thinkers and later generations have fervently discussed what
Pufendorf might have meant by the term and how one could define and describe the
actual structure of the Holy Roman Empire. In his later explanations, Pufendorf himself
stated that he had not used the term to insult the Reich. His intention was to indicate the
fact that the administrative structure of the Empire was neither a democracy, nor an
aristocracy, nor a monarchy. It was an irregular body.114 Yet, upon severe criticism of
contemporary writers, in subsequent editions of Monzambano Pufendorf first modified
the phrase including the term and then eventually completely removed it from the book.
Important for the purposes of the discussion in this chapter is that Pufendorf had
not used the term monstro simile pejoratively, although the term indirectly suggested that
the Holy Roman Empire was an idiosyncratic entity that was constantly wrestling
problems emanating from its structural peculiarities. There were strict limitations on the
royal power due to “capitulations, laws, customs, and by the princes’ increasingly
vociferous assertion of their rights.”115 In other words, there were legitimate reasons to
think that the Reich, as an administrative body, was not a functional political entity. In
reality, however, Pufendorf was one of the first to declare institutional efficiency of the
Holy Roman Empire under Habsburg orchestration even though detecting deterioration in
the post-1648 Empire from a kingdom with clear-cut royal privileges into “an irregular
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system of fragmented sovereignty.”116 Recently, modern historians have noted that many
contemporaries and generations of historians had misunderstood Pufendorf whose goal
was only to stress irregularity of the Reich: Pufendorf had optimistically believed that the
Reich was capable of further progress and development.117
The similarity between Pufendorf’s allegorical yet positive approach to the Reich
in the 1660s and R.J.W. Evans’s optimism about the organizational efficiency of the
Habsburg Monarchy four hundred years later must be more than a coincidence. Just as
with Samuel von Pufendorf, R. J. W. Evans acknowledged the idiosyncrasies of the
Habsburg Monarchy and the near-inevitability of political conflicts and social disputes as
a result of the coexistence of irreconcilable elements and opposing forces which
necessitated permanent attention of Vienna. In the final stage, however, in a way
analogous to Pufendorf, Evans preferred to stress progress in the Habsburg Monarchy
and presented a considerably positive perspective.
Inspired by R.J.W. Evans’s approach, many Habsburg historians in the last three
decades have stressed the assumed harmony among the “mildly centripetal” forces of the
early modern Monarchy as a hard-won success. Historians did not totally ignore what
Evans called “bewilderingly heterogeneous [political, social, cultural] elements,” but they
underplayed the administrative challenges emanating from the strained togetherness of
those elements. Perhaps the ethnic wars and conflicts that followed the fall of empires in
the early twentieth century led to a nostalgic veneration of multiethnic empires. Nation-
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states have persistently failed throughout the twentieth century in eliminating problems
emanating from the frenzy of nationalism. Nevertheless, optimistic approaches to the
Habsburg Monarchy constitute a remarkable phenomenon that awaits interpretation. They
seem to be more a product of a teleological faith in the progress of the Monarchy than
only nostalgia. In these approaches, Emperor Leopold I’s rule represents a momentous
era of transition by the end of which the Monarchy elevated from a regional state to great
power status.
Seeking parallels between Samuel Pufendorf and R.J.W. Evans may look
arbitrary to some readers, but there are more direct and manifest parallels between the
latter’s positive interpretations and Austrian historians of more recent times, such as
Oswald Redlich. Redlich was the author of Weltmacht des Barock: Österreich in der Zeit
Kaiser Leopolds I, followed by a second book analyzing the first four decades of the
eighteenth-century, namely Das Werden einer Grossmacht: Österreich von 1700 bis
1740.118 Redlich’s study presented teleological discrepancies from the beginning. First, as
noted by R. J. W. Evans years later, there was a logical fallacy in the naming of Redlich’s
books which was most probably “unconscious,” because the ‘world-power’ of a given
century simply could not be the antecedent of the ‘great power’ of the next. 119 Moreover,
from the beginning to the end, Redlich’s narrative in the first book negated the title of
that book with recurring contradictions and arbitrary calibrations. Redlich stated early in
his book that the bulk of the Habsburg lands were a loosely connected part of the Reich.
Only after expansion into Hungary and Transylvania and repelling of the Turks at the end
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of the seventeenth century “emerged a really new, special Austrian Great Power.”
Acknowledging the important role of contingencies in the longevity of the Austrian state,
he had written that “without setting such a goal beforehand … the power and grace of
events and achievements” created the Austrian Great Power.120 However, Redlich
differentiated the House of Habsburg from the actual Austrian Monarchy. He argued that
long before the “Austrian Monarchy” became a Great Power after the conquest of
Hungary, the “House of Austria” was already a political Great Power since the time of
Charles V due to numerous crowns and lands the family possessed.121 Concerning the
Austrian Monarchy, by the mid-seventeenth century, one could not yet speak of “an
Austrian Gesamtstaat or even only implications of a Gesamtstaat idea.” The Monarchy’s
rise to Great Power status began after the Treaty of Carlowitz in 1699, which also marked
the “first developmental phase of Austrian centralized absolutism,” and Austria’s rise to
“European Great Power” status.122 At the end, such remarks disproved the titles of both
volumes. If Austria had become a European Great Power by 1699, one simply cannot
mention of a baroque world-power in the pre-1699 era. Yet, notwithstanding its
numerous contradictions, Redlich’s study presented an overly optimistic view of the
Habsburg Monarchy as a powerful political entity.
A similar optimism and a stronger progressivism prevailed in the grand narrative
of Hugo Hantsch who wrote a two-volume history of Austria. Perhaps feeling obliged to
locate Austria’s place in Europe at a time when memory of the Second World War was
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vivid and post-war ideological divides were still strong, Hantsch boldly stressed Austria’s
Europeanness:

The Peace of Westphalia is a European affair, and Austria does not stand
outside of Europe. It is a fateful incidence for the [Holy] Roman Empire
and Austria that the Erblande does not stand outside of Europe [and] it is
an elegant member of it. Furthermore, the princely family [of Habsburgs]
that rules over Austria carries the crown of Christianity, the crown of the
Reich, and bonds of blood and interest combine the two branches of
Austria ruling in Erblande and Spain. This House of Austria is therefore a
first rank European power factor, and it is impossible in historical
contemplation to dissolve or neglect a connection that history itself has
created.123
Hantsch wrote, echoing Redlich, that in the post-Westphalian Europe, it was
Leopold I of the House of Austria who carried as the emperor the “noblest tiara” of the
west. He added that despite intolerable tensions and crises during much of Leopold’s
rule, the foundations of the “Monarchia Austriaca” were laid, Erblande’s sovereign state
status developed significantly, and it achieved security while effectively halting the
aggressions of the French.124 In addition, Leopold I’s rule coincided with the birth of the
age of reason and rationalism as spiritual foundations of Europe were gradually
shattering. Hantsch had no doubt that Austria was also participating in this intellectual
process which opened for the country the door to a new world and access to hitherto
hidden sources of life, closing the gap between living streams of Western Europe and
Austria. In Hantsch’s perspective, the ability of fanatically pious Leopold to fully benefit
from the advice of scholars such as Johann Joachim Becher, Phillip von Hörnigk, and
Wilhelm von Schröder especially on economic issues illustrated that the Emperor was not
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narrow-minded. Not only the restoration of Catholicism was completed during his rule,
but he also had initiated the post-1683 building boom in the Monarchy.125
The similarities between Oswald Redlich and Hugo Hantsch’s perspectives are
not coincidental. Both Redlich and Hantsch were born in the nineteenth-century
Habsburg Monarchy. When they were writing their histories of the Monarchy they were
actually writing national histories of their home country. They both had witnessed how
the Habsburg Monarchy suffered at the hands of nationalists. Both were students of
certain teachers and lived in a certain political atmosphere. One of Redlich’s teachers was
an Austro-German historian, Julius von Ficker. A keen believer in the multi-ethnic
Habsburg Monarchy as the only viable solution to the spreading nationalist delirium in
Central Europe, Ficker held a positive approach to the Monarchy’s history. In his wellknown debate with Heinrich von Sybel,126 Ficker stressed more than anything “the
coexistence and harmony of universal and national duties as the very essence of the
medieval Reich.”127 A similar perspective was also prevalent in Redlich’s two-volume
history of the Habsburg Monarchy. When compared to Redlich, Hugo Hantsch was a
member of a future generation of historians. Yet he was also born in the late nineteenthcentury Monarchy and raised in Bohemia where national strife was intense.128 It must
have been difficult at the time for an Austro-German intellectual from Bohemia to

125

Ibid., 2:59–69.
Ficker was one of the parties in the Sybel-Ficker debate with German historian Heinrich von Sybel
about the nineteenth-century question of “großdeutsche-Lösung” vs. “kleindeutsche-Lösung” and he had
argued for a ‘Greater Germany.’ Also promoted by the Austrian Empire, this perspective favored multiethnicity as the natural, thus best structural successor of the old Reich for the good of Germans and other
peoples in Central Europe.
127
Alexander Novotny, “Oswald Redlichs Bedeutung Für Die Neuere Geschichte Österreichs,”
Mitteilungen Des Instituts Für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung 68 (1960): 549.
128
For the following brief part on Hugo Hantsch see: Robert A. Kann, “Hugo Hantsch, 1895-1972,”
Central European History 5, no. 3 (1972): 284–89.
126

73

cultivate a nuanced view of the Habsburg state and not defend it against ambitions of
numerous nationalities. This necessitated a progressive perspective on the Monarchy’s
history. Moreover, Hantsch was an ordained Catholic priest which most probably served
as another factor strengthening his identification with the Monarchy. Eventually, just as
with Redlich, Hantsch progressively praised the achievements of the Habsburg
Monarchy. One may suggest, therefore, that the works of Redlich and Hantsch
transmitted the propagandist and inherently nationalist tones of nineteenth century
historiography to the twentieth century.
Adam Wandruszka’s brief book on the Monarchy, published originally in German
in 1956, built upon a similar grandiose discourse. Echoing Redlich, Wandruszka
mentioned a purported “Habsburg world power” as early as the sixteenth century, but he
also venerated Leopold I as the ruler of high baroque. He stressed the relief of Vienna in
1683 as the great political and military turning point for the Monarchy.129 A comparable
optimism and progressivism guided Erich Zöllner’s macro-history of Austria published in
the 1960s.130 Zöllner unequivocally acknowledged the “desperate loosening of the
Reich’s unity” in the post-1648 period and the diminishing Habsburg influence in
Germany. However, those were not signs of weakening or decline; rather they signified
the “shifting of the heavyweight of Austria’s political, military, and financial
foundations” from Germany to its hereditary lands.131 One could even speak of the
“victory of [Habsburg] absolutism and Catholicism” after 1648 as Protestant resistance
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finally broke in the Monarchy. In addition, echoing Redlich and Hantsch, Zöllner argued
that between 1648 and 1740 Austria attained Great Power status.132 For Zöllner, Austria’s
emergence as a Great Power was not merely a geopolitical phenomenon; it was
economic, intellectual, and cultural too. Zöllner’s painstaking analysis discussed in detail
the mercantilist policies implemented in the second half of the century in handcrafts,
mines, forestry and many other manufacturing and production sectors as well as
population movements and settlement. Further passages on scholarly, scientific, and
architectural accomplishments of the time produced a portrayal the Monarchy in the
second half of the seventeenth century as a land of achievements.133 Zöllner’s history was
also progressive and optimistic. Yet it refined earlier approaches and assumptions in a
language accessible to general readership. The book could be interpreted as the most
complete single-volume modern history of the Monarchy published in German before the
1960s.
The optimism that Austrian historians have inherited from earlier generations
became the norm in the Habsburg studies by the 1960s, determining the general tone of
the Habsburg scholarship in and outside of Austria in subsequent years. Today, one can
read similar ideas in the writing of Austrian scholars of later generations.134 As implied in
R. J. W. Evans’s memorable circumlocution cited earlier and as seen in narratives of
Austrian historians, Habsburg historiography has generally acknowledged the
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idiosyncratic nature of the Monarchy emanating from political, social, and economic
conflicts of interest among different lands and groups of people. Although these conflicts
were rarely healed throughout the history of the Monarchy, optimism and progressivism
often overcame criticism, especially for the second half of the seventeenth century.
A noteworthy example showing that progressivism in Habsburg historiography
was becoming normal outside of Austria was French historian Victor Lucien Tapié’s
grand narrative. In his chapter concerning the period in question (1648-1683), Tapié
asked whether the period was a “dark age,” as referred in Czech historiography, or an era
of “baroque glory.”135 Tapié was a scholar of baroque and an expert of Bohemian
baroque. To him, the answer was obvious: the artistic manifestations of the time
illustrated the glory of the baroque age. Tapié presented the Bohemian baroque mostly as
a timeless phenomenon alleviating the burdens of tragedies, miseries, revolts, and
inequalities. Such evils “may have been more acute in [Danubian] countries,” he wrote,
“but, even so, they serve as the measure by which to judge the compensations provided in
the Baroque ideal.” Tapié agreed that 1683 was a turning-point for the Monarchy, yet he
put forth a different claim. The evolution of the Monarchy after that year was not visible
in economic and political developments or great military victories; it was reflected in
triumphal Danubian baroque art.136 Decades later, another French historian and a student
of Tapié, Jean Bérenger, repeated his adviser’s arguments and highlighted baroque’s
centrality in the achievements of the early modern Habsburg Monarchy. The victory at
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Kahlenberg highlighted “the end of the Turkish peril” and the beginning of “economic
prosperity and the rebuilding of the capital on new foundations.”137
Anglo-Saxon historiography concerning the early modern Habsburgs has also
followed suit and applied a progressive and optimistic approach. Robert Kann’s grand
narrative interpreted the period between the Peace of Westphalia (1648) and the end of
the War of the Austrian Succession (1748) as a period of “evolution and assertion” for
the Monarchy.138 The disorganized structure of Kann’s narrative prevented the book from
making an impact as R. J. W. Evans would enjoy a few years later. Assumptions woven
into his narrative were not unlike that of earlier histories: it was under Leopold I—
especially after the Turkish and French wars in the last three decades of the seventeenth
century—that the Habsburg lands integrated into a “moderately centralized empire.”139
Kann noted that the Austrian power in the Holy Roman Empire was questionable after
1648. However, he added, “one may [still] consider the history of the Habsburg lands
after 1648 as incipient evolution of the great-power status,” due to the Habsburg
dynasty’s policy of basing its every move “exclusively on the strength resulting from the
rule in hereditary lands and those of the eastern crowns … the basic premise for the
attainment of a great-power position.”140 Kann, too, stressed the role baroque art and
architecture played in the emergence of the so-called Habsburg great power. This
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Baroque style offered the Habsburg capital “the opportunity to display the splendor due
to the center of a rising great power.”141
At an international colloquium held at the University of Minnesota in 1991,
scholars from different backgrounds primarily saw hard-won accomplishments of the
early modern Monarchy, demonstrating that progressivism had become the norm in
Habsburg historiography by the 1990s. In fact, in the introduction written for the book
published after the colloquium, R. J. W. Evans toned down his earlier progressivism. He
acknowledged that only several decades after 1699 “things turned sour” for the Monarchy
because, by that time, the “soft absolutism” of the so-called great power was
“dangerously overextended.”142 Evans referred to the Habsburgs’ commitment to their
imperial mission as a “long bout of schizophrenia” and conceded that the “lack of any
consistent alternative ideology of dynastic rule” created uncertainties for the
Monarchy.143 The contrast between his earlier optimism and such ideas were significant,
but none of these deterred him from declaring “the year of deliverance from the
infidel”—1683—“the symbolic date for an underlying change of direction.”144 At the
same colloquium, issues that could have been associated with weaknesses in many other
historical contexts were regarded by historians as indications of Habsburg ingenuity. In
response to his fitting question about the “obvious disjuncture between [the Monarchy’s]
achievements in its heroic age and the equally obvious paucity of its monetary resources
to accomplish what it did,” John Spielman coined the concept of “the Habsburg economy
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of privilege.”145 Accordingly, the Monarchy “delegated to its servants the right to collect
honoraria” instead of paying them to assure loyalty of its servants. Spielman interpreted
this as a successful strategy despite a “progressive inflation over time” in honorific titles
and their eventual becoming of “parking stickers allowing the bearer a place amidst the
crowds in Hofburg antechambers.”146
The most significant contribution to the literature in the last three decades has
been Charles W. Ingrao’s history of the Monarchy covering the period between 1618 and
1815. Ingrao’s book achieved more than simply constructing another progressive
narrative. The interpretations were so convincingly articulated with a solid command of
details that the book became one of the fundamental reference works concerning the early
modern Habsburg Monarchy. Nonetheless, Ingrao’s major achievement was to apply the
outcome-focused triangular theory of court/noble/church cooperation to the eighteenth
century, a task unfinished by Evans himself. Ingrao recontextualized the developments in
the early modern Habsburg state within a Western European historical framework,
detaching the Monarchy from its quite peculiar central/eastern European context. While
doing this, as with many other scholars, Ingrao did not ignore the multitude of problems
that the early modern monarchy faced. In fact, his narrative included lengthy discussions
of the Monarchy’s structural shortcomings. Regardless, the narrative played down these
problems and their influence on Vienna’s policies and presented a progressive
perspective that stressed unity, cohesion, and—most importantly—success. The
Monarchy, according to Ingrao, was “neither weak, nor backward, nor in decline” even
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by the end of the eighteenth century.147 Leopold I’s rule symbolized a crucial phase in
Ingrao’s progressive narrative too. He argued that by 1699, “the monarchy was more
secure against outside threats than at any time in its history.” According to Ingrao, soon
after the signing of the Treaty of Carlowitz that year, territorial acquisitions in the
southern Netherlands and Italy set the stage for the foundation of the “second Habsburg
Empire.”
A most noticeable theme in the progressive narratives framed mainly around
Leopold I’s reign is the Emperor’s religious personality. As shown in the previous
chapter, religiosity of Ottoman sultans and statesmen in Ottoman historical context is
frequently interpreted as a hindrance to development and progress. As such, the idea is a
small fraction of widespread preconceptions in the literature regarding non-Western
religiosity, in particular in Islamic historical framework. In response to that assumption, I
have previously denied the Ottoman state’s capitulation to irrational religious fanaticism
in the seventeenth century, arguing that the Ottoman administrative acumen subdued
religion and religious groups and subtly pulled them under state service as mediators
between the court and subjects attracted to the ideas of such religious groups. In
Habsburg historiography, whether religious fanaticism has ever guided or even partially
influenced courtly decision-making mechanisms during Leopold I’s rule is not a major
problematic. Unlike in the case of the Ottoman history, historians do not see any
discrepancy between moments that necessitated rational strategies and political
fluctuations originating in Leopold I’s steadfast submission to divine guidance. For most
Habsburg historians Leopold I’s devout Catholicism compares to an innocuous and
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almost benign naiveté.148 The subtle portrayal of the Emperor by R.J.W. Evans represents
this prevailing view in the literature regarding Leopold I’s religiosity:
…devoutness going with a disarming gaiety; friendliness and immediacy
with conscientiousness and pride. Here is a man well-informed, intelligent,
and curious, but no freethinker; honest and correct, but pusillanimous and
irresolute; thoughtful, immensely hard-working … and heavily reliant on
advice which he treats, however, with some independence of spirit and
without sense of obligation.149
One reads similar assessments in John Spielman’s Leopold of Austria, where the
author interprets the Emperor’s pietism as a benevolent factor for the course of events:
…[Leopold’s] deep faith in Providence encouraged his ingrained
prudence, while the striking success of many of his undertakings
confirmed it. He saw the events that forced him to act not as the working
of blind chance, but rather as the unfolding of God’s design.150
Emperor Leopold’s devotedness to his faith was not a novelty for the Habsburg
court. A zealot Catholicism had pervaded into the Hofburg since the times of Ferdinand
II (1619-1637) whom Robert Bireley called “the founder of the monarchy” principally
due to Ferdinand’s achievements in the confessional domain.151 In intensely religious
setting of the court young Leopold’s tutor Jesuit father Phillip Christof Müller possibly
swayed the emperor on occasion despite his solely spiritual duties.152 Leopold was so
pious, had such strong faith in God, and the Catholic sentiments of his family were so
amplified in his personality that Oswald Redlich questioned whether Leopold actually
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needed a spiritual tutor.153 It was also during Leopold’s reign that the Capuchin order
rose to prominence in Austria. Before, during, and after the siege of Vienna in 1683,
Capuchin father Marco d’Aviano played a significant role in uplifting morale of the
Viennese.
Unlike in the case of the Ottoman Empire, no Habsburg scholar has questioned
whether Leopold I’s religiosity was problematic. As I have illustrated above the
“outcome-focused” progressivism concentrated on achievements and undermined issues
that can be interpreted in different ways. In fact, divine guidance did not help Leopold
reform the administrative structure at the monarchical center. Despite positive portrayals
by historians, Leopold I was unable to “overcome administrative inefficiency and
corruption.”154 The principal reason was the Emperor himself: during his reign, Leopold I
continuously appointed bureaucrats to the highest administrative posts, leading to an
inflation of statesmen at the court. Under Leopold I, the members of the highest
deliberative body Geheimrat, the Privy Council established by Ferdinand I, increased
from a dozen to sixty only to soon become ineffective. This resulted in the establishment
of Geheime Konferenz, or the Privy Conference designed to replace the Privy Council.
Yet it soon faced the same denouement when Leopold appointed too many of his
favorites to this new body.155 Nevertheless, in his detailed account of the evolution of
these decision-making bodies at the court under Leopold I, Stefan Sienell interpreted the
Emperor’s continuous appointment of statesmen to these bodies as a sign of his absolute
control over state, seemingly a positive trait. Such a judgment is consistent with
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prevailing progressivism in the field.156 Given the pervasiveness of the progressive
paradigm, it is not surprising that Paula Sutter Fichtner more recently attributed
“somewhat of a worldwide status” to Leopold I’s Austria.157
The discussion above has focused on the prevalent argument in Habsburg
historiography that the Peace of Westphalia, Leopold I’s rule, and the victory in 1683
were major landmarks in the history of the Monarchy. Occasionally, revisionist historians
have raised questions about assumptions woven into these common premises. Recently,
Lothar Höbelt denied two major themes attached to 1648’s acceptance as a turning point
in the Monarchy’s history. Höbelt wrote that the idea that “the Habsburgs lost in their
capacity as emperors, but won in their capacity as territorial rulers” by 1648 is an “old
cliché.”158 According to Höbelt, the notion that the Peace of Westphalia resulted in the
disempowerment of the Habsburgs is questionable. He argued that “the outlines of the
Westphalian settlement had been in place for quite some time” and “in terms of power
politics, 1648 was not a harbinger of things to come.”159 Höbelt also noted that “the
effect of Habsburg solidarity on the European ‘balance of powers’ was massively
overrated” as shown by the end of the Thirty Years’ War which was, in reality, “a futile
bid for hegemony by the Casa d’Austria that was bound to fail.” Such a remark is
especially noteworthy given that the Habsburg historiography in and outside of Austria
since the nineteenth century has expounded at great lengths the benefits of 1648 to the
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Monarchy. Lately, Thomas Winkelbauer also agreed that Austria’s “evolution” away
from the Holy Roman Empire had origins in the sixteenth century and it was not a
phenomenon of the post-1648 period.160
Another common paradigm mentioned previously is the Habsburg Monarchy’s
emergence as initially a territorial power during Leopold I’s rule and then a great
European power especially after 1683. Such an assumption is even more questionable
and raises further skepticism. It can be suggested that one of the inspirations behind that
contention is the notion of absolutism, an already problematic theme in early modern
European historiography. As shown above, Austria’s emergence as a great power after
1683 has been established many decades ago as a premise in Habsburg historiography.
Historians have employed numerous evidence to support this contention, such as major
military campaigns, imposition of confessional unity, expansion of financial resources,
administrative centralization, and many other institutional developments. Yet, regardless
of their intensity, these developments were not peculiar to the early modern Habsburgs;
their wider implications often laid beyond the capabilities of the Habsburg Monarchy.
Geographically, debates concerning absolutism relate directly to most of the
continental Europe and traditionally constitute a “progressive, modernizing force” in
mainstream European historiography for the entire continent during the century and a half
after the 1650s.161 Within such a framework, absolutism has served as a convenient
concept when explaining the formation of modern state. Indeed, for many historians,
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absolutism has constituted a “necessary stage” on the road to modernity.162 Scholarly
discussions about structural and institutional developments which lie at the heart of the
Habsburg Monarchy’s purported emergence as a European great power are essentially
informed by these assumptions in ‘absolutist’ literature. Therefore, the most
progressively written period in Habsburg historiography—the years between 1648 and
1780—almost completely overlaps with the time frame of debates about absolutism. As
such, specifics of the Habsburg historiography replicate the general European ‘master
narrative.’ Despite obvious and well-known barriers with which Vienna constantly
wrestled,163 even the most balanced writers see absolute capabilities in the late
seventeenth and early eighteenth century Monarchy. 164 Habsburg and European history
textbooks unanimously define the Habsburg Empress Maria Theresa (1740-1780) and her
son Joseph II (co-rule: 1765-1780; sole-rule: 1780-1790) as ‘enlightened absolutists,’
while their governments are seen as absolutist regimes.165 When one looks within this
larger framework at Leopold I’s rule and emphasis on military, political, economic, and
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cultural achievements during his reign, one is actually dealing with an era representing in
the minds of historians an incubation period for the emergence of the so-called Habsburg
absolutist regime of the eighteenth century.
Such a teleological and progressive perspective based upon selective, “outcomefocused” writing of history underlines independent achievements and sets the stage for
what happened later in time. To that end, many facts of the Habsburg history must be
understated. During the entire early modern era, Habsburg victories were gained by
continent-wide coalition armies formed after cumbersome diplomatic exchanges and
numerous concessions. Hyperactive Habsburg diplomacy frequently achieved significant
goals and saved the Monarchy, but there were times of total diplomatic failure such as in
the Ottoman capital before 1683, despite the ensuing military victory. By the end of
Leopold I’s rule, the Monarchy’s material resources remained scarce. Eugene of Savoy
had indicated a bitter reality when he declared that “if the survival depended on the
monarchy’s ability to raise 50,000 florins at once, it would nonetheless be impossible to
save it.”166
Additionally, the cooperation between the court and landholding nobility, crucial
for the stability of the Monarchy, considerably limited within the Monarchy
developments in line with western Europe. From the beginning, the Habsburg Monarchy
maintained its existence through bargaining with such elites in the periphery. 167
Negotiating and bargaining with the nobility and granting concessions to privileged
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groups were so crucial to the Monarchy’s longevity that historians have emphasized
Austria’s twofold need for consensus even when imagining the Monarchy as a mighty
military power.168 Another historian described the political and diplomatic processes of
the Monarchy as “consensual politics.”169 The same Monarchy persecuted nonconformist groups (primarily Protestants) and only offered patronage to a few.
Interestingly, historians attributed even such major drawbacks to the success of the ruling
house: the Habsburg Monarchy was the “victim of the ruling elite’s own success.”170 But,
was it not the same elites who intentionally restricted developments in line with other
western countries?
Historians’ frequent mention of details contradicting the established progressive
narrative demonstrates an interesting phenomenon. The prevailing progressive tone of
Habsburg literature has become so dominant over decades that, despite the abundance of
evidence which could be interpreted in diametrically differently ways in other historical
contexts, Austrian and Anglo-Saxon historians continue to unanimously describe the
Habsburg Monarchy as a great power. My goal in questioning established themes,
paradigms, and the progressive language in Habsburg historiography is not to label the
Monarchy and its historical geography as underdeveloped, thus constructing a negative or
declinist narrative. On the contrary, such inquiry about the validity and coherency of the
established perspective stems from a desire to fully comprehend and contextualize the
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actual historical condition of the Habsburg Monarchy in its idiosyncratic milieu. The
Habsburg historical geography contained considerable peculiarities throughout the
existence of the Monarchy which have been intentionally downplayed and often labeled
by historians as ignorable anomalies for the sake of a ‘positive narrative.’
In summary, the progressive approaches to the Habsburg Monarchy in the second
half of the seventeenth century had their origins in the nineteenth-century. During the
twentieth century, the prevailing progressive trend has hinged on optimistic
preconceptions of Austrian and Anglo-Saxon scholars about specific developments
during Leopold I’s reign, while scholars such as R.J.W. Evans and Charles Ingrao have
sealed that optimism with compelling narratives. I believe that the progressivism of
modern Habsburg historiography was partially a result of Austria’s recognition by its
early modern contemporaries as far too strong to assert its will when, in reality, Austria
was too weak to impose its version of settlements.171 Also, the predomination of
progressive narratives partially pertains to how early modern Habsburgs perceived
themselves. Victories against Kara Mustafa Paşa in 1683 and against the French in the
Spanish Netherlands the next year had inspired Philip Wilhelm von Hörnigk to proclaim
that “Oesterreich Uber alles wann es nur will.”172
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PART TWO: THE KÖPRÜLÜ RESTORATION AND KARA MUSTAFA PAŞA
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CHAPTER 3: KÖPRÜLÜ RESTORATION REFRAMED

The discussion in the previous chapter is important, because progressive narratives in one
field often exert a butterfly effect within the widest borders of historiography. The effect
is strongest in fields of study that are thematically and geographically closest to the topic
that are portrayed progressively. This is most clearly true for the prevailing perceptions
about the early modern Ottoman Empire. Parallels can be detected between outcomefocused, progressive interpretations of the early modern Habsburg Monarchy and
perceptions of the contemporary Ottoman Empire. The trajectories of the two empires
were so interconnected and their confrontations were reciprocally so formative in this
period that when we explain the longevity of the Habsburg Monarchy through stories of
achievement, it becomes easy to view the Ottomans in permanent decline. Especially
when a reference to the Ottoman Empire is necessary in a study written from the
Habsburg perspective, the narrative neither presents any awareness of extensive debates
among Ottomanists on the decline paradigm nor includes even a brief structural
comparative analysis between the two states. Instead, the so-called Ottoman decline
seems to typically function as a practical explanatory tool based on reductionist
assessments of military victories (or defeats) and territorial expansions (or losses).173
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As illustrated above, the military victory in 1683 has been traditionally regarded
as one such critical juncture in the balance of power between the Habsburgs and
Ottomans with direct and indirect impacts on how Ottoman history is researched and
recorded. For centuries, scholars have thoroughly examined the second Ottoman siege of
Vienna and produced a vast literature. Studies written by Austrian and Anglo-Saxon
historians of Europe and the Habsburg Monarchy have a triumphant approach to the
victory which fits into the broader framework of European historiography and the
progressive trend among Habsburg historians.
On the other hand, studies written from the Ottoman perspective on 1683 fall into
two categories: The first group of studies is written by western historians of the Ottoman
Empire. Even though none of these scholars has focused on Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa
Paşa and his career per se, the recently growing “renewal of faith” paradigm influenced
how they portray the age of Kara Mustafa Paşa. Accordingly, religion is considered the
key motive in all Ottoman political and social processes during the early modern era;
hence Mark David Baer’s description of the Vienna campaign as the “failed final jihad.”
The first chapter of this research has shown in detail that religion-based approaches and
explanations can be used only if political and strategic processes are fully understood.
The second group of studies is written by Turkish historians of the Ottoman
Empire whose writings are usually detached from paradigmatic discussions among
western historians and lack a balanced view of the siege and the Grand Vizier. The
notorious defeat in 1683 and the ensuing Treaty of Carlowitz in 1699 have been difficult
issues to deal with for Turkish historians. However, despite the severity of the defeat in
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1683, the campaign is usually glorified as an attempt to conquer a major European
capital.
Dichotomies created on the one hand between progressive Habsburg
historiography and declinist approaches to the Ottoman Empire and, on the other hand,
between western and Turkish versions of the Ottoman history and 1683 perpetually
imprisoned Kara Mustafa Paşa, the historical figure, into the purgatory of the past. Joseph
von Hammer-Purgstall, the famous Austrian historian of the Ottoman Empire, sealed as
early as the 1830s the descriptions of Kara Mustafa Paşa in western scholarship:
“…known to us as dirty racketeer in his treatment of the Catholics and Greeks in Chios
and Jerusalem, the barbarian born to human, money and skin-flayer,” wrote HammerPurgstall at the beginning of his chapter on Kara Mustafa Paşa.174 In a different passage
about why the Ottomans had lost at Vienna, he argued that it was because of the Grand
Vizier’s “arrogance and vanity as well as his weak talent as a commander.” HammerPurgstall added that due to his avarice, the Grand Vizier had not allowed storming and
plundering of the city by his soldiers because he did not want to share the treasures of
Vienna with anyone.175 His soul and character were the same colors, that is, schwarz.176
About a hundred years before Hammer’s history of the Ottoman Empire was
published, an Ottoman soldier named Esiri Hasan bin Hüseyin wrote an account of the
siege of Vienna before his death in the 1740s. Esiri had participated in the Vienna
campaign and, as his own appellation suggests, he had fallen prisoner to the Austrians. In
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general, just as Silahdar, Esiri was critical of Ottoman statesmen and troops for their
arrogance before and during the campaign. I will discuss Esiri’s ideas about why the
campaign was unsuccessful at the end of the present study. Yet, Esiri left for posterity a
noteworthy remark about Kara Mustafa Paşa: “…The disgrace [the Vienna campaign]
transmitted to the German lands with the sword of Islam will not leave [Germans’] hearts
until the Judgment Day and was a lesson for the entire Christian nation.”177

The

connotations of this remark to this day surpassed the critical appraisals of Kara Mustafa
Paşa and his term. Generations of Turkish historians have adopted about Kara Mustafa
Paşa a perspective that praised the Grand Vizier for his attempt to conquer a major
European capital.
Such defamatory and laudatory passages are abundant in both the European and
Ottoman primary and secondary literature, but do they actually convey the historical
truth? Kara Mustafa Paşa, in the end, was a statesman at a time when “the single and
most distinctive feature of Europe was that almost everywhere wealth and prestige were
based on the ownership of land.”178 The Grand Vizier’s ambitions, therefore, should not
astonish the historian or layman even when ambitions turn into blind commitments. The
purpose of the present study is to purge the Grand Vizier and his motivations in
undertaking the Vienna campaign from excessive vilifications and unreasonable
glorifications based on mono-dimensional reading of sources. Such a perspective
necessitates one to understand and contextualize how Kara Mustafa Paşa came to power
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as the third of three powerful grand viziers from the same family who continuously
occupied the grand vizier’s seat between 1656 and 1683.

“The reign of violence:” seventeenth century before the Köprülüs
Throughout the history of the Ottoman Empire, a total of 217 grand viziers served for a
total of 292 terms. Between the death of the Grand Vizier Sokollu Mehmed Paşa in 1579
and the appointment of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa to this post in 1656, 52 grand viziers had
served for a total of 68 terms, with each term averaging 13.5 months. The numbers are
quite telling: the competition was so intense among the political cliques within the court
during the seventy-seven years preceding Köprülü Mehmed Paşa’s assumption of office
that a quarter of the individuals (24 percent) who were entrusted with the sultan’s seal
throughout the history of the empire came to this position during that short period. Over
those three quarters of a century, there were grand viziers who served only for a day, such
as Ohrili Hüseyin Paşa (May, 1622), or only for several hours, such as Zurnazen Mustafa
Paşa (March, 1656). The latter, whose appointment was instantaneously annulled upon
the objections of rebellious sipahis, was one of the five different individuals who served
at this post during the first nine months of 1656. The sixth was Köprülü Mehmed Paşa
whose appointment in mid-September of that year finally brought to a halt the musical
chair game within the court accompanied by decades-long tumult in the capital and
across the Empire.
The perpetual chaos in the capital and provinces preceding Köprülü Mehmed
Paşa’s assumption of office represents one of the curiosities of the Ottoman history that
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historians continue to struggle to understand.179 During the first four decades of this
period, the Ottomans fought protracted battles with the Habsburgs (Der Lange
Türkenkrieg of 1593-1606) and the Safavids (1578-1590; 1603-1618; 1623-1639). The
empire faced great difficulties in mobilizing especially the sipahis for the Habsburg
war,180 while the renewed combats against the Safavids ended without major changes in
the status quo, despite frequent and reciprocal territorial gains and losses during the war.
The social and economic repercussions of incessant warfare in the west and east
were observable in the countryside, especially in Anatolia. Historians have shown that the
period was marked with inflation and falling tax-revenues and the court was facing
difficulties in payment of troops’ salaries. As early as the 1590s, the court had begun to
sell governorships to high-ranking members of the military class in return for advance
cash payment. Such developments led runaway troops and uprooted peasants to wander
in the countryside, encouraging an increasing number of troops to desert and peasants to
leave their homes. The phenomenon was observed through meticulous research on
population registers. According to the registers of the 1640s, an important proportion of
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largely single males were “either still in hiding to evade tax registration or active in
brigandage.”181 In one Anatolian district, 117 villages had disappeared between 1576 and
1643 from the registers, due to brigandage and other chronic socio-economic
problems.182 Provincial governors also took a role in the chaos. The runaway troops and
peasants soon began to join retinues of provincial governors who would use them in
private armies which then roamed and ransacked rural areas. The ensuing widespread
chaos in the Anatolian countryside was known as Celâlî rebellions or the ‘Great Flight.’
As a result, the first mention of a rebellious paşa in Ottoman history originates from
sources of this period. Such individuals were governors at different levels (including
beylerbeyis, or governor-generals) who were incapacitated by other rebellious groups in
their regions. Thus, one rebellious group bred the other, culminating in the so-called
“reign of violence.” Such was the situation in the provinces before Köprülü Mehmed
Paşa rose to power.
The condition in the provinces was only emblematic of much deeper and chronic
problems in the imperial capital by the late 1640s and 1650s. In contemporary chronicles
one reads that the sipahi and janissary commanders as well as guild leaders in the capital
had their own agendas and they all exerted pressure on courtly appointments, forcing the
resignation of many statesmen including grand viziers. Unstable social and political
circumstances in the capital and countryside also left the state vulnerable to foreign
attacks. Taking advantage of the chaos in the Empire, Cossack ships bombarded the
Black Sea town of Sinop. As part of the war between Venice and the Ottoman Empire for
control of Crete and the eastern Mediterranean, numerous Venetian ships blockaded the
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Ottomans’ access through the Dardanelles to the Agean Sea and cut supply lines of the
Ottoman forces.183 In 1655, the Ottomans had lost so many ships to the Venetians that the
contemporary chronicler Silahdar noted that the Ottoman fleet had never been so
miserable since the days of Selim II (1566-1574), the reigning Sultan when the Ottoman
fleet suffered a heavy defeat at the Battle of Lepanto.184 The same year, the Venetians
even captured Bozcaada (Tenedos) and Limni (Lemnos). The two islands, within hours’
reach of the Ottoman capital by sea, were also strategically located at where the Strait of
Dardanelles meets the Aegean Sea.185
The appointment of Tarhoncu186 Ahmed Paşa, an Albanian statesman, to the
grand vizierate earlier in June 1652 had raised hopes for restoration of authority but to no
avail.187 Tarhoncu’s efforts to balance the budget deeply disturbed the corrupted groups
in the capital who within nine months extorted an order from Sultan Mehmed IV, at
eleven years of age at the time, for execution of the Grand Vizier. Nevertheless,
Tarhoncu’s rise to the grand vizierate probably set a precedent for the appointment of his
fellow Albanian Köprülü Mehmed Paşa in 1656. Tarhoncu Ahmed Paşa had allegedly
stipulated certain conditions to Mehmed IV’s mother, Turhan Sultan, before his
appointment as the Grand Vizier. Also Turhan had agreed, for the first time in the history
of the Empire, to establish an office building outside of the palace for the Grand
Vizier.188 Such development meant “pushing the sultan further away from the center of
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administrative activity.” 189 Yet, it also illustrated the readiness of the mother Sultan and
her entourage to relinquish the authority to the able hands of a powerful grand vizier.
Another indication of the desperate conditions in the capital was appointment of
İbşir Mustafa Paşa to the grand vizierate in the fall of 1654. Described as a calm and
quiet personality by the chronicler Abdurrahman Abdi, İbşir Mustafa had risen to
prominence as a provincial governor. Before too long, however, that calm and quite man
assembled his own retinue formed of rebels and gained esteem from many other
rebellious groups in Anatolia. Furthermore, he eventually became the grand vizier and
wedded one of the aunts of Sultan Mehmed IV.190 Yet, İbşir Paşa’s retinue had entered
Istanbul with him, severely challenging the authority of the sipahis and janissaries in the
capital. Due to the pressure of these groups on the court, the Grand Vizier was deposed
again in May 1655.191 Between İbşir’s fall and the appointment of Köprülü Mehmed
Paşa to grand vizierate on September 14, 1656 six appointments were made to grand
vizierate without any effect on the prevailing disorder.

The restoration of power: Köprülü Mehmed Paşa
This administrative chaos finally came to an end with the rise of a new grand vizier.
Köprülü Mehmed Paşa’s assumption of the grand vizierate in 1656 was a watershed
followed by an era of relative stability. From that year on, success breed success, and
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eight individuals linked with the Köprülü family served in this position until 1710.192
Kara Mustafa Paşa had entered the Köprülü family at young ages and rose to prominence
in Ottoman politics mainly due to his membership to that household. Kara Mustafa Paşa’s
grand vizierate was preceded first by that of the founder of the family, Mehmed Paşa, and
then his elder son Ahmed. A true evaluation of Kara Mustafa Paşa’s career is possible
only through a detailed analysis of the Köprülü regime’s main characteristics.
Köprülü Mehmed Paşa himself was born in the Albanian village of Rudnik.193 He
was raised and educated in the Ottoman palace as a devşirme. Chronicler Silahdar noted
that probably due to his “egoistic and stubborn” personality he was sent to provinces for
service after his education.194 He married a woman from a small village called ‘Köprü’
(Vezirköprü today) in the Ottoman province of Amasya, hence the epithet ‘Köprülü.’195
What is written about his purported illiteracy in Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall and
Nicolae Iorga’s histories cannot be true given his education at the palace school
(Enderun) and long-time service in the capital and provinces, including a brief period as
the treasurer of Grand Vizier Hüsrev Paşa (1628-1631).196 He participated in Sultan
Murad IV’s renowned Baghdad campaign in 1638 and served under Grand Vizier
Kemankeş Kara Mustafa Paşa (1638-1644), also of Albanian-origin, as rikâb-ı hümâyun
kaymakamı (substitute for the grand vizier during the latter’s absence in the capital) and
mirâhur (chief supervisor of the sultan’s stables). In the late 1640s, during a campaign
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against a rebel group in central Anatolia, he was captured and fell prisoner, yet he was
later rescued by İbşir Paşa. Finally, in September 1656, Mehmed IV’s mother, Turhan
handed over the seal of sultan to Köprülü.
The story of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa’s appointment to grand vizierate is often
embellished with a purported negotiation between him and Turhan. Accordingly, the
septuagenarian Köprülü, who in late 1651 had been appointed as a vizier but immediately
lost the rank due to his late arrival in the capital,197 laid down certain conditions to accept
the seal of sultan. The meeting between Köprülü and mother sultan purportedly took
place at the latter’s private apartment inside the harem where Köprülü could enter only
disguised and under directions of the Kızlar Ağası (chief black eunuch, chief officer of
the harem). At the meeting on September 13, 1656 Köprülü and Turhan made a contract:
all reports Köprülü presented to the sultan had to be ratified without alterations; as the
Grand Vizier, he required full authority on allocation of ranks from the lowest to the
highest so that he could employ individuals most useful to the state. In addition,
complaints and claims against him by the elite who were wealthy or considered
respectable would not be paid any attention. Finally, rumors coined by those who disliked
him would not be tolerated; “everyone would want a share from the government yet it
would be impossible to please or convince all of them.”198
Two factors arouse skepticism about the historical accuracy of the contract: first,
the conversation is only mentioned in the chronicle of Mustafa Naima; second, another
contemporary source Silahdar stated that the original intention was to appoint Haseki
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Mehmed Paşa to the grand vizierate who was in Damascus at the time.199 Therefore, as
noted by Metin Kunt, the encounter between Turhan and Köprülü “should be interpreted
not as a unique event but rather as a part of a general seventeenth-century trend towards
restoring the traditional authority of the grand vizier.”200 Nevertheless, even if the verbal
contract assumed to have taken place between Turhan and Köprülü is not authentic, the
latter had clearly gained the trust of the ruling house. With the advantage of hindsight,
one is able to make comparisons between the above summarized conditions of the state
and the restoration of authority before Köprülü’s administration. As discussed below,
Köprülü swiftly and with much bloodshed restored central authority, with reverberations
on the authority enjoyed by subsequent grand viziers. Was Köprülü’s grand vizierate
merely a historical contingency, an “extraordinary success;” or “is it to be explained in
terms of personalities?”201
Indeed, one may attribute the success of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa to his ability to
merge certain characteristic qualities (such as his resoluteness and fortitude) with the
traditional role assigned to the post of grand vizier since the early Ottomans. In the
famous code of law issued by Mehmed II (1444-1446; 1451-1481) a grand vizier was
described as vekil-i mutlak, absolute deputy of the sultan.202 In other words, Ottoman
tradition assumed irrespective of whether a sultan’s authority was powerful or weak,
grand viziers would possess unique administrative privileges. Accordingly, a grand vizier
would have the sultan’s seal in their possession during their term in office and, as often
told in Ottoman chronicles, they would literally carry and hide this seal inside their
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garment. The possession of sultan’s seal had such great symbolic importance that when
Sultan Murad III (1574-1595) decreed in 1580 that grand viziers would no longer be
given the seal, the people and officials began to question the authenticity and authority of
the Grand Vizier’s orders, forcing Murad III to withdraw his decree.203
Observers such as Koçi Bey (d. 1650) and Katip Çelebi (d. 1657) suggested
similar interpretations in the first half of the seventeenth century when four of the six
sultans came to the throne at very young ages. Moreover, one of them suffered from a
mental disorder, while another one, Ibrahim, “was enough of an eccentric to be
nicknamed “mad” in Ottoman historiography.”204 Koçi Bey argued that “the sultan is the
heart of the world; when the heart is strong the body too will be strong ... and the grand
vizier, his deputy, should regain his paramount position.”205 Likewise, Katip Çelebi,
argued that only a sâhib’ül-seyf (master of sword) sultan or grand vizier could “pull the
empire out of difficulties.” Another anonymous contemporary observer noted that "no
one shall know the governmental affairs but the Grand Vizier, [who] are the padishah's
secretaries, treasurers, deputies, confidants and well-wishers; therefore, it is not
permissible that the padishah should have closer and dearer servants than they."206 In
other words, intellectuals in the early seventeenth century “favored a return to a powerful
grand vizier.”207 In this atmosphere, the grand vizierate of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa (later
that of his son Fazıl Ahmed Paşa and adopted son Kara Mustafa Paşa) marked the
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beginning of the high time of grand viziers who tested and experienced the broadest
executive limits of grand vizierate.
Having received full confidence from Turhan, Köprülü’s first major act was to
wipe out the defiant groups from the capital after a door to door hunt.208 In order to carry
out this large-scale, punitive, perilous attack on these groups well-established across the
capital, Köprülü needed an edict but issued by Sultan Mehmed IV. The opportunity came
on January 4, 1658 when these groups aimed to foment a capital-wide popular
disturbance. Out of fear, shops were closed and many were forced to join the rebels’
march through the streets. Köprülü swiftly reported the situation to the palace. The next
day, the Grand Vizier gathered at his office outside of the palace the statesmen and chief
officers and read the edict signed by the Sultan. The edict ordered the elimination of
rebel-minded members of the sipahis:
[Sipahis] have rendered excessive encroachments since the sultan’s
ascension to throne and completely disregarded the dignity of the court.
The annihilation of such bandits is a duty most important for the state, and
the responsibility of the issue has been entrusted to the grand vizier. Those
of you who have been deferential to the state for generations shall not
back the rebels but aid the Grand Vizier in their punishment.209
The restoration of the court’s authority began the same day. A retired sipahi
captain was executed hours after the meeting in the presence of the Sultan. That night,
city-wide patrols on both halves of the Bosphorus under personal command of Köprülü
resulted in the capturing and execution of many bandit leaders. Corrupted notables could
not escape the purge. Ineffective military commanders were punished, while corrupt
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religious leaders and preachers were exiled to Cyprus and other remote regions of the
Empire. Even the Greek Patriarch Parthenios III could not escape the rage of the Grand
Vizier and was hanged due to allegations of arranging plans against the Ottoman state in
cooperation with the Voivode of Wallachia.210
The court’s authority in the capital was restored due to Köprülü Mehmed Paşa’s
resoluteness, but the harshness that marked the Grand Vizier’s early days in the office
continued to guide his domestic and international policies until the end of his five-year
term. In 1658, he carried out a punitive campaign on Transylvanian Prince George II
Rákóczi, who was technically a Turkish vassal, yet had ambitions for the Polish throne
which also threatened the stability in the Ottoman controlled principalities of Wallachia
and Moldavia. It is likely that the total disorder within the Ottoman court preceding
Köprülü’s assumption of office encouraged George II Rákóczi to act without consultation
to Constantinople when he launched his campaign in Poland. Five months before
Köprülü’s assumption of office, George II Rákóczi’s envoy Jakab Harsányi had reported
from Constantinople that “these people have lost their heads, I have never seen
Constantinople in such a disorderly and confused state.”211 Apparently, Rákóczi had
assumed that Köprülü Mehmed Paşa would be only another grand vizier among the
fifteen who had received the seal of the sultan since 1647, the year Rákóczi also put on
the Transylvanian crown. The developments proved the Transylvanian Prince wrong in
his assumption. Soon after his assumption of office, Köprülü Mehmed Paşa instructed the
diet at Erdel Belgradı (Gyulafehérvár) in October 1657 to dismiss George II Rákóczi on
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the grounds that he had violated the conditions stipulated to Transylvania as a vassal of
the Ottoman court. However, George II Rákóczi was the richest landowner in
Transylvania and was practically the most powerful noble in his lands. The diet could not
or did not dare to overthrow him while Rákóczi himself refused to abdicate. In the
summer of 1658, Köprülü’s army supported by the Crimean Tatars as well as 12.000
Polish-Lithuanian troops conquered Yanova (Ineu; Ger: Jenö). In October 1658, Ákos
Barcsai was appointed the Transylvanian Prince and agreed to pay yearly tribute to the
Ottoman court.212
George II Rákóczi escaped the Ottomans as a large-scale uprising in Anatolia had
begun to test the strength of Köprülü and forced him to return from the frontier to the
capital. In mid-summer that year, rebel leaders gathered in Konya including many former
and incumbent governors who united under leadership of Abaza Hasan Paşa with their
retainers of more than 30.000 rebel troops. The rebel leaders not only ignored the orders
to fight under Köprülü’s command, but they also demanded the Grand Vizier’s dismissal
and the appointment of Tayyârzâde Vezîr Ahmed Paşa, whose father had earlier briefly
served as grand vizier.213 However, the course of events showed that both Köprülü
himself and the rank he represented had gained full thrust of the court. Mehmed IV
ignored such requests and banished the rebels’ envoys from his presence. Chronicler
Silahdar remarked that “the sultan had shown such firmness and resilience in protecting
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the Grand Vizier that no one could dare to speak negatively about Köprülü.”214 After
several skirmishes, Abaza Hasan Paşa and his retinue was finally captured in February of
1659. The heads of the rebels with their names written on foreheads arrived in the court
on March 10, 1659.215 To give a definitive end to the decades-long rebellions in Anatolia,
Köprülü then ordered a widespread military inspection and investigation in all of
Anatolia, resulting in the execution of thousands of people (including many judges and
scholars) and the collection of 80,000 muskets.
How did contemporaries interpret Köprülü Mehmed Paşa? Contemporary
chronicler Silahdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa, the author of one of the most important
chronicles for the second half of the seventeenth century, portrayed the Grand Vizier as
an extremely immoral and cruel personality to the contrary of conventional wisdom about
him:
[Köprülü Mehmed Paşa] was a wealthy, cruel, tyrannical, egoistic and stubborn,
ruthlessly and unfairly bloodthirsty septuagenarian, a bucktoothed old man.
Taking advantage of the Sultan’s youth, he unfairly murdered viziers, governorgenerals, and commanders as well as town dwellers and wealthy individuals in
Anatolia and Rumelia, expropriating altogether their goods and properties. [With
their money] he constructed landed properties and charities, built up and
flourished the lands of Islam. He paralyzed many dignitaries across the empire
and among the military and revoked ranks and lines of service, incapacitating the
remaining [officials]. To this day, the Sublime State has been breaking down and
is weakened, because he eliminated prudent statesman able to face the enemy and
caused the state to be defeated by infidels at every occasion.216
As much as the chronicle of Silahdar Mehmed Ağa is of primary importance for
the period, it is also the only contemporary source presenting such a derogatory image of
Köprülü Mehmed Paşa. Other contemporary Ottoman chroniclers, historians of later
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generations, and foreign ambassadors recorded various impressions about the Grand
Vizier and positive remarks eventually prevailed. Chroniclers Raşid Mehmed Efendi and
Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Paşa interpreted Köprülü’s term as a most auspicious turning
point in the Empire’s history and praised him for eradicating the aggressions of rampant
groups with his “Aristotle-like” style.217 Almost two centuries later, Joseph von HammerPurgstall argued that Köprülü was such an artful leader that no one ever revealed
“whether his kindness was true or fake,” and indeed he had implemented machiavellist
policies supposedly without hearing about Machiavelli.218
Foreign ambassadors, too, left remarks about Köprülü and his resoluteness to
restore authority and ameliorate the Empire. What one reads in foreign accounts about
Köprülü is a combination of a shrewd and grim personality tinged occasionally with rage
and wittiness. A week after Köprülü’s appointment on September 23, 1656 the Austrian
ambassador Simon Reniger von Reningen (1649-1666) met the Grand Vizier to notify the
Ottoman court of the goodwill of the Habsburg Emperor. According to Reniger’s report,
upon the ambassador’s salutation, the Grand Vizier complained about an incursion made
by 2000 raiders from across the Habsburg border to the Ottoman controlled Budin (Ofen).
He asserted that “one may think that the Ottoman Empire is in ruins or not as strong as
before, but it is only a matter of tiniest reason or opportunity to arm another army …
[against the Habsburg Monarchy].”219 A brief remark in the same report sent to Vienna
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stated about Köprülü that “it is said that he is a person with good inclinations.”220
Köprülü later indeed carried out a western campaign that brought Varad (Oradea) in
Transylvania under direct Ottoman control. Almost ten years later when Simon Reniger
presented his Haupt Relation dated April 27, 1666 to Emperor Leopold I, the ambassador
referred to by then deceased Köprülü only briefly as the grand vizier who “induced fire
along the border.”221
A year after Köprülü’s assumption to office, the Swedish ambassador Nicholas
Rolamb visited the Ottoman capital. At the time, the Swedish King Charles X Gustav was
fighting in the Second Northern War (1655-1660) against a northern European coalition
to realize his ambitions in Poland. Common interests brought Charles X the alliance of
the Transylvanian Prince George II Rákóczi, but an alliance with a prince whose fortunes
were closely tied to Ottoman interests in Central Europe made sense only if the Ottoman
court was gained as an ally. Rolamb’s romantic mission aiming a Swedish-Ottoman
alliance was diplomatically a total failure. As a result of his disappointment and
displeasure, his report of the mission, A Relation of a Journey to Constantinople,
included many derogatory passages and fabrications about the Ottoman state, society, and
statesmen. Nevertheless, Köprülü Mehmed Paşa was still able to impress the Swede: “this
present vizir Coprili Mehemet passa [is] possessed with true zeal for his sovereign’s
reputation, and the interest of the Turkish empire.” In fact, Rolamb had elaborated the
Austrian ambassador Simon Reniger’s brief note about Köprülü’s good inclination:
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…his credit with the emperor grew to such a height, that he now respects
him as a father and indeed he is a man of good natural parts in their own
way, and of great experience by reason of his age; but his behavior is
rough and tyrannical, which is what creates him the esteem of the Turks.
The readiness of his wit makes him govern well, and his cruelty awes
those who might otherwise plot against his life. … To sum up, by rigorous
and cruel proceedings he has compassed his ends so far, that the Turkish
army … [is] now so far broke of rebellious humour … for they were
become sensible that either they must conquer the enemy, or choose
inevitably to perish by the hands of the vizir…222
Thus, contemporary Ottoman and European sources illustrate that Köprülü
Mehmed Paşa’s firmness and purposefulness helped the Ottoman court restore authority
in the capital and provinces. Köprülü, who at the earliest years of his career had served in
the kitchens of the Ottoman palace, at the end of his life satisfactorily fulfilled the role of
an expected sâhib’ül-seyf (master of sword) as described by seventeenth century Ottoman
observers.223 In reality, Köprülü was not a particularly illustrious individual. The courtier
who had been sent to Köprülü to notify the latter about his appointment later narrated that
upon first seeing the old man he had asked himself “What in the world does such a
person have to do with grand vizierate?”224 In that old man’s grand vizierate, “there was
nothing unorthodox or novel,” but his rise marked “the culmination of a trend of his
times.”225 Köprülü’s iron fist was clenched when the state needed it and his methods of
administration became a model for subsequent grand viziers.
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When the political and social circumstances before his grand vizierate are compared with
Köprülü Mehmed Paşa’s grand vizierate, his term of office was indeed a great success
especially in the domestic realm. He rehabilitated the central government, ameliorated
income and expense balances, and fairly readjusted salary payments inside the court, a
long-time contested issue among corrupt courtiers.226 Before his death in Adrianople in
October 1661, the Ottomans had both expelled Venetians from Crete except Candia and
captured the Transylvanian city of Varad (Oradea) in 1660. At that time, Varad was
already a European center of historical, cultural, and economic significance. Unlike what
most sources assume, the direct Ottoman control in Varad and establishment of a new
Ottoman province there should have been a greater threat to Europe than the capture of
Nové Zámky by the next Köprülü vizier.

From restoration to the reign of grand viziers: Köprülüzade Fazıl Ahmed Paşa
“The Sultan shall select and appoint from among the viziers a clever and wise grand
vizier who is apprehensive of world affairs and serviceable in plenty of tasks; [he shall]
give him freedom, let no one interfere in his duties, and give permission to his every
word. … [A grand vizier] is the absolute deputy and highest ranked vizier. In the Sublime
State no other rank supersedes that rank except the rank of sultanate.”227 Such was
written by scholar Hezarfen Hüseyin Efendi228 about the role of the grand vizier in
İlgürel, “Köprülü Mehmed Paşa,” 259.
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1669/70 (hijri 1080). As I have shown earlier, similar ideas about the role and rank of
grand viziers had been expressed by contemporary observers when there was chronic
administrative crisis in the Empire. In that sense, Hezarfen’s ideas were not new. In fact,
they echoed another well-known source, Asafname, written by Lutfi Paşa who had served
as grand vizier (1539-1541) during Süleyman the Lawgiver’s reign (1520-1566).229 The
restatement of such ideas under Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s grand vizierate, however, was not
mere redundancy.
Building upon the legacy of his father, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa further expanded the
scope of the authority and independence granted by the Ottoman dynasty to the
incumbent grand vizier concerning domestic affairs and international relations issues.
Examples include Ottoman sources about the meetings before the announcement of war
against Austria in 1662 and the war council held by the Grand Vizier before the 1663
campaign. Reports of the peace talks between the Austrian ambassador, Simon Reniger,
and Fazıl Ahmed Paşa in the winter of 1664/65 complement the narratives in the Ottoman
sources. In addition, the insistence of the Grand Vizier in continuing the siege of Candia
in 1668 despite challenging financial impediments is quite enlightening. Finally, the
rhetorical language Fazıl Ahmed Paşa used in the letters he exchanged with the PolishLithuanian court before embarking on his last campaign is worth noting. I will discuss
each of these matters based on Ottoman and European primary sources to show that, by
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the end of Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s term of office, the possessor of the seal of sultan had
virtually become the unrivaled executive authority of the Empire.
Fazıl Ahmed Paşa was born in 1635-36 (hijri 1045) in Köprü.230 He moved to the
Ottoman capital with his father at the age of seven where he began his education among
the ilmiyye, the men of letters. However, his youth coincided with severe scholarly
disagreements (probably fomented by Kadızadeli preachers) upon which his father,
Köprülü Mehmed Paşa, undisturbed by “things he had heard” from scholars, banned his
son from a career among the men of letters.231 Ahmed Paşa then began a new career in
mülkiye, the administrative class. His career among the ilmiyye stayed with him
throughout his life as his epithet Fazıl (virtuous) was given to him due to his scholarly
background.232 Fazıl Ahmed Paşa first served as the governor of Erzurum and Şam
(Damascus). Two months before his father died, he was appointed as the asitane-i saadet
kaymakamı (governor of the capital). On November 1 1661, he became the second person
to inherit the post of the grand vizier in the Ottoman Empire.233
Fazıl Ahmed Paşa was entrusted with the position, principally due to his father’s
success as the grand vizier. Köprülü Mehmed Paşa clearly had increased the dignity of
the court and the dynasty, both within the empire and international arena. As chronicler
Raşidi noted, “if someone unfamiliar with state affairs had been appointed, it was clear
that a state of disorder and disorganization would prevail again. Therefore, for the
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preservation and continuation of the order established [by Köprülü Mehmed Paşa], the
Sultan appointed his son.”234
The first campaign of Fazıl Ahmed Paşa aimed to restore Ottoman authority in
Hungary and Transylvania. The course of events eventually led to a major showdown at
St. Gotthard between the armies of the Grand Vizier and Habsburg general Raimond
Montecuccoli (later also Hofkriegsratpräsident). The political reasons behind the
campaign and the consequences of the battle of St. Gotthard have been well researched
by many scholars.235 Therefore, I will not discuss here the political background in detail.
Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s major strategic goal in Transylvania was to bring to a definitive end
the ongoing double-dealing of Transylvanian princes between Vienna and
Constantinople, while also testing the waters for independence. Nonetheless, in the early
1660s, it was not only the fluctuations of Transylvanian princes that eventually brought
the main Ottoman army into Hungary; Emperor Leopold I also oscillated frequently
between antagonistic and peaceful policies from 1659 to 1662. Before the Ottoman
campaign was eventually launched by the late summer of 1662, the Habsburg court had
supported the election of the pro-Habsburg János Kemény (the counselor of George II
Rákóczi) as the Prince of Transylvania; then it signed a secret treaty with Köprülü
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Mehmed Paşa. Upon Köprülü’s death, it took new initiatives ignoring the treaty and
captured fortresses along the frontier. Then envoys were sent to the Ottoman Empire to
avoid war.236 Contemporary Ottoman sources, therefore, unanimously accused the
Habsburg Emperor for his “machinations” in Hungary and Transylvania and justified the
campaign as a revenge and punishment initiative.237
In the summer of 1662, the Ottoman army was at Adrianople with the intention of
launching a land campaign on the Venetians through Bosnia and Albania to expel the
Venetians from the islands and coastal areas they had captured from the Ottomans. The
news coming from Transylvania, however, redirected Ottoman attention to Hungary. At
the meeting held before the announcement of the Austrian campaign, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa
gathered all viziers, commanders, regiment ağas, and other dignitaries within the army.
First, the edict of the Sultan about the circumstances in Hungary was read aloud; then the
Grand Vizier addressed those who were present: “Pay attention paşas and ağas!
Austria[ns] are a strong enemy of the Ottoman state. … [They are] known to receive
support from all of the Christian nations. It is true that Venice is a peerless deceitful
wrestler at sea wars; yet they have no courage for front battle on land as they are like
fishes out of water when they leave their fortresses…What would be your say if we
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postpone the Venetian campaign and do not leave behind a strong enemy by itself?” It is
difficult to determine whether the Grand Vizier expressed these words verbatim, but all
those who were present at the meeting abided by his idea. The Austrian campaign began
in the autumn of 1662 upon the Sultan’s edict, but it was Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s initiative.
As the Ottoman army approached the frontier, Austrian peace overtures
intensified. Peace talks between the Grand Vizier and Austrian representatives as well as
the letters exchanged between the two parties were recorded by Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s
private secretary, Mühürdar Hasan Ağa.238 Mühürdar’s chronicle illustrated that Fazıl
Ahmed Paşa was the sole decision-maker throughout the entire process. Apparently, by
time the army reached Belgrade, the Grand Vizier already had the intention of a military
confrontation with the Austrians. When he met Austrian envoys who inquired about the
possibility of renewing peace between the two states, he requested the return of Győr to
the Ottoman Empire and evacuation of fortresses occupied by Austria. Envoys rejected
both demands. At the last meeting, the Austrian envoy handed a letter to Fazıl Ahmed
Paşa written by Hofkriegsrat Präsident Lobkowicz, which the latter had signed as Duke
of Sagan.239 The letter repeatedly mentioned friendliness and neighborliness, yet it did
not promise anything Fazıl Ahmed Paşa expected. After this last meeting, the Grand
Vizier refused to hold any further negotiations and ordered all Austrian representatives to
be sent to Buda with guards and imprisoned.240
The eventual decision to lay siege to Nové Zámky was the Grand Vizier’s idea.
Mühürdar Hasan Ağa noted in his history that from the moment the army’s march began
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in the Balkans, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa ordered soldiers, commanders, and captives to be
brought to him and conversed with them about Austrian fortresses. At the war council, he
presented three alternative targets: Komárom, Győr, and Nové Zámky. Viziers and other
commanders again left the decision to the Grand Vizier who judged Nové Zámky the
most reasonable objective for strategic as well as climactic and geographical reasons.
The Ottomans conquered Nové Zámky after a month long siege in the late
summer of 1663 followed by the capturing of several smaller fortresses in the area. In
mid-winter, Lobkowicz and Fazıl Ahmed Paşa exchanged mutually hostile letters
blaming each other for the conflict. The letters made it clear that both decision-makers
were ready for a major military confrontation.241 Skirmishes and reciprocal sieges laid to
enemy fortresses continued until August 1, 1664 when a European coalition army
commanded by Raimond Montecuccoli ambushed the Grand Vizier’s army as the latter
was crossing the River Raab at Szentgotthárd. Many Ottoman generals and soldiers lost
their lives. Yet, the Austrians, who had left the battlefield with less damage and
causalities, did not pursue the retreating Ottoman army, mainly due to military
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commitments against France at the time.242 Ten days after the battle, Simon Reniger and
Fazıl Ahmed Paşa had exchanged final drafts of the Peace of Vasvár at the headquarters
of the Ottoman army.
During the peace talks held with the Austrian ambassador, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa was
the only negotiator on behalf of the Ottoman Empire which illustrated the extent of
authority and independence he retained as the grand vizier. Conditions of the peace were
agreed upon between Fazıl Ahmed Paşa and Simon Reniger on August 10, 1664 at a
confidential meeting at the Ottoman headquarters by Marzelli. The Grand Vizier, who did
not want anybody except his kahya (chief steward) to witness the occasion, exchanged
the articles inside his sleeping room and requested from Reniger “alles in gehaimb zu
halten.” The articles still needed to be ratified by the Sultan and Emperor.243
According to the next report of Reniger, sent from Neuhäusel on September 25,
the moment Fazıl Ahmed Paşa disclosed the Peace of Vasvár the rest of the Ottoman
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headquarters turned into a fine spectacle.244 Before the ratified copy of the treaty arrived
from Vienna and finally was declared to the entire Ottoman camp, only the Grand
Vizier’s kahya and few others had heard about the terms agreed upon at the secret
meeting on August 10. Everybody gathered at the tent of the Grand Vizier to witness the
occasion. Simon Reniger was welcomed by the Grand Vizier with considerable
friendliness. Only six sergeants—rather than many more as usual—accompanied the
ambassador during the meeting, a friendly gesture which also attracted the attention of
the readers of Reniger’s report at the Hofburg. Reniger notified Vienna that the Grand
Vizier treated him with “absonderlicher Freundlichkeit” and customarily presented him
and two persons in his entourage with caftans. Upon a question by the ambassador
regarding the arrival of the ratified version of the treaty from the Sultan, Fazıl Ahmed
Paşa stated that although he was the humblest servant of the Sultan, he had full power
and sufficient knowledge from him that the moment Leopold I officially approves the
determined articles of peace, it would likewise take effect on the Ottomans’ end.245 Thus,
in the third year of his grand vizierate, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa had captured an enemy
stronghold, barely escaped calamity on the battlefield, and managed to turn the situation
into an enviable success by taking advantage of the Habsburgs’ reluctance to launch a
new war in the east. This was certainly an individual achievement; yet it also amplified
the executive authority of the Sultan’s absolute deputy.
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Next, the Grand Vizier focused on Candia, the Mediterranean stronghold of the
Republic of Venice. The eventual surrender of Candia after twenty-five years of siege
was fruit of the Grand Vizier’s determination during the last two years of the siege
despite great challenges. Rumors of a campaign on Crete had begun to circulate after
peace was signed with Austria, upon which the Republic of Venice began to seek
diplomatic channels to hold on to Candia. In fact, when the campaign on Venice was
announced, there existed an oppositionary group in the capital in favor of peace with the
Republic.246 Also, opinions varied regarding how the operation should be carried out.247
At the same time, such campaigns were realized through great financial difficulties.
Ottoman sources were silent about social problems created by protracted campaigns
during Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s time. Yet, as reflected in the report of an English council, it
was quite possible that extra taxes levied on subjects to finance especially the final years
of the Venetian campaign forced people to abandon their homes even in close proximity
to the imperial capital.248
Venice, too, was inclined to sign a treaty, but on its own terms. According to the
Grand Vizier’s secretary, Mühürdar, at first the Republic offered to divide Crete into two
halves controlled by the Ottomans and Venetians. The Ottoman court took this offer
seriously. The old population and income registries of the island were controlled to
calculate the financial circumstances that would occur after such a divide.249 Yet, the

The oppositionary group included the Şeyhülislam (Chief Müfti). Abdurrahman Abdi Paşa,
Abdurrahman Abdi Paşa Vekâyiʻnâmesi, 332.
247
Kenneth M. Setton, Venice, Austria, and the Turks in the Seventeenth Century (Philadelphia: American
Philosophical Society, 1991), 208.
248
Ibid., 219.
249
Mühürdar Hasan Ağa, Cevâhirü’t-Tevârih, 307. This also suggested that the recent campaigns against
Austria and Hungary had probably put considerable pressure on the treasury.
246

119

offer was rejected. In the following months, Ottoman attacks increasingly intensified
along with diplomatic initiatives of the Republic to hold on to Candia.250 There was
considerable security on the island against surprise enemy attacks, yet the challenge came
from elsewhere. One can read in the reports sent by Fazıl Ahmed Paşa to the court that,
by the late 1667, the Ottomans were already struggling with logistical problems as they
quickly ran out of weaponry, while also suffering hard winter conditions unusual for
Crete. Casualties were many. The situation obliged the Grand Vizier to stay on the island
with the army during the winter.251 By early summer 1668, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa dispatched
a report to the Sultan notifying the court about harsh conditions suffered until then, yet
emphasizing the clear intention to continue until the city fell or surrendered.252
On November 1, 1668, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa recieved a hatt-ı humayûn (imperial
edict) from Mehmed IV. At the time, the Sultan was in Yenişehir (Larissa) where he had
moved to get closer to Crete upon news coming from the frontier about the critical
circumstances. In the letter, the Sultan notified the Grand Vizier of the Venetian envoy
Alvise da Molin253 who was on his way to the Sultan’s headquarters for peace talks.
Mehmed IV directly asked Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s opinion about how he should proceed:
Praise be to God, we have arrived in Yenişehir. Venetian envoy is also
close by, but he has not yet come to my presence. My lala,254 what is your
say? What answer shall we give to the envoy? If you really believe that the
city will fall [soon], we can ask for the surrender of the city; but if the
siege continues for another year, my ‘well-protected lands’ are unable to
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provide troops, arsenal, weaponry, and other various needs. Immediately
confer with [your dignitaries] and respond as soon as possible.255
Mehmed IV’s addressing of the Grand Vizier as “benim lalam,” or “my lala” and
his direct order asking for Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s opinion suggest that the Sultan respected
the opinion of the Grand Vizier more than what conventional wisdom assumed about
sultans’ independence concerning decision-making. Although Fazıl Ahmed Paşa
expressed his opinions through the customary rhetoric of sultanic glorification (used in all
reports and petitions presented to sultans), one may comfortably suggest that without the
directives of Fazıl Ahmed Paşa, Mehmed IV would hesitate about how to proceed in such
a critical situation. In his response, the Grand Vizier emphasized that the city’s fall was
close and, as a precaution, he also sent letters to various leading dignitaries at the court
and asked for their support and prayers.
Meanwhile, Alvise de Molin was offering expensive gifts to the courtiers at the
headquarters who would agree to abandon Candia to the Republic. Continuation of war
was becoming particularly intolerable for the Sultan, who would be the first target of
subjects since extra taxes were depleting their already scarce assets. Mehmed IV sent
another letter and asked the Grand Vizier one more time if the fall of the city was
realistically possible. In his response, the Grand Vizier emphasized that “one foot was
inside of the fortress.”256
In the late March 1669, the Grand Vizier, who until then had rejected any offer by
the Alvise de Molin and expected the surrender of Candia, sent a last message to the
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envoy. It stated that the Ottoman Empire would accept the demolition of Candia and let
Venice build another fortress somewhere else on the island. Alvise de Molin was not
authorized by the Venetian Senate for the surrender of the city so he rejected the offer
and was imprisoned in Chania. The siege continued. Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s determination
paid off on September 27, 1669 when the city surrendered. He entered the city a week
later on October 4.
The capturing of Candia was not significant in terms of strategic or financial
benefits for the Ottoman Empire. After the siege, piracy continued in the Mediterranean,
while the loss of population led to diminishing agricultural productivity and tax income
for the Ottoman treasury.257 Yet, the Grand Vizier had resolutely continued the siege and
achieved his objective despite considerably harsh geographical and climactic conditions,
extreme financial difficulties in maintaining the siege which threatened the Sultan’s
position, and the increasing insistence of courtiers and dignitaries who favored signing a
peace agreement with the Republic. After the surrender of the city, the Grand Vizier
retained some of the most fertile lands around Candia for himself. His holdings were
positioned next to that of the dynasty and were referred to on the land registers with
exactly the same wording as that of the Sultan, establishing “a sort of parity between the
Sultan and his grand vizier.”258 Thus, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s achievements elevated the post
of grand vizierate to an effectively peerless level in Ottoman bureaucracy by defeating
the “peerless deceitful wrestler of seas,” while making the Köprülü line an unrivaled new
powerhouse in the Empire.
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During the following years, the Grand Vizier returned his attention to Europe for
his last campaign. This time the objective was Poland. For the purposes of discussion in
this section, one does not need to examine the finer details of the Ottoman campaign on
Poland that began in the spring of 1672.259 However, as a last point, the rhetorical
language that Fazıl Ahmed Paşa used in the letters he exchanged with the Polish Sejm,
before launching the Polish campaign in 1672, is crucial to discussion of the Grand
Vizier’s de facto power.
Poland and Muscovy, in early 1667, had signed the Peace of Andrusovo. Upon
being informed about the treaty, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa had warned the Polish ambassador in
Istanbul not to take initiatives against the Ottoman interest in cooperation with Muscovy.
The ambassador was notified that the Ottoman Empire would not protect Poland, if the
latter and Muscovy “mutually help each other,” and “sword does not intervene” between
them.260 Yet peace remained in effect with influences on the Ottoman interests in Podolia
and the Ukraine. Severely alienated by Poland and Muscovy and exposed to the
aggressions of both, Petro Dorošenko, the Hetman of Zaporozhian Cossacks (16651672), turned to the Ottoman Empire and asked for protection. In July 1667, his
representatives had notified the Ottoman court that the Cossacks were ready to serve the
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Sultan with their 50,000 men and asked for protection and regalia, to which the Ottomans
concurred.261 However, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth continued its attacks on
the Cossacks and appointed a new Hetman, Myxajlo Xanenko. To the surprise of the
Poles, the Crimean Tatars supported the appointment of Xanenko against Dorošenko.
Developments led to the replacement of the Crimean Khan by the Ottoman court and
dispatch of a nasihatname (letter of advise) to the Polish court, but to no avail.262 Fazıl
Ahmed Paşa, now virtually the executive head of the Empire, could not condone such an
act of hostility. In the winter of 1671-1672, the Ottoman Empire declared war on
Poland.263
On May 14, 1672, the Ottoman courier who had earlier taken the Sultan’s letter to
the Polish court returned with a response. The letter emphasized that Ukraine was an
inherited land of the Polish crown and did not belong to the Cossacks who were brigands.
People living in Ukraine were Polish subjects just as Petro Dorošenko himself, who was a
“bandit peasant” and lacked authority to seize an inherited land from Poland, let alone
hand it over to another nation. The letter also notified the Ottoman court that a Polish
envoy was on his way to Constantinople to solve the problem. For the Ottoman court and
Fazıl Ahmed Paşa, such defiance of their authority was unacceptable. Although the letter
sent by the Sejm was signed by King Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki (1669-1673), the
Ottoman response addressed to the deputy of the King was written by the Grand Vizier:
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…You wrote that Ukraine is your inherited estate and that its inhabitants
your subjects. In reality, the owner of all sovereignty is the Lord of all
universes. However, God’s sapient custom is such that when he wishes
safety and fearlessness for the people of a land whose disorderliness and
unrest is perennial, he brings them under the shadow of an Alexander-like
ruler’s sword that repels fear…264
That “Alexander-like” ruler was undoubtedly the Sultan. Yet as his absolute
deputy and the possessor of his seal, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa himself was the actual bearer of
that “sword that repels fear.” The letter asserted that the day the Ottoman court gave
Petro Dorošenko regalia, the Zaporozhian Cossacks and their lands had become Ottoman
protectorates. The Grand Vizier added that as of June 5, 1672, the Ottoman army was on
its march from Adrianople to the frontier and concluded the letter with an imperious
statement that was effectively an ultimatum: “Respond to our letter as soon as possible
for you know that as we get closer to the frontier, each post requires a different verdict
and response.”265 In the summer of 1672, the Ottoman Empire besieged Kamaniçe
(Kamieniec Podolski). The city soon fell, forcing Poland to sign a peace agreement. The
ensuing Treaty of Buczacz was agreed upon in October 1672, making Poland effectively
an Ottoman vassal. When the Sejm refused to approve the treaty, however, the conflict
between the Ottoman Empire and the Commonwealth was renewed and lasted until
October 1676. That same month, the Grand Vizier Fazıl Ahmed Paşa, bedridden for
months due to his sickness, died after fifteen years as grand vizier.
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Contemporary observer Paul Rycaut, who had spent a long time in the Ottoman
Empire with various assignments from the English crown, left detailed remarks about
Fazıl Ahmed Paşa. Rycaut, who wrote that he had often seen the Grand Vizier and knew
him well, generously praised and even glorified Fazıl Ahmed Paşa. He praised the second
Köprülü’s ability to deal with his father’s enemies and the mother sultan, as well as to
“conserve himself in the unalterable esteem of his Sovereign to the last hour of his
death.” He called him a “prudent and politick person” and wrote that he was gentle and
moderate “beyond the example of former times.” He was “generous and free from
Avarice” and was “greatly addicted to all the Formalities” of Law due to his education in
that field. His justice was practiced punctually and severely. Rycaut believed that the
Grand Vizier had accomplished many achievements in a short time (“15 years and 8
days”) and, therefore, when measured by his triumphs, he “might seem to have lived but
little to his Prince and People.” However, Rycaut added, the Grand Vizier “could not dye
more seasonable, nor in a greater height and eminency of glory.”266
If the grand vizierate of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa had marked the restoration of the
court’s authority in the capital and across the Empire by a sâhib’ül-seyf statesman, Fazıl
Ahmed Paşa’s term marked the accumulation of full administrative and executive power
at the hands of another representative of such a sâhib’ül-seyf archetype. Köprülü
Mehmed Paşa had faced challenges to his authority from different directions. Yet, as I
have illustrated above, it was during his son Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s term in office that the
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possessor of the seal of sultan practically possessed unrivaled power in state affairs, if
only in theory second to that of the sultan. Therefore, in the ninth year of Fazıl Ahmed
Paşa’s grand vizierate, Hezarfen Hüseyin Efendi’s reiteration of the privileges given by a
sultans to his “absolute deputy” was more than rhetorical utterance; it reflected a reality
of the time as practiced by the incumbent grand vizier. Such increased leverage of grand
vizierate in Ottoman decision-making mechanism vis-à-vis the sultan would have
remarkable impact on the next grand vizierate.
Another significant influence of Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s grand vizierate on his
successor was his physical absence from the capital and the Sultan’s court during nine of
the thirteen years he held the sultan’s seal. When Fazıl Ahmed Paşa was away from the
court, Kara Mustafa Paşa, whom the former addressed as “my brother” in the
administrative letters they exchanged, would function as the rikâb-ı hümayun kaymakamı
(deputy for the grand vizier) and accompany Mehmed IV everywhere. Kara Mustafa Paşa
also substituted Fazıl Ahmed Paşa at dîvan (imperial council) meetings during the latter’s
illness. When Fazıl Ahmed Paşa eventually died, Kara Mustafa Paşa and Mehmed IV
were no different from two close friends with consequences extending to the decision of
the Vienna campaign. Therefore, one has to begin a thorough examination of Kara
Mustafa Paşa’ career from the days he served under Fazıl Ahmed Paşa.

Kara Mustafa Paşa: his career before grand vizierate
In his campaign chronicle of the Köprülü family, chronicler Hüseyin Behçeti denoted
Kara Mustafa Paşa’s assumption of office with the following phrase: “Joyful tidings to
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the world; Mustafa Paşa received the seal of sultan.”267 Adopted at early ages by
Köprülü Mehmed Paşa, Kara Mustafa Paşa was a protégé of the Köprülü family. He
served at varios positions at the palace, until finally becoming the deputy grand vizier
under Fazıl Ahmed Paşa. During the final months of the latter’s grand vizierate, Kara
Mustafa Paşa also substituted him at imperial councils, a clear sign that he would assume
the same position. When Fazıl Ahmed Paşa eventually died in the fall of 1676, Kara
Mustafa Paşa became the second member of the Köprülü line to inherit the grand
vizierate.
Kara Mustafa Paşa was born in Merzifon in 1634/35 (hijri 1044), hence the
appellation Merzifonlu or Merzifonî, meaning ‘from Merzifon.’268 His father, Oruç Bey,
was a sipahi who died during Sultan Murad IV (1623-1640)’s Baghdad campaign in
1638/39. Contemporary sources indicate that Oruç and Köprülü Mehmed Paşa, who was
a sancak beyi (district governor) at the time were close friends. Upon his father’s death,
Mustafa entered Köprülü’s household at the age of four and became his protégé.269
Mustafa and Köprülü Mehmed Paşa’s elder son, Ahmed, were of the same age; they grew
up and received education together. At approximately the age of 20, Mustafa married
Köprülü Mehmed Paşa’s daughter. During the grand vizierate of Köprülü, Mustafa first
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served his father-in-law as telhisçi (clerk responsible with writing of grand vizieral telhis,
or reports presented to sultan) and then as silahdar (swordkeeper page who also
functioned as a secretary). Upon bringing the news of the conquest of Yanova (Ineu) to
the court in September 1658, the Sultan appointed Mustafa as küçük mirâhur (deputy to
the chief supervisor of the sultan’s stables). Two years later, he became the governor of
Silistre Province, followed by governorship of Diyarbekir Province as a vizier. When
Fazıl Ahmed Paşa became the grand vizier in 1661, Kara Mustafa Paşa was appointed
kaptan-ı deryâ (admiral) which he retained until 1666. During Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s
Hungarian campaign, Kara Mustafa Paşa also became the rikâb-ı hümâyun kaymakamı
(deputy for the grand vizier) for the first time. His second term in this position was during
the Cretan campaign (1666-1669). He joined the Polish campaign in 1672 and was one of
the three commanders during the siege of Kamaniçe. After the fall of the city, he held
peace talks with Polish envoys before the signing of the Treaty of Buczacz. When the war
was renewed the next campaign season, he commanded raids on Polish fortresses. During
Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s sickness in the later months of his grand vizierate, Kara Mustafa
Paşa was the former’s proxy at imperial councils, a clear sign of his ensuing assumption
of the grand vizierate. On November 5, 1676, Kara Mustafa Paşa became the Grand
Vizier.
As suggested by this brief overview of Kara Mustafa Pasha’s career before grand
vizierate, by the time he was invested with the sultan’s seal, he had already established
himself as an experienced, well-connected, self-assured individual inside the court and
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within the bureaucracy. Furthermore, Kara Mustafa Pasha built substantial intimacy with
Sultan Mehmed IV whom he physically accompanied when his predecessor was away
from the court due to campaigns. His ascent to predominance in Ottoman bureaucracy
and decision-making processes, however, occurred definitively after his appointment as
rikâb-ı hümâyun kaymakamı.
The deputy grand viziers were second in rank to the incumbent grand vizier.
Therefore, the holder of that position had to be someone who would not plot against the
grand vizier when he was away from the capital. From the beginning to the end of his
term, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa usually arranged Kara Mustafa Paşa’s appointment to this post.
Only during the Polish campaign between 1673 and 1676, a favorite and son-in-law of
the Sultan, Musahib Mustafa Paşa, briefly occupied that post. Most likely to prevent a
potential conflict between his own favorite and the Grand Vizier’s favorite, Mehmed IV
had sent letters to each of the two Mustafas as early as February of 1667. Written in the
form of hatt-ı hümâyûn (edict with the sultanic sign) and delivered as the two paşas were
having a feast together at the palace, the letters asked them to develop “further mutual
understanding and solidarity.”270 However, it was the Grand Vizier’s favorite—not the
Sultan’s closest companion—who gradually asserted his authority in the absence of Fazıl
Ahmed Paşa.
As rikâb-ı hümâyun kaymakamı, Kara Mustafa Paşa dealt with many issues
regarding justice, security, and international relations, at times virtually modifying the
Sultan’s will. In November 1664, when the Sultan’s pavilion was in Yanbolu (Yambol)
due to the Hungarian campaign, a brigand named Derdhanoğlu and another person
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believed to be his companion were caught in Anatolia and brought to the presence of
Mehmed IV who ordered their execution. The next day, as Sultan was watching a game
of jeered.271 Derdhanoğlu was mounted on horseback with flambeaus attached to his
shoulders, paraded through the town center and bazaar, and then executed. However,
before the execution of the second person, Kara Mustafa Paşa told the Sultan that they
“had no knowledge of the man who is accused of Derdhanoğlu’s companionship
committing acts that require execution according to law.”272 The man was not executed.
Apparently unhappy with the decision, Mehmed IV later invited Kara Mustafa Paşa to his
presence and asked why Derdhanoğlu’s companion was not executed. The Sultan thought
that if the latter was a “good man,” he would not have been caught with a brigand.
According to Abdi Paşa, who witnessed the conversation, Kara Mustafa responded that
before the execution the slain brigand had confessed that the second man was innocent
and that they were not companions. Unsatisfied with the explanation, the Sultan still
ordered imprisonment of the man and further investigations to be carried out in
Adrianople.273 At a second instance, the Sultan let Kara Mustafa Paşa inspect and
investigate the case of a man accused of banditry. Again, Kara Mustafa Paşa decided that
the man was not culpable. Instead, he ordered the arrest of the governor who had handed
over the man to the court.274 Both cases are significant examples of Kara Mustafa Pasha’s
influence on the Sultan’s will. Most remarkably, Kara Mustafa Paşa was one of three
“... birbirleriyle daha ziyade muvâfakat ü musâdakat üzre olmaları içün...” Abdurrahman Abdi Paşa,
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individuals who interrogated the false Jewish Messiah Sabbatai Zevi on September 16,
1666.275 However, it should be noted that although frequently soliciting his opinion, the
Sultan did not always agree with Kara Mustafa Paşa.276
Kara Mustafa Paşa’s role as the deputy grand vizier was not limited to judiciary
issues. He actively participated in the administration of the Empire. He fulfilled
ceremonial duties during appointments and valedictions. He accompanied the Sultan at
ceremonies such as the arrival of the Egyptian treasury to the capital.277 The Sultan at
many times invited Kara Mustafa Paşa to his presence and conferred with him about
various matters such as complaints about provincial governors.278 Another noteworthy
aspect of their closeness was the friendship he had established with the Sultan. At all
hunting sessions, either Kara Mustafa Paşa himself or his pages escorted Mehmed IV.
When the Sultan wished, Kara Mustafa Paşa played jereed and some sort of a lance
game, or shot arrows for exhibition with other courtiers.279
The sultan and kaymakam had a working relationship at other occasions. In
November 1667, when heavy rainfall halted the advance of the Sultan to Yenişehir
(Larissa) during the Cretan campaign, the Sultan dispatched a special raincoat to Kara
Mustafa Paşa. The narrator of the occasion, Abdi Paşa, noted that such a compliment
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from the Sultan “proclaimed [Kara Mustafa Paşa’s] rank of dignity.”280 Four years later
in May 1671, mud and puddles interrupted the advance of the Sultan and his entourage at
Mustafa Paşa Bridge (Svilengrad) by the Meriç (Maritsa) River. As the river flooded, the
entire army, including the Grand Vizier Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s pavilion, remained under
water except that of Kara Mustafa Paşa who then evacuated his tent for the Sultan’s
use.281 At several occasions, the Sultan went to Kara Mustafa Paşa’s mansion in the
capital for state ceremonies.282 In 1675, during the festivities held for the birth of a new
heir to the throne, Mehmed IV promised to wed his sister with Kara Mustafa Paşa, adding
kinship to their closeness.283
The most assertive roles Kara Mustafa Paşa assumed as the deputy grand vizier
were during diplomatic talks and negotiations in addition to during his command of the
Ottoman-Polish War of 1672-1676.284 The Sultan and Kara Mustafa Paşa privately
discussed many critical issues, especially before audiences held for foreign envoys and
ambassadors. It was Kara Mustafa Paşa who—probably after consultation with the Grand
Vizier—admitted Petro Dorošenko’s request for protection from the Ottoman court.285 In
the summer of 1669, during negotiations with the Venetian envoy, Kara Mustafa Paşa
imprisoned the envoy, who then sent a letter to Fazıl Ahmed Paşa for his release. That
summer, during the meetings held at the presence of the Sultan as the siege of Candia
was still underway and the Venetian envoy was offering great sums to the Sultan’s
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courtiers for a resolution, Kara Mustafa Paşa was the only statesman who supported the
Grand Vizier’s decision of continuing the siege at all costs.286
During the Polish campaign in 1672, Kara Mustafa Paşa took an active role for
the first time in the planning and administration of a campaign and the execution of a
siege. During the march to Kamaniçe (Kamieniec Podolski), the Ottoman army suffered
severe provisional shortcomings for which the commanders in the army held the Voivode
of Wallachia responsible. Kara Mustafa Pasha personally faced and reprimanded the
Voivode, who immediately handled the problem.287 Before the siege was launched, Kara
Mustafa Paşa inspected the environs of the fortress along with several other paşas and
determined where each of the three flanks would be positioned. The siege was eventually
executed according to his report and during the brief siege of Kamaniçe, he was one of
the three commanders.288 After the fall of the city, Kara Mustafa Paşa—not the Grand
Vizier who was also present at the army headquarters—held talks on behalf of the
Ottoman Empire with Polish envoys between October 15 and 18. On October 18, 1672
Kara Mustafa Paşa and the envoys finally agreed on the articles of the Treaty of Buczacz.
However, when the Polish Sejm refused ratifying the treaty, the war between the Ottoman
Empire and Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was renewed the following year. During
the war that lasted until 1676, Kara Mustafa Paşa carried out raids on Polish fortresses
along the border. Such active roles in all aspects of decision-making and statecraft helped
Kara Mustafa Paşa become one of the powerhouses at the Ottoman court even before he

Abdurrahman Abdi Paşa, Abdurrahman Abdi Paşa Vekâyiʻnâmesi, 333; Silahdar Tarihi, 1928, 1:555.
Hacı Ali Efendi, Tarih-i Kamaniçe (Tahlil ve Metin) [Kamianetz Campaign Chronicle], ed. Ayşe Hande
Can (T.C. Kültür Bakanlığı), 31, accessed January 15, 2015,
http://ekitap.kulturturizm.gov.tr/TR,78458/haci-ali-efendi---tarih-i-kamanice.html.
288
Abdurrahman Abdi Paşa, Abdurrahman Abdi Paşa Vekâyiʻnâmesi, 380.
286
287

134

assumed grand vizierate. Nevertheless, it was not only Kara Mustafa Paşa who rose to
prominence as he also secured positions for his kapı (plural: kapılar) or household.289 The
gradual penetration of the members of Kara Mustafa Paşa’s kapı into the Ottoman
bureaucracy through similar methods even before his grand vizierate also deserves
attention.
Indeed, the diffusion of the members of Kara Mustafa Paşa’s household into the
Ottoman bureaucracy was a phenomenon in its own right and it directly relates to the
recently growing debate regarding the expansion of the “political nation” in the
seventeenth-century Ottoman Empire as dynastic authority shrank.290 Earlier researches
had already shown that the leading figures of this expanding “political nation” were
members of Ottoman grandee households. Over the seventeenth century, the domination
of these groups in decision-making processes gradually grew. The trend had actually
gained phenomenal significance especially with Köprülü Mehmed Paşa, who himself was
once a protégé of another Kara Mustafa Paşa, a fellow Albanian.291 Nonetheless, despite
previously published works and recent growing interest especially about individuals from
ilmiyye (scholarly and judicial circles), the structure of seventeenth-century Ottoman
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grandee households and their diffusion into the Ottoman bureaucracy are yet to be
explored panoptically, including that of Kara Mustafa Paşa.292 The thematic boundaries
of this study do not allow a complete analysis of the expansion of Kara Mustafa Paşa’s
household and its members’ diffusion into the Ottoman bureaucracy. For purposes of this
study, however, it is necessary to show Kara Mustafa Paşa’s relationship with the
Köprülü family and the gradual penetration of some of his loyal servants to key positions
in Ottoman administration.
What enabled the preliminary expansion of Kara Mustafa Paşa’s household in the
imperial administration was his protection by the Köprülüs. I have already mentioned the
positions Kara Mustafa Paşa held during the grand vizierate of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa
who was his father-in-law. Kara Mustafa Paşa’s sphere of influence expanded remarkably
during the second Köprülü regime. Grand Vizier Fazıl Ahmed Paşa and his deputy Kara
Mustafa Paşa knew each other since early childhood. Because of this closeness, Fazıl
Ahmed Paşa was able to stay away from the capital for extended periods of time; he was
virtually safe against plots that could be organized by potential opponents. Official letters
exchanged between the two illustrate the closeness between the Grand Vizier and his
deputy. In the letters, the Grand Vizier atypically called Kara Mustafa Paşa “my brother”
in addition to the honorific formulation used for a vizier. Fazıl Ahmed Paşa also signed
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his letters as “sincerely loving Ahmed,” while his deputy’s signature humbled himself as
“your servant Mustafa.”293 Such outspoken expressions added a noticeably humane
aspect to the otherwise strict hierarchy between viziers and grand viziers.
Such good relations also benefited to those relatives of Kara Mustafa Paşa who
entered the larger Köprülü household. An incident recorded in the chronicle of Kamaniçe
campaign in 1672 mentioned one Hüseyin, a nephew of Kara Mustafa Paşa. Hüseyin was
the servant of a wealthy man named Hasan Ağa, the incumbent Grand Vizier Fazıl
Ahmed Paşa’s uncle. Hasan Ağa also owned a farm near a location where the imperial
army camped for a night in June 1672. That evening, Mehmed IV’s Haseki,294 who
apparently accompanied the Sultan during the early phases of the army’s march to the
frontier, visited Hasan Ağa’s farm. In the presence of the Haseki, Kara Mustafa Paşa’s
nephew Hüseyin rode a horse that performed a special gait, and then he presented several
bundles of gifts to the Haseki Sultan. Pleased with the performance and gifts, the Haseki
rewarded Hüseyin with 150 gold coins. As much as it was a rare occurrence, Mehmed IV
and his Haseki’s visit to a farm in the countryside owned by an uncle of the Grand Vizier
unmistakably illustrate the trust the Köprülü family had gained from the dynasty.295 At
the same time, the gold coins that Kara Mustafa Paşa’s nephew received from the Haseki
Sultan was a prophetic moment foretelling who would inherit the legacy of the Köprülüs.
Taking advantage of his privileged position as the deputy grand vizier, Kara
Mustafa Paşa had secured the appointment of individuals from his household as
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müteferrika (a general career line for viziers’ servants), sancak beyi (district commander),
and mirâhur.296 However, there were times when he also abused his power to eliminate
individuals he did not like. In the summer of 1669, one Mehmed Paşa, the commander of
Nové Zámky, was executed on the orders of the Sultan for not preventing the Austrians’
construction of a new fortress on the border. Mehmed Paşa’s head arrived in the capital
on July 23, 1669. Chronicler Silahdar recorded that the dead paşa was actually innocent.
Upon hearing about the construction of the fortress, Mehmed Paşa had sent a report to the
capital and asked for instructions about how he should have handled the situation. Such
reports were presented to the Sultan through Kara Mustafa Paşa, the deputy grand vizier
at the time. Apparently a “sworn enemy” of Mehmed Paşa, the deputy grand vizier did
not present the report to the Sultan. He waited until the construction was finished and
then presented to the Sultan a false report stating that the commander of Nové Zámky had
received a bribe from the Austrians and, in turn, had let them build a fortress; then the
Sultan ordered the execution of Mehmed Paşa.297
Observations of contemporaries illustrate how Kara Mustafa Paşa diligently
secured himself inside the court after his appointment to the grand vizierate. Part of that
security came from his predecessor’s household. In The History of the Turkish Empire,
Paul Rycaut wrote that, upon Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s death, Kara Mustafa Paşa sent an
“obliging and courteous Message to the Servants of the deceased Vizier.”298 He consoled
Hacı Ali Efendi, Tarih-i Kamaniçe (Tahlil ve Metin) [Kamianetz Campaign Chronicle], 19.
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them and promised “to take them and their Concern[s] into his Care and Protection.” He
recruited his predecessor’s kapıcılar kahyası (chief steward) for his own service. His first
key appointments as the new Grand Vizier was the advancement of Süleyman Ağa, Fazıl
Ahmed Paşa’s kethüda (chamberlein), to the post of büyük mirâhur (chief supervisor of
the sultan’s stables), which Rycaut described as “a place of not only of honor, but of great
security.”299 This was certainly a strategic appointment; beyond their duty to take care of
the Sultan’s stables, mirâhurs traditionally fulfilled many bureaucratic duties on sultans’
order and on behalf of the court. At the same time, it was a key rank for later promotions
within the Ottoman bureaucracy.300 Kara Mustafa Paşa himself had occupied this post
briefly during the times of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa. Also, previously in the summer of
1671, Kara Mustafa Paşa’s own kethüda Kara İbrahim Ağa had first become küçük
mirâhur (deputy supervisor of the sultan’s stables) and then büyük mirâhur in a matter of
month.301 Kara İbrahim Ağa held that position until the death of Fazıl Ahmed Paşa. When
the grand vizierate transferred in November 1676, Kara İbrahim Ağa left his post to the
aforesaid Süleyman Ağa, the chamberlain of Fazıl Ahmed Paşa, and promoted to the rank
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of deputy to Kara Mustafa Paşa.302 Thereby, the new Grand Vizier strengthened himself
both with his own entourage and the loyal members of Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s kapı.
In his report dispatched to Vienna on November 25, 1676, after these
appointments were made, the Austrian ambassador Johann Christoph von Kindsperg
mentioned Kara Mustafa Paşa, Kara İbrahim Ağa, and Süleyman Ağa together. He wrote
that this “united board of three supervisors” would govern the Monarchy according to the
Sultan’s pleasure. He also added that these were not the only appointments; other officers
were also replaced by new ones. According to the ambassador’s interpretation, the new
Grand Vizier was employing his “creaturas” with the supposition that “he would also bit
by bit replace, among others, the paşas that did not befit him.” 303
When evaluated within the larger trends of seventeenth century Ottoman history,
the transition of the grand vizierate from Fazıl Ahmed Paşa to Kara Mustafa Paşa was a
significant event. Having spent two decades with two prudent and successful Köprülü
grand viziers, Mehmed IV must have been completely comfortable entrusting his seal to a
protégé of the Köprülü family. In essence, the Sultan’s choice counters widespread
perceptions about the Ottoman decision-making mechanism’s irrationality in the
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seventeenth century. As much as it was a manifestation of the dignity the Köprülü family
had attained by the mid-1670s, Mehmed IV’s handing the seal not to his own favorite
Musahib Mustafa Paşa but to a member of the Köprülü household proves existence of a
rational governing mentality that was perceptive and judicious. It also illustrates that the
guiding principles of that governing mentality were stability and continuity.
The challenge to the stability and continuity Köprülüs so carefully established
originated from an unexpected direction: Unlike the Austrian ambassador Kindsperg’s
assumption that the Empire would be ruled by a “united board of three supervisors,” the
Empire would be ruled single-handedly by Kara Mustafa Paşa. As illustrated above,
when Kara Mustafa Paşa assumed office, he was the most powerful executive authority in
the Empire. What made him so powerful even at the earliest stages of his grand vizierate
was not any of his earlier achievements; it was the legacy of his predecessors. Few grand
viziers in the entire history of the Empire inherited the legacy that Kara Mustafa Paşa had
taken from the Köprülüs. Considering complex human psychology, succession to such a
man as Fazıl Ahmed Paşa must have been an honor whose career at the highest executive
office of a massive empire was full of glory. At the same time, such a predecessor who
managed to survive many difficulties must have been a burden on the next person
assuming that position; expectations were then much higher. Perhaps, in addition to his
grand vizieral duties, Kara Mustafa Paşa had to cope with the legacy of Fazıl Ahmed
Paşa, who handled state affairs comfortably and charismatically.
In the next chapter, I will illustrate in the light of Austrian diplomatic reports sent
from Istanbul to Vienna between November 1676 and December 1678 how Kara Mustafa
Paşa gradually became a particularly unfriendly personality soon after his assumption of
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office. A report written by the Austrian ambassador Kindsperg in August 1677 notified
Vienna that the Grand Vizier had become “a vehement man, who satisfied neither
Christians nor Turks.”304 Given the respect and authority the post of grand vizierate had
gained under Köprülüs, the appointment of a “vehement man” to that position would be
conducive to unexpected, unpredicted, and undesired results
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CHAPTER 4: THE ORIGINS OF HABSBURG-OTTOMAN DIPLOMACY AND
THE FORMATIVE FIRST YEAR OF KARA MUSTAFA PAŞA’S GRAND
VIZIERATE

Pre-1683 Habsburg-Ottoman diplomacy
On December 30, 1672 the Austrian resident ambassador at Constantinople, Giambattista
Casanova, received a farewell audience in Adrianople from the Grand Vizier Fazıl
Ahmed Paşa. The audience took place at Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s private office. Casanova’s
successor, Johann Christoph von Kindsperg, who had recently arrived from Vienna to
Adrianople, was also present at the meeting. Two days after the meeting, on January 1,
1673 Kindsperg became the new Habsburg ambassador in the Ottoman Empire. The
arrival of a new Habsburg ambassador to the Ottoman lands and the departure of his
predecessor was not a novelty for either state.305 There had been a resident Habsburg
ambassador in the Ottoman capital since 1547 and during the following centuries
ambassadors regularly dispatched reports from the Ottoman lands to Vienna.
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Before I embark on my analysis of Johann Christoph von Kindsperg’s
negotiations with Kara Mustafa Paşa, starting from the latter’s assumption of office in
November 1676, I will first discuss the general patterns of the Austrian-Ottoman
diplomatic exchanges in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Hyperactivity vs. unilateralism
A great majority of the Habsburg diplomatic documents concerning the HabsburgOttoman diplomacy between the early 1500s and the end of the First World War are
today located inside the vaults of the Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv (HHStA) at
Minoritenplatz, in the first district of the Austrian capital Vienna. Known as the Turcica
series, the collections concerning Turkish diplomacy at HHStA consist of eight parts. In
addition to diplomatic reports and instructions, these series include many other primary
sources directly related to the Austrian-Ottoman interactions across the centuries. For the
pre-1683 Habsburg-Ottoman diplomacy, there are 152 cardboard boxes under the Turcica
I series. These boxes hold tens of thousands of reports and instructions written largely in
German, but also in Italian, Latin, and French, as well as few in Ottoman Turkish.
Couriers once hauled these documents back and forth between the Habsburg and
Ottoman capitals. However, the archival sources concerning the Habsburg Monarchy’s
relations with the Ottoman Empire are but a minute portion of the colossal collection of
textual artifacts the hyperactive Austrian diplomacy produced during the history of the
Monarchy. I call the Austrian diplomacy hyperactive, because the more one studies early
modern Habsburg diplomatic documents the stronger becomes the conviction that given
the lack of resources to raise powerful armies, conciliatory and preemptive diplomacy
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had become the key policy instrument at the Viennese court. Historians of Austria have
usually expressed the primacy of diplomacy in Austrian policy-making by the Rankean
trope of “Primat der Außenpolitik.” Such dependence on diplomacy was a forced
outcome of the unique circumstances surrounding the Monarchy rather than being a
deliberate decision, but it shows that the Habsburgs had successfully turned their
weakness into a strength and opportunity. The inability of the Monarchy to intimidate
their prospective enemies on the battlefield inspired the Hofburg to develop a Europeanwide diplomatic network. Whenever the Monarchy needed to convince enemies or attract
potential allies, the Hofburg first intensified the traffic on that diplomatic network,
frequently attaining its objectives.
A decision-making mechanism built greatly upon information-gathering through a
diplomatic network could function effectively only if that network supplied on a regular
basis the statesmen at the center with reliable facts and observations about the condition
of enemies and allies. Researchers of Austrian diplomacy will quickly notice at HHStA
that the dates in the archive’s information system for diplomatic records concerning
relations with the thirty Außerdeutsche Staaten (mostly European and few non-European)
go as far back as the early 1500s, with several extending even further back. Starting from
such early times, Austrian agents in foreign countries operated as the tentacles of a
massive intelligence and surveillance system. The agents continuously informed Vienna
about the conditions at all European courts of primary and secondary importance.
As duly noted by the experts of the Austrian foreign policy, the Monarchy’s
geographical condition at the heart of Europe, encircled with potential adversaries from
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every direction, only increased the need for such a network.306 Frequently threatened by
the aggressiveness, expansionism, and whims of its neighbors, the Habsburg Monarchy
became a conservative state out of necessity, often struggling to preserve the status quo
along its borders and across the continent. In such circumstances, the preservation of the
status quo was not the only goal. Austrian diplomacy was also a key instrument in
attracting allies, because the Habsburgs by themselves could hardly handle existential
threats to their territorial integrity. Potential allies did not necessarily consist of the socalled European great powers. Especially after Leopold’s Wahlkapitulation in 1658,
Vienna increasingly treated the princes in Germany as allies, although they were vassals
of the Emperor in theory. Moreover, the Habsburgs did not simply request the
cooperation of the German princes; they wanted to secure “the unanimity of princes [and]
established a consensual relationship that appealed more readily to the princes’ sense of
self-interest and independence.”307 In other words, the decision-makers in Vienna knew
that they could maintain the status quo in international level only through “combined
consensus of domestic elites and foreign allies,”308 and diplomacy was the most effective
means to that end.
Historians have often interpreted the Hofburg’s continuous dependence on
domestic and foreign consensus as a sign of the so-called “Habsburg clemency.”309 The
phrase is displeasing for scholars who—intentionally but to a great extent unjustifiably—
view in early modern Austria a great military power. Such a point of view fits to the
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progressive narrative that I analyzed earlier. R.J.W. Evans, for instance, once described
the “Austrian clemency” as “a figment of historians’ imagination.”310 Yet, even scholars
who reject “Austrian clemency” as a cliché and compare the Monarchy’s military
capabilities to Louis XIV’s France or eighteenth century Prussia admitted that Austria
was often in need of “double-consensus” (with domestic elites and foreign allies). 311
The Monarchy’s incessant search for consensus through diplomacy may appear to
some as a sign of weakness, but the clement Austrians were not ordinary diplomats. The
Monarchy’s survival through many political and social crises was primarily a result of its
ceaseless search for consensus augmented by hyperactive diplomacy. There is a
significant contradiction, therefore, in downplaying the so-called Habsburg clemency for
the sake of portraying the Monarchy as a mighty power. It is true that many parameters
that Vienna could not control frequently helped the Monarchy’s preservation, but a
survey of early modern Habsburg diplomatic artifacts show that if the Hofburg
successfully orchestrated and employed any of these parameters for survival, it was the
diplomatic processes. The “outcome-focused” master narrative of Austrian history often
highlights the products of those diplomatic processes, such as alliances and treaties, and
neglects to incorporate into that narrative the Monarchy’s diplomatic hyperactivity as a
major factor behind its longevity.
The Habsburg-Ottoman diplomatic encounters played a very critical role in that
longevity. The diplomatic contacts and exchanges between the two states were always
intense and often yielded important consequences, primarily due to the geographical
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proximity between the Habsburg capital and the Ottoman territory. From the 1520s on,
the Ottoman military presence was within hours’ reach of Vienna. Therefore, just as the
Monarchy needed “double-consensus” at home and abroad in Europe, it needed doublevigilance against the Ottomans. Cognizant of that necessity, the first Austrian ambassador
arrived in Constantinople in 1546. During the following centuries, the Habsburg
ambassadors at the Ottoman capital supplied Vienna with reliable facts and observations
that could be analyzed retrospectively and used instantaneously. The ceaseless
conveyance of diligently detailed reports from the Ottoman lands not only helped the
decision-makers at the Hofburg maintain a high level of alertness, but also provided them
a remarkable advantage in the long-run: there was asymmetrical flow of information. The
flow of information was asymmetrical, because the Ottomans had a non-reciprocal and
unilateral diplomatic approach toward Christian states. The Ottoman Empire did not
modify that understanding even after the emergence of first residential embassies in
Renaissance Italy.312
With the lack of permanent Ottoman representatives in Vienna, the Ottoman
surveillance relied on a variety of other methods. The Sublime Porte’s most important
information sources were special envoys and couriers sporadically sent to the Habsburg
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capital by the court or the paşa at Buda. Other sources of information were governors
along the frontier, Jewish and Greek subjects travelling in Europe, captured enemy
soldiers, the sultan’s European vassals, and the foreign ambassadors in Istanbul.313 Such
channels provided the Ottoman court with sufficiently reliable information, and the
system worked effectively as long as the Ottomans were militarily superior. Indeed,
during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Ottoman statesmen often surprised
foreign representatives with their knowledge about the European affairs. In the final
stage, however, the Ottoman methods of information-gathering in Europe lacked the
personal connections that a resident Habsburg ambassador carefully established in the
Ottoman capital. Therefore, the Ottoman agents in Europe could not fathom the dynamics
of the Viennese court as efficiently as an Austrian ambassador could do for the Ottoman
court; hence the asymmetry in the flow of information and surveillance between Vienna
and Istanbul.
Today, the difference between the information-gathering methods of the two
states is best observed at their archives. The Turcica series at HHStA are rich and
complete enough to enable the researcher to determine, from the Habsburg perspective,
the short-term and long-term patterns in Habsburg-Ottoman diplomatic exchanges. At
Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri (Prime Ministerial Ottoman Archives, BOA) in Istanbul,
one is not able to analyze the Ottoman diplomacy in a similar fashion, despite the vast
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array of material in the Ottoman archives. The reason is that the Ottoman bureaucracy did
not produce until the early 1800s diplomatic documents matching the Turcica series. The
closest collection at BOA, the series of Düvel-i Ecnebiye Defterleri (the registers of the
foreign states), contain analyzable data only for the post-1740 period, and even for that
period their content is still not comparable to the information available at the Austrian
archives. The scarcity of early modern diplomatic documents necessitates Ottomanists to
knit their analyses from piecemeal information scattered across a large variety of archival
documents. Therefore, the Turcica series at HHStA are of immense significance for a full
comprehension of the early modern Habsburg-Ottoman diplomacy and its dynamics.
Based on the Turcica collections, the Germanophone Habsburg historiography has
produced a vast literature on Habsburg-Ottoman diplomacy and delineated the general
patterns of the early modern Habsburg-Ottoman diplomatic exchanges.

An historical overview of the Habsburg-Ottoman diplomacy
Historians often mention that, in pre-1700 Europe, the Ottomans were regarded as the
hostis naturalis totius Christianitatis.314 The reality was different. The Ottoman Empire
had economic importance for England, the Dutch Republic, and Venice. Only for the
latter did it also pose a military threat. France, too, had economic interests in the Levant
and it also had a “marriage of convenience” with the Ottomans due to common (though
mostly unfeasible) political goals, but a break of relations would not harm either party
significantly. The rivalry between the Spanish and Ottoman fleets in the Mediterranean in
the sixteenth century did not have an impact on their home bases. The Ottomans posed an
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existential challenge only for Austria, because the Habsburg hereditary lands in Central
Europe (Erblande) were exposed to the direct and indirect impacts of the so-called
“natural enemy.”315 It has been argued that one could measure at Istanbul this varying
intensity of relations between the Sublime Porte and the European states by looking at
where the ambassador of each respective state resided. There might be some truth in that:
The English, Dutch, Venetian and French ambassadors customarily lived among the nonMuslim/merchant dominated quarters of the city, whereas the Habsburg envoys stayed,
until the 1650s, in the close proximity to the Ottoman palace.316
The rivalry between the Habsburg Monarchy and Ottoman Empire was such that,
for militarily minded historians, the conflict between the two states was a “crusade-like
faith and culture war” which involved “total confrontation.”317 It is indeed difficult to
shun such conflict-based approaches, which have traditionally dominated the
historiography of the early modern Habsburg-Ottoman interactions.318 Inside the
historical geography of both states, “legends, traditions, collective memory, traumatic
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experiences, future anxieties and apocalyptic prophecies” as well as the politicization of
historiography helped the spread of mutually antagonistic perspectives about the assumed
enemy.319 Accordingly, the diplomatic encounters between the Habsburg Monarchy and
the Ottoman Empire can only be described as apprehensive. The envoys of both parties
felt themselves as soldiers at all encounters, as a “tenacious struggle” continued behind
the scenes for small details that had huge symbolic importance.320
Despite such symbolic rivalry and frequent military confrontations, the diplomatic
contacts and exchanges between the Habsburgs and Ottomans often resulted in peaceful
conclusions. It is often noted that the wars between the two states between 1526 and 1792
lasted for a total of 80 years. Less emphasized is that fact that the two states also signed
65 peace treaties and armistices during their respective histories. For that reason, any
narrative that ignores diplomatic encounters between the Habsburg and Ottoman states
produces a “distorted picture.”321
The first Habsburg resident ambassador in Constantinople, Johann Maria
Malvezzi, had arrived in the Ottoman capital in 1546 as the special envoy Gerhard
Veltwyck’s secretary. Malvezzi was the first resident Habsburg ambassador in the
Ottoman lands, but he was not the first imperial agent. The first imperial representative,
Fiume Hans von Thurn, had visited the Ottoman capital in 1497.322 The first Turkish
representative in Vienna, on the other hand, had been seen in 1488, but his mission was
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to the Hungarian King Matthias Corvinus, who briefly resided in Vienna between 1485
and 1490.323 Thus had begun the diplomatic exchanges between the Habsburgs and the
Ottomans in the late fifteenth century, as the European states system was still in the
making. Between these earliest contacts and the arrival of the first Habsburg resident
envoy, Malvezzi, to the Ottoman capital, the diplomatic interactions were largely limited
to post-war years.
With Johann Maria Malvezzi’s arrival in Constantinople in 1546, following
Süleyman the Lawgiver’s (1520-1566) conquests in Hungary, Austria began to formulate
its policy against the Ottomans independently from the Reich and signed independent
treaties with the Sublime Porte.324 During the earliest decades of the relations, the
Ottomans had the upper hand in the diplomatic encounters as a result of their military
superiority. According to the treaty signed on June 19, 1547 Austria agreed to pay 30,000
Gulden to the Ottomans in return for the Sultan’s withdrawal of his claims to the
Habsburg-controlled Hungary.325 The treaty technically made Austria a vassal of the
Ottoman Empire, but it is also possible that Ferdinand I willingly paid that tribute to the
Porte to protect his claims on the ancient Hungarian crown.326 Between 1547 and 1606,
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Austria made 27 payments of 30,000 Gulden to the Ottoman Empire. These payments
were always accompanied by additional bounties to the Sultan and his courtiers, and the
two sides constantly disagreed about whether the bounties were meant to be “gifts,”
“tributes,” or “taxes.”327
In the sixteenth century, the negotiations between the two parties took place
inside the Ottoman court, giving the reigning sultan the privilege of dictating the peace
articles. Indeed, the Ottoman superiority by the mid-1500s was such that Süleyman the
Lawgiver sent his peace conditions to the Austrian court in the form of an order, or
hükm.328 However, the situation began to change with the turn of the seventeenth century.
Since Joseph von Hammer, historians have typically referred to the Treaty of Zsitvatorok
at 1606, signed at the end of the Langen Türkenkrieg (1593-1606), as the turning point in
the balance of power between the two states.329 A frequently repeated detail is that with
the Zsitvatorok Treaty, the Ottomans agreed that the Habsburg ruler was not a kral (king)
as he was previously referred by the Ottomans, but a çâsar (emperor), thus an equal of
the Ottoman sultan. Thereby, the two states had become equals. Another sign of Austria’s
elevated status was that in 1606 the two parties agreed on a final and one-time payment
of 200,000 Gulden by Austria to the Sublime Porte, ending the former’s vassal status.
One can indeed argue that, politically and militarily, there was more of a balance between
the two states after 1606, although the Ottoman documents continued to refer to the
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Habsburg ruler as kral in the decades following 1606. In addition, in the post-1606
period, the peace negotiations were held near the border, another sign of the ‘new
normal’ in the seventeenth century.330
Although Zsitvatorok was an important landmark, certain aspects of this wellstudied treaty were routines in the Habsburg-Ottoman diplomatic encounters throughout
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Zsitvatorok lacked definitive borderline articles,
a trademark of many other treaties signed between the Habsburgs and Ottomans. In the
borderlands between the two states, there were many fortresses controlled by one of the
states but had adjacent territories extending into the enemy land, making the borderland
effectively a Doppelherrschaft, or a condominium.331 Also, due to the conflicting claims
on strategic fortresses and their surrounding areas, the peace negotiations usually took a
long time and ratifications of the treaties was often delayed.332 Disputes often continued
even after a peace was concluded, as neither party withdrew their claims on certain
strategic locations; hence, the ceaseless Kleinkrieg along the border, often in the form of
kidnappings and thefts.
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However, there were certain differences between the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. The Ottoman diplomacy was reportedly more “calculable” 333 in the sixteenth
century and not as much in the seventeenth century, probably as an outcome of
continuous circulation of statesmen from the 1580s and the resulting lack of continuity in
policies. Other factors could be the continuous warfare against the Habsburg and
Safavids as well as the recurring rebellions in Anatolia. It is often reiterated that for the
same reasons, the Ottoman Empire did not launch a campaign against Austria during the
Thirty Years’ War.334 Nonetheless, one should also note the Habsburg determination to
avoid a war with the Ottomans in the first half of the seventeenth century. The Habsburg
special envoys played a key role in repeated renewals of the Zsitvatorok Treaty in 1618,
1625, 1627, 1642, and 1649, saving the Monarchy from potentially calamitous
consequences of an Ottoman campaign into central Europe.335
The heavy burden of maintaining such undulating relations was on the envoys and
ambassadors who, in addition to their daunting diplomatic tasks, wrestled with numerous
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other challenges. At every diplomatic encounter, agents of both states displayed
premeditated patronizing gestures that had immense symbolic importance. During the
audiences in Vienna and Istanbul, or at the exchanges of envoys at the frontier, both sides
religiously abided by such symbolism. The entrance of the Ottoman special envoy Kara
Mehmed Paşa and his entourage to Vienna in the summer of 1665 was one such occasion.
In his ambassadorial takrîrât (report), Kara Mehmed Paşa wrote that, before the Ottoman
delegation’s entry to the city, the Austrian internuncio asked the Ottomans to remove
flags and banners and carry only drums, because no Ottoman delegation hitherto had
entered Vienna according to their own custom. There was a brief disagreement between
the two sides. Kara Mehmed Paşa argued in his report that the issue was resolved
according to the Ottomans’ request, who did not remove their banners.336 An identical
scene had occurred on August 26, 1628 when the Austrian envoy Ludwig von Kuefstein
was on his way to Istanbul. Kuefstein met the Turkish delegate in Raab for the envoy
exchange. Customarily, the exchange of envoys took place after both envoys walked
toward each other from an equal distance to meet at a predetermined middle point.
Whoever arrived first at the predetermined point was assumed to have lost the “duel.” At
this instance, the Turkish agent stopped in the midst of his walk, obviously to perplex
Kuefstein, upon which the Austrian threatened the Ottoman party with leaving the
scene.337 Upon the Austrian’s proclamation, the Turkish agent again continued his walk
and the two representatives met in the middle as planned.
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Another ritual dutifully practiced between the two parties was gift-giving. The
archival documents in Turcica catalogues give one a solid idea of how especially the
Ottoman court regarded gifts an important aspect of the symbolic rivalry. Gift lists were
usual attachments to the reports of the Austrian ambassadors during the entire early
modern era. In general, it is difficult to determine whether it was the Habsburg (and other
foreign) envoys who habituated the Ottoman statesmen to receiving gifts so as to achieve
objectives in Istanbul, or whether the Ottoman courtiers routinely solicited gifts from
foreign representatives. The recipients of gifts were not only sultans and viziers; valides,
kahyas, mirâhurs, nişancıs, and Janissary leaders all received gifts from the Habsburg
ambassadors and special envoys. Gift-giving was sometimes overwhelming for the
ambassadors. In the autumn of 1677, the Austrian ambassador, Johann von Kindsperg,
complained to Vienna that at the Ottoman court ministers outrageously asked for
presents.338 Unsurprisingly, there were often disagreements regarding the value of the
items brought by the envoys.339
Another symbolic act that the Ottoman court diligently observed was the forced
stay of the Austrian envoys at Nemçe hanı, the so-called German inn, until the midseventeenth century.340 Typically, the French and Venetian ambassadors stayed in Pera,
the non-Muslim quarter on the eastern side of the Golden Horne, which certainly
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provided to the foreign agents the privacy they would seek. The Austrian ambassadors,
however, resided close to the Ottoman palace and were kept under close scrutiny. The
Ottomans finally modified that policy after the 1650s. Johann Christoph von Kindsperg,
who stayed in Istanbul between 1673 and 1679, resided in the outskirts of the city, away
from the watchful eyes of the Ottoman court. The question of whether Kindsperg’s
relative physical freedom provided him any advantage against the erratic politics of the
Ottoman capital under Kara Mustafa Paşa’s government is what I will deal with next.

Preemptive diplomacy in Istanbul: the critical first year of Kara Mustafa Paşa
Johann Christoph von Kindsperg was born in 1638 in Graz.341 His father, a clerk named
Daniel Kindsperg, had worked as a Gegenschreiber (clerk) at Obereinnehmeramt in
Triest between 1635 and 1658. Later in life, Daniel Kindsperg was promoted to the
Hofbuchhalter (book-keeper) position at Inner Austrian Hofkammerat and died in 1683,
“the year of the Turk.” His son Johann Christoph von Kindsperg was appointed as the
imperial ambassador to the Ottoman Empire on January 28, 1672 and left Vienna on May
19, 1672 along with twenty assistants and twelve other travelers, on a total of four loaded
ships.342
Kindsperg’s first audience with the Grand Vizier Fazıl Ahmed Paşa, on December
30, 1672, was also the last of his predecessor, Giambattista Casanova. According to
Kindsperg’s Diarium, it was Casanova—technically still the ambassador at that
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moment— who talked with the Grand Vizier at the meeting. After the salutation,
Giambattista Casanova notified Fazıl Ahmed Paşa of Leopold I’s “peaceable thoughts”
and gave the Emperor’s good word that the Habsburg Monachy wanted to hold on to
peace with the Porte as long as the latter would not act to the contrary of the peace
concluded between the two sides.343 Fazıl Ahmed Paşa responded that the Sultan did not
wish less than the Emperor to maintain the peace and friendship with the Germans if no
reason was given for adversity.344
The conversation then shortly paused as “Serbet, Ambra Rauch, und schmeckende
Wässer” was served. Before the Austrians departed, Casanova complained to Fazıl
Ahmed Paşa about the incessant plundering and robbery committed along the border
from the Ottoman side. He said that such acts were against the existing peace, the issue
needed resolution, and those who fomented rebellions and supported rebels needed
punishment. Moreover, he informed the Grand Vizier that against the insolence of the
rebels the Emperor was assembling an army.345 In response, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa stated that
he had resolutely ordered the Transylvanians and all Ottoman frontier paşas to maintain
peace with the Germans and not to support the “evil” rebels, who, as Kindsperg noted,
had recently solicited help at the Porte several times.346 The conversation continued for
another “three whole quarter of an hour” as Casanova and the Grand Vizier talked about
other border issues with “shared gentleness,” upon which the old ambassador and seven
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other individuals in his entourage received caftans before they eventually left.347 The next
day, the two ambassadors joined a ceremony organized by some of the court members for
Casanova’s departure.348
Thus had begun Johann Christoph von Kindsperg’s embassy in the Ottoman
capital on the first day of 1673. Kindsperg’s narrative of his first meeting with Fazıl
Ahmed Paşa illustrated that the rebellion in Hungary and Transylvania was the primary
concern for the Hofburg at the time. Given Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s cooperative manner
concerning the border security, it was a very promising first meeting for the Austrian.
Despite frequent solicitations of the Transylvanians for support against the Habsburgs in
the early 1670s, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa had not violated the existing peace with the Monarchy
and did not modify his Hungarian policy until his death. The issue became especially
critical for the Hofburg and Kindsperg, however, with Kara Mustafa Paşa’s assumption
of office in November 1676.
The situation in Hungary itself was a key parameter in the change of the
Ottomans’ Central European policy. Unlike Fazıl Ahmed Paşa, Kara Mustafa Paşa
welcomed Transylvanian agents and honored them at the Ottoman court. This alarming
shift in the Ottoman policy also influenced the Habsburg diplomatic strategy in the
Ottoman capital. From November of 1676, the Habsburgs’ objective in Istanbul was to
break the ties between the Transylvanian rebels and the Ottoman court. The most
effective way of achieving that goal would be to extend the peace with the Ottoman
Empire, and thus prevent an Ottoman campaign into Hungary. The Habsburg diplomacy
in Istanbul, therefore, quickly acquired a completely preemptive character in the late
347
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1676. At all costs, the Viennese court wanted to avoid a military confrontation with the
Ottomans because of ongoing campaigns against France in the west. Many predecessors
of Kindsperg were highly successful in executing preemptive missions at the Ottoman
capital, but none of the previous Austrian agents at Istanbul had to deal with a statesman
as ambitious and powerful as Kara Mustafa Pasha.
I will further explore in the discussion below Kara Mustafa Paşa’s ambitious
personality, which was the key difference between him and his predecessor, Fazıl Ahmed
Paşa. Here, I first would like to briefly recap the course of events in Hungary during the
1670s, because the adjustment in the Ottoman strategy in Hungary after 1676 was closely
related to the developments in Hungary as much as it was an outcome of Kara Mustafa
Paşa’s character. The course of events in Hungary in the 1670s is well-studied. After the
Peace of Vasvár in 1664, many Hungarian magnates had deeply resented the
disadvantageous peace signed with the Ottomans. According to the frequently repeated
assumption in the literature, the magnates had interpreted the signing of a peace with the
Ottoman Empire after a military victory as a lost opportunity to reconquer Turkish
Hungary. The grievances were doubled by the signing away of the estates owned by
several influential magnates, who had thus lost their income resources. In addition to
ignoring the magnates’ interest in 1664, the Viennese court was religiously repressing
predominantly Protestant Hungarians. In fact, there were many wealthy Protestants who
had expressed their willingness to side with the Ottomans before Vasvár.
Two years after the signing of the Vasvár Treaty, anti-Habsburg magnates sent
Peter Inczedy as emissary to Fazıl Ahmed Paşa in 1666 with special instructions signed
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by Count Ferenc Wesselényi (a Catholic and former opponent of the Ottomans). The
instructions stated that the magnates were ready to become Ottoman subjects on the
condition “that the sultan would recognize the age-old rights of the Hungarian nobility in
a written charter (ahdnâme).”349 The mission was unsuccessful. Fazıl Ahmed Paşa was in
Crete, where the situation was quite already precarious. He simply disregarded the
Transylvanians.
In March of 1667, Ferenc Wesselényi died. Another influential magnate, Ferenc
Nádasdy, took the leadership. Despite Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s reluctance to intervene, the
magnates’ attempts under the leadership of Nádasdy to adjoin Hungary to the Ottoman
Empire turned into a popular anti-Habsburg movement, known as the Magnate
Conspiracy. Vienna responded severely. Three magnate leaders were executed.350 Yet,
the executions marked “only the beginning of a much bigger crackdown in Hungary.”351
From 1671 onwards, Vienna aimed to establish confessional absolutism in Hungary,
much as it had successfully applied in Bohemia. Leopold I’s Hungarian policy over the
1670s was guided by his Jesuit advisers, who argued that the recalcitrance of the
Hungarians had nullified the contract made with the Hungarian nation at the Emperor’s
coronation. Leopold himself also once recorded his own view: “Most Hungarians are
suspect, unfaithful and disobedient; whenever misfortune and danger are at their height,
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then they create the gravest annoyances. It would be best to get rid of them and to leave
them to their own kind.”352
The developments inspired modern historians of Hungary to call “ten dark years”
the decade following 1671. Violating the constitution of Hungary, Leopold converted the
government of Hungary into a seven-member Gubernium, controlled by Vienna and
“overflown with German mercenaries” who had replaced soldiers dismissed from the
defense line fortresses.353 Protestants were harshly prosecuted and the Hungarian treasury
was brought under the control of Hofkammer. These developments led to the formation of
the Hungarian guerilla forces known as Kuruc (“crusaders”) which sporadically attacked
the “foreign” Habsburg garrisons during the 1670s.
When Kara Mustafa Paşa took the sultan’s seal in 1676, the Kuruc were still
seeking foreign support, as the anti-Habsburg movements in Hungary posed a serious
threat to Vienna itself only when the malcontents attracted foreign allies. Along with
France and Sweden, the Ottoman Empire was one of the three prospective candidates.
One after another, the Kuruc envoys visited the Porte and declared submission to the
sultan. When the new Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa Paşa openly showed support for the
rebels, it sounded an alarm for Vienna and Johann Christoph von Kindsperg. Maintaining
the peace with the Ottoman Empire was crucial to deterring it from supporting the
magnates. Accordingly, the instruction and reports sent back and forth between Vienna
and Istanbul frequently mentioned “maintaining good friendship and neighborliness.”
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Meeting the new Grand Vizier and first impressions
On November 6, 1676, Johann Christoph von Kindsperg dispatched Vienna a brief
notice. The “weit berühmte” Grand Vizier Fazıl Ahmed Paşa had died at a village nearby
Burgas on November 3, 1676 as the Ottoman army was returning to Istanbul from the
four-year long Polish campaign.354 Kindsperg wrote that Kaymakam (deputy) Kara
Mustafa Paşa, who had married the Sultan’s daughter the previous year, succeeded Fazıl
Ahmed Paşa. The only other replacement Kindsperg mentioned in this first report was the
appointment of Kara Hasanoğlu as Yeniçeri Ağası (Janissary Agha). Kindsperg added
that he would soon send another report detailing all the other appointments made by the
new Grand Vizier.355 As a postscript, the ambassador also noted that on October 15, 1676
the Ottomans and Poles had closed a treaty at a place not far from Kamianets-Podilskyi
(Kamaniçe).356
The detailed report that Kindsperg had promised was written on November 25 and
sent from Ponte Piccolo.357 This second report informed Vienna about the recent
appointments made by the new Grand Vizier. Kara İbrahim Ağa, a protégé of Kara
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Mustafa Paşa and the chief supervisor of the Sultan’s staples, had advanced to paşa rank
and become the new Grand Vizier’s deputy, while Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s chamberlain,
Süleyman Ağa, was appointed as the new chief supervisor of the stables. As earlier
emphasized, Kindsperg believed that this “vereinigte triumviri” would govern the Empire
in line with the Sultan’s desires.
Kindsperg argued in his report that he was the first foreign representative to
congratulate Kara Mustafa Paşa: “I have congratulated the new Grand Vizier with a
written letter which he gladly received. Upon reading my letter he said that among all
[foreign] representatives I was the first one to congratulate him because of his exaltation,
and whenever I wanted to see him I would be welcomed.” Kindsperg had not presented
the letter personally because he pointed out in the same report that he was on his way to
Adrianople, where he would request a personal audience from the Grand Vizier and
congratulate him in person. The ambassador wanted to hand over the gifts in person and
work on leaving a good impression and establishing friendship. Kindsperg’s remarks
regarding Kara Mustafa Paşa’s reaction after reading the letter, therefore, suggests that
either one of his resources at the Ottoman court informed the ambassador about Kara
Mustafa Paşa’s alleged reaction after readıng the letter or Kindsperg simply envisioned
the new Grand Vizier as a friendly personality. During the following months, these initial
positive remarks about Kara Mustafa Paşa determined the approach of the Hofburg to the
Ottoman court.
Further details in the same letter regarding the relations between Hungary and the
Ottoman Empire must have raised suspicion at the Hofburg. On November 17, 1676
Transylvanian envoy had received an audience from Kara Mustafa Paşa. Prince Apafi
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Mihály I’s chamberlain, named Ballo, had brought the yearly tribute of 80,000 Thaler and
declared to the new Grand Vizier that his prince did not wish anything other than the
welfare of the Sultan. Ballo was not alone at the audience. Two “rebels,” as Kindsperg
referred to them, accompanied him. They requested support from the Grand Vizier
against the “Teŭtschen.” Kindsperg noted that the “rebels” did not receive any formal
endorsement, but the Grand Vizier stated that if the Germans attacked them or molested
Transylvania, such acts would require resistance. The report generally pleased the readers
at the Hofburg. An undated and unsigned opinio expressed satisfaction with Kara
Mustafa Paşa’s compliment upon reading Kindsperg’s congratulatory letter. Regarding
the Hungarian “rebels,” the same opinio stated that the Hofburg had decided to warn Graf
von Strasoldo, the captain-general of Upper Hungary, to maintain good relations with the
Ottomans and not present any reason for hostilities from the other side of the border.
In response to Kindsperg’s letter, the Hofburg sent an instruction on March 8,
1677.358 It is clear from the instruction that Kindsperg’s positive portrayal of Kara
Mustafa Pasha, whom the ambassador was yet to meet in person, raised the hopes in
Vienna that the existing peace between the two states could be extended. The Hofburg
was pleased to have learned that the ambassador had exchanged compliments with the
new Grand Vizier and also heard positive things from him, a good sign to receive the
long-suspended audience by the Sultan. The instruction ordered Kindsperg seek in every
way the cooperation of Kara Mustafa Paşa, expecting decisive success at the end.
Kindsperg was also ordered to learn on why the audience had been suspended.
Concerning the good-reception of the Transylvanian “rebels” at the Porte, Vienna
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informed Kindsperg that Colonel Graf von Strassoldo was ordered to maintain good
neighborliness and conserve peace on his side of the border. The letter then gave a brief,
optimistic account of the operations against Louis XIV in the Saar and continued as
follows: “Praise be to God, we are in such situation that in case of a war with the Turks,
we will be superior by means of divine grace; and thereby things in Hungary can be in a
better, quieter, and safer state. To that end, the Christian forces would be unhindered
where emergency requires; but as long as the Porte does not give us a reason to do so,
you can assure them that we give our Imperial Promise not to undertake anything against
the existing peace.”
Before that optimistic instruction arrived to Kindsperg, the ambassador sent
another report to Vienna. It was written on March 16, 1677 and was sent from Adrianople
through courier Phillip Adams.359 This relatively long report included very important
information and observations that determined the nature of the relations between the
Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire in early 1677. Kindsperg’s report opened
with a note about the arrival of the Polish delegation to the Ottoman capital, and
summarized the articles of the Treaty of Żurawno signed on October 17, 1676 between
the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Ottoman Empire. Then, Kindsperg
continued with a detailed historical summary of the developments in Ukraine, starting
from the Cossack Hetman Petro Dorošenko’s resort to the Ottoman Sultan. I have already
explained in the previous chapter the course of events in Ukraine in the late 1660s and
early 1670s. In 1675, Petro Dorošenko, who had accepted the Sultan’s suzerainty upon
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being neglected by the Poles and Muscovy at the Peace of Andrusovo in 1667, renounced
his allegiance to the Sultan and acknowledged Muscovy’s sovereignty in 1675.360 In the
fall of 1676, Muscovy also captured the Cossack stronghold Chyhyryn (Tr: Çehrin, Rus:
Чигири́н). Located at the immediate northern hinterland of Crimea, the city was
considered a strategic stronghold by the Ottomans.
Kara Mustafa Paşa’s first reaction to the Russian occupation of Chyhyryn was to
assign Vizier İbrahim Paşa and the Crimean Khan Selim Giray with the task of
recapturing the fortress.361 Kindsperg noted that the Ottoman court had issued in early
1677 an order of sürsat, a special war-time tax for this campaign.362 At the same time, the
Ottomans appointed Yurii Khmelnytsky as the new Cossack Hetman. He was the son of
the famed Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, and had been residing at the Ottoman capital
for several years. The physical captivity of such influential alternatives to the crowns of
the Sultan’s Central European vassals was a typical Ottoman policy. Petro Dorošenko’s
readmission of Muscovy’s sovereignty had presented an opportunity to take advantage of
one such name held captive at the Ottoman capital. The Ottoman court sent Yurii
Khmelnytsky along with the regalia to İbrahim Paşa and commanded the latter to declare
Khmelnytsky’s hetmanate in Ukraine.
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According to Kindsperg, Ukraine was not only a source of tribute and
contribution for the Porte, but also a means of overwhelming and subduing Poland in
years to come. Nevertheless, the earliest operations did not yield any favorable results for
the Ottoman court. Vizier Ibrahim Paşa’s twenty-three day siege in the summer of 1677
would be unsuccessful, resulting in both İbrahim Paşa and the Crimean Khan losing their
positions. The vizier was imprisoned at Yedikule (Seven Towers), whereas Selim Giray
was banished to Rhodes. Murat Giray would be eventually appointed to the khanate in
the fall of 1677.363
Having concluded his account of the events in Ukraine, Kindsperg again turned
his attention to Transylvania and Hungary, Austria’s principal eastern concern at the
time. Apparently, due to the urgency of the situation in Hungary, Kindsperg did not wait
until he received an audience from Kara Mustafa Paşa, but immediately after arriving in
Adrianople he contacted the Grand Vizier through the Habsburg internuncio Marco
Antonio. Kindsperg notified the Grand Vizier of the efforts of the “rebels” in
Transylvania and the initiatives of the French ambassador Marquis de Béthune in
Poland.364 Kindsperg was referring to the ongoing negotiations between Transylvania,
Poland, and France as per the Fogaras Accord signed on March 19, 1675 among the three
parties. Mainly a product of the French ambitions, the treaty had “treated the Hungarian
exiles as a distinct power-group” in the European politics.365 The aim of the accord was
to eventually unite Hungary and Transylvania under a pro-French king elected according
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to Hungary’s ancient customs. Thereby, Louis XIV was hoping to surround Austria with
enemies.366
It would be difficult to conceal such initiatives from the Austrian diplomats. The
Transylvanian ambassador in Istanbul, Kristóf Paskó, reported to his prince that the
Austrian ambassador had “purchased” a copy of the Fogaras Agreement from the French
ambassador’s deputy in Adrianople.367 That Austrian ambassador was probably
Giambattista Casanova, Kindsperg’s predecessor, but it is certain that Kindsperg himself
was well-informed about the developments. Kindsperg wrote to the Grand Vizier that
great border confusions would follow such enterprises in Transylvania. Moreover, he
argued that the Transylvanians would prefer to become subjects of France rather than the
Porte. The ambassador also added that, if the “rebels” were not eliminated immediately
through a military campaign, the “restless French nation” would become a neighbor to
the Ottoman Empire and intervene with the border issues in Hungary.368 In case, the
“rebels” were eradicated and Marquis de Béthune’s “machinations” were prevented,
however, then the remaining imperial forces would also be dissipated from the Upper
Hungary except in places that were occupied out of necessity. Thereby, tranquility would
be restored along the border. In response to the internuncio’s communication, Kara
Mustafa Paşa reported that the French intervention in Hungary was unacceptable. Just as
the Habsburgs would not want to have the French as neighbors, the Porte would also not
want to see them as neighbors.
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According to Kindsperg, the Grand Vizier had heard about the accord signed
between France, Transylvania, and Poland through the ambassador’s communication. If
one relies on the Austrian’s account of what happened next, upon learning these secret
initiatives the Transylvanian representative, named Kubuni Laslo, an agent of Count Paul
Wesselényi, was dismissed by the Ottoman court without receiving an audience. The next
day, the Grand Vizier ordered the commander at Eger (Tr: Eğri, Ger: Erlau) to avoid
confusion along the border. Thus, after the first communication between Kindsperg and
Kara Mustafa Paşa, there was no sign of modification in Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s Central
European policy.
On February 22, 1677 Kindsperg received his first audience from Kara Mustafa
Paşa, who was still in Adrianople with the main army since their return from the Polish
frontier.369 The audience took place at Kara Mustafa Paşa’s house office in Adrianople.
Two stools of equal shape and height were prepared in the second floor meeting room.
The ambassador first entered the room, took his seat, and waited for Kara Mustafa Paşa.
Then the Grand Vizier walked into the room and sat across from the Austrian
ambassador, who stood up and congratulated his host:
Upon the new Grand Vizier’s entrance into the room I congratulated him
because of his assumption of office, hoping that during his grand vizierate
the subjects of both sides, who are repressed by un-peace-loving rebels,
will recover and praise God due to his good government. In response, [the
Grand Vizier] said that his vizierate was a gift of God.370
Kindsperg then continued to explain to Kara Mustafa Pasha that the continuous
bloodshed along the borderlands necessitated an ultimate resolution. The Emperor
369
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certainly wanted to preserve the existing peace with the Porte, if in that way the
intolerable hostilities and pressures [in borderlands] would be brought to an end. The
Austrian ambassador, whom Kara Mustafa Paşa’s kahya notified before the meeting not
to negotiate openly during the audience and instead to prepare a written statement,
presented a six-page report to the Grand Vizier. That report included a list of peace
violations committed throughout the last year by the Ottoman commanders in Oradea,
Eger, Nové Zámky, Buda, Nagykanizsa, and Bosnia. Upon receiving the report, Kara
Mustafa Paşa responded that he would read the letter and added that the Ottoman Empire
also wanted to maintain and strengthen the peace by all means possible.
Then, the Austrian ambassador provided Kara Mustafa Pasha with a brief account of the
recent campaigns in the Dutch War (1672-1678), where two allied camps fought each
other, one formed around the Dutch Republic (also called the Quadruple Alliance) and
the other led by France. The Habsburg Monarchy was an ally of the Dutch Republic. The
previous year, the highlight of the campaign for the Quadruple Alliance was the
successful siege of Phillipsburg, a strategic fortress located on the eastern bank of Rhine
and held by France since 1644. Kindsperg told the Grand Vizier that the allies had
successfully laid siege to Phillipsburg and defeated the French. Also, the Swedes were
brought to the ground and had lost their fleet.371 There were many other successful
campaigns, and new territories were captured. Kindsperg described Kara Mustafa Pasha’s
reaction as follows:
The [Grand] Vizier showed great satisfaction on account of [our] success,
and asked if all that had happened in one year. In response, I said that
371
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most of it had happened during the last campaign season. The Grand
Vizier said that he was pleased [to hear all this]; the Ottoman Empire is
always glad to learn that its friend prevails and prospers against enemies,
and [the Porte] certainly desires to preserve the peace.
The audience was soon over.372 Kindsperg was customarily served coffee and
şerbet, and smoked amber tobacco before he stood up, showed reverence, and left the
meeting room. The communication about the situation in Hungary, however, continued
between the ambassador and the Grand Vizier, who was preparing to leave Adrianople
for Istanbul.373 On February 26, Kindsperg sent his internuncio Marco Antonio to Kara
Mustafa Paşa with “great exaggerations” against the “rebels” who “were the reason
behind the ruin of both sides’ subjects, and, therefore, had to be abolished.”374 The main
request of the ambassador from the Ottoman court concerned the communication method
between the Ottoman commander in Buda and the Austrian fortresses on the other side of
the border. In line with Kindsperg’s instructions, Marco Antonio reported to Kara
Mustafa Paşa that previously when border issues necessitating urgent resolution occurred,
the paşa at Buda would himself send “unnecessary delegations” to Vienna without
waiting for “express” or “immediate” orders of the Ottoman court.375 The internuncio
requested from Kara Mustafa Paşa, however, to authorize the present paşa at Buda to
communicate through letters with the Austrian controlled Raab or Tottis about such
“small affairs.”376 In this manner, the old border custom would be maintained and “the
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poor subjects lying on streets … would rise up.”377 At the first glance, meetings between
the two sides appeared to be a more preferable way of resolving urgent issues.
Nonetheless, the Austrian decision-makers considered visiting delegations unnecessary,
likely because the problems were not resolved at a single meeting and necessitated
multiple sessions, each already interrupted by exchange of letters with superiors.
Kara Mustafa Paşa thereupon admitted that it would be the “right” thing to
authorize the paşa at Buda to communicate through letters rather than sending çavuşs or
ağas. However, in a quite interesting remark, which I will further analyze below, Kara
Mustafa Paşa questioned whether the rebels themselves were causing so many
problems.378 In response, as instructed by Kindsperg, Marco Antonio said that the
“rebels” were the source of the ruin along the border. Upon that comment, Kara Mustafa
Paşa gave several orders to his courtiers present at the meeting. He ordered his
reisülküttab (chief of scribes) to initiate an investigation into the previous and present
conditions at the border. He also ordered another courtier to compose a prohibition letter
(Verbotschreiben) to the frontier based on the verbal and written information provided by
the Austrians and dispatch it to the Ottoman border commanders. In addition, he ordered
an inquiry into the French-Transylvanian cooperation and the Polish involvement in that
contact. The ultimate goal was to avert the disorderliness along the border.379 Marco
Antonio’s meeting with Kara Mustafa Paşa had thus ended.
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Kindsperg also notified Vienna of a confidential conversation he held with kahya,
who told to the ambassador that the Grand Vizier was inclined to get rid of the rebels.
According to kahya, however, Kara Mustafa Paşa first wanted to gather satisfactory
information about the situation and inform the Sultan about the disorderliness. Kahya
also shared some very interesting information with Kindsperg: one of Kara Mustafa
Paşa’s plans was to discredit the “badly guided” ministry of his predecessor, and remove
Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s dependents, without exceptions, from the high positions they were
occupying. Every border paşa would be replaced at the end, but the replacements had to
be approved by the Sultan.380
Kindsperg’s first report following his first audience with the Grand Vizier
included some very interesting details that beg for interpretation. First, the positive
descriptions of Kara Mustafa Paşa certainly convinced the Hofburg to extend the peace
with the Ottoman Empire. The new Grand Vizier had sincerely welcomed the Austrian
ambassador on February 22, 1677, as well as the Austrian interpreter on February 26. The
overall atmosphere during the first audience, and Kara Mustafa Paşa’s manner toward the
Austrian interpreter, was so positive that Kindsperg compared Fazıl Ahmed Paşa to Kara
Mustafa Paşa and praised the latter: “The [Grand] Vizier is a quite friendlier, better, and a
more straightforward character than the previous vizier. After my departure, he spoke
positively about me at the imperial council [dîvan].”381 One cannot know for sure
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whether Kara Mustafa Paşa spoke positively about the ambassador at the imperial
council. However, Kindsperg’s portrayal of Kara Mustafa Paşa as a better character than
Fazıl Ahmed Paşa, who was portrayed in contemporary Ottoman and European sources
as a calm, judicious, and charismatic statesmen, illustrates that the Grand Vizier
displayed a friendly and temperate personality during the earliest months of his term in
office. That was hardly surprising. Kara Mustafa Paşa’s previous expertise inside the
court at the highest echelons of bureaucracy had made him a self-assured statesman long
before his rise to the grand vizierate. The condition of the state only strengthened his
hands. In the last two decades, the Ottoman Empire had emerged stronger from all major
military commitments under the Köprülü regime. The state was safe against domestic and
foreign threats more than any time in the seventeenth century. By the mid-1670s, the
strongest prospective enemy, the Habsburg Monarchy, was pressing the Ottoman
government to renew the existing peace between the two states. Moreover, Kara Mustafa
Paşa was much safer than many pre-Köprülü era grand viziers. He certainly had enemies,
but none of them were strong enough to challenge the heir of the mighty Köprülüs. When
considered within this broader framework, Kindsperg’s first impression of Kara Mustafa
Paşa as a friendly and comfortable character is therefore hardly surprising. During the
following months, these observations continued to guide the Monarchy’s Ottoman policy,
which focused on renewing the peace with the Porte at all costs.
The second important section in the report was Kara Mustafa Paşa’s question to
Marco Antonio regarding the extent of the anti-Habsburg movement in Hungary and his
orders for investigation of the situation along the border. His question and the
investigation orders suggest at first glance that the Ottoman Grand Vizier, in early 1677,
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was not well-informed about the disruption that the Kuruc rebels had caused in Habsburg
Hungary and Transylvania. In reality, it was simply impossible for Kara Mustafa Paşa to
be unaware of the extent of the rebellion. The Ottoman court regularly received reports
from the borderland commanders regarding the situation in the region. Also, the
Hungarian malcontents had sent many delegations to Fazıl Ahmed Paşa over the past
decade. Kara Mustafa Paşa, as the deputy grand vizier, had met the agents of the
malcontents several times, and was certainly aware of the severity of the Kuruc
operations in Hungary by the mid-1670s. Moreover, in November 1676, only two weeks
after his appointment to the grand vizierate, he had met with the representatives of the
malcontents, who requested protection from the Ottoman court. Such background
information suggests that Kara Mustafa Paşa was well-informed about the extent of the
anti-Habsburg movement in Hungary, but he wanted to give the impression to the
Habsburgs that he was uninterested in the developments. If that was the case, the Grand
Vizier was probably trying to gain time by misleading the Austrians, because the
situation in Chyhyryn demanded a quick intervention. Petro Dorošenko’s betrayal of the
Sultan after spending seven years as his protectorate, and his entrance to Muscovy’s
sphere of influence in the fall of 1676, could not be ignored at Istanbul.
Nonetheless, although it is difficult to determine definitively whether Kara
Mustafa Paşa had any plans in his mind regarding the Hungarian affairs only several
months into his term, a third and most interesting detail in the report raises strong
suspicion. According to the confidential conversation between the Grand Vizier’s kahya
and Kindsperg, Kara Mustafa Paşa was planning to replace all border paşas who were
“dependents” of his predecessor, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa. As explained earlier, in the Ottoman
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court an individual’s escalation in the decision-making mechanism often also meant the
rising fortunes of his household members. Thus, Kara Mustafa Paşa’s desire to work with
his trustees was not a novelty. What makes his plans to replace “alle Gräniz Passen” in
Transylvania so noteworthy, however, is that, despite the affinity and mutual trust that
existed between Fazıl Ahmed Paşa and Kara Mustafa Paşa during the former’s grand
vizierate, the latter apparently disagreed with his predecessor’s Hungarian policy. One
can only conjecture about the matter due the limited reliability of a foreign ambassador’s
report on the dynamics of the Ottoman court, but it may be reasonably assumed in the
light of Kindsperg’s report dated March 8, 1677 that Kara Mustafa Paşa had certain plans
regarding Transylvania and Hungary from the earliest days of his grand vizierate. If any
such plans existed as early as March 1677, including a campaign into central Europe to
resolve matters definitively, they could only be realized through loyal and credible
commanders whose fortunes depended on the Grand Vizier. The story of Kara Mustafa
Paşa’s career as the Grand Vizier and his negotiations with Kindsperg during the
following months will further strengthen the judgment that there indeed existed such
plans. During the following months, Vienna continued to believe that the peace with the
Ottoman Empire could be renewed.

Raimondo Montecuccoli’s congratulatory letter to Kara Mustafa Paşa
Kindsperg’s report from March 8 arrived in Vienna in less than four weeks, because his
instructions, composed on April 9, 1677 in Vienna, touched upon the matters he
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discussed in that report.382 First, Kindsperg was instructed to gather precise information
about the conditions of the peace between the Ottoman Empire and Poland. Vienna
wanted the ambassador to keep alert eyes (“wachtsambes Augen”) on the meetings
between the two parties, while inquiring whether the Polish envoy had any additional
matters to discuss with the Ottomans. Eventually, he was expected to retrieve a copy of
the ratified treaties. Second, the Hofburg was expecting reliable information about the
next possible move of the Ottomans. Since the Polish campaign was over, Vienna wanted
to know if there was a possibility of an Ottoman campaign on Muscovy.383
The third and the most important issue the instruction touched upon was the
situation in Hungary. Vienna emphasized that regarding the “silencing” of the turmoil in
the Hungarian Kingdom, the new Grand Vizier made “good and peaceful” offers, yet
“did little for the observation of the good neighborliness.”384 Kindsperg was told that,
despite his note about the abolishing of Count Paul Wesselényi’s agent, Kubuni Laslo,
from the Ottoman court without audience, there was continuous ransacking in Upper
Hungary around Oradea (Tr: Varad; Ger: Wardein), where the rebels were “provided
accommodation.” Therefore, Kindsperg was expected to work constantly for the Grand
Vizier’s words to take effect and result in the eradication and obliteration of all the
“rebels.” To that end, Vienna authorized Kindsperg to give a special present to Kara
Mustafa Paşa, but he was also instructed to wait until the problems in Hungary were
solved definitively and the resolutions took full effect.
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The instruction had a significant attachment. In his above analyzed report, dated
March 8, Kindsperg had recommended to Vienna that Raimondo Montecuccoli, the
Habsburg War Council President, should send a letter to Kara Mustafa Paşa to accelerate
the resolution process in Hungary. That letter was attached to the instruction written on
April 9 and was sent to the Ottoman capital.385
Devletlü ve saʻadetlü muhibb ve dostumuz hazretlerinin huzur-u
ʻizzetlerine selamlar ve ʻarz-ı muhabbetler iblağ ve ithâf olundukdan
sonra cenâb-ı ʻizzetlerine lâyık ve mahsus olan münir-nişîn sadâret-i
ʻazamî mertebesine nâil olduğuna ʻatebe-i ʻâliyede mümekkin olan
ʻazametlü Çâsâr’ın kapu kethüdâsı [Johann Christopher von Kindsperg]
mektubuyla bize iʻlâm eylemişdür. İmdî mübârek sulh ve ko[m]şuluk şartı
budur ki mesrûr ve mahzûz olduğumuzu iʻlâm eyleyeyüz. Hemân Hakk
Sübhane ve Teʻala saʻadetlü ve kudretlü Âl-i Osman pâdişâhına sadâret-i
ʻazamî mertebesi cenâb-ı ʻizzetlerine dâim ü devlet ve saʻadetle ʻömr-ü
tavîl müyesser eyleye. Mezbûr kapu kethüdâsı tafsîl üzere cenab-ı
ʻizzîlerine böyle ʻazîm mertebeye lâyık olduğundan meʻada sulh ve salâha
ve emn ve emâna meyl ve muhabbeti ve Macar serhadleri izdiyâd-i
refâhiyyet üzere olmaları babında sâdıkâne ve vaʻadleri olduğu babında
bildirmişdir. Böyle olduğu içün sulh ve salâha takayyüdümüz zuhurun
bulunması içün cemʻ-i serhadde kapudanlara muhkem fermanlar irsali ile
tenbih idüb tâ kim nâmaʻkul olan ʻadâvetden ve çeteden menʻ idüb ve iki
ʻazametlü ve kudretlü pâdişâh arasında ʻakd olunan mübârek sulh ve
salâhın maddeleri lâyıkı üzere hıfz eyleyeler. Yetmiş seneden berü ʻatebe-i
ʻâliye ile ʻakd olunan izdiyâd üzere olan mübarek sulhun şartları üzere
eğer ʻasî olanlara ki size tarafdar olmuşdur, bu ana değin bizimkilerden
kovulmuş ve firar itmiş sizin memleketlere kabul ve himayet olunmazlar
ise reʻaya fakirlerine olan zarar ve ziyan ve zulm ve taʻaddi sebebi defʻ
olunur ve serhadde artırdığımuz ʻaskeri bundan sonra refʻolunub ve bu
vech ile tekrar dostluk ve ko[m]şuluğa lâyık olan kâʻideleri pekiştirmeğe
mübâşir olunur ve reʻaya fukarâsı kel-evvel asûde-hâl olub emn ve emâna
bâʻis olanlara duʻâcı olalar. Mezbur kapu kethüdaları sulha müteʻallık
olan müsâlahaları vâkîʻ oldukda mesmuʻ-u izzetleri olub ve hüsn-ü
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nazarları ve muhabbetleri diriğ buyurmayalar. Bâki hemişe ʻizz ü devlet,
der seney-i sadaret (...) Be-makam-ı Beç. Mah-ı Aprilin dokuzuncu günü
be-tarih-i Hazret-i ʻİsa, sene 1677.
Mahlas: Azametlü Çasarın başvekili ve seraskeri Raimondo Montecuccoli.
The content of Montecuccoli’s letter essentially repeated the border issues that
Kindsperg had discussed in detail with the Grand Vizier. The letter opened with
salutations exalting Kara Mustafa Paşa for his assumption of office and stated that the
ambassador Kindsperg had notified Vienna of Kara Mustafa Paşa’s willingness to
maintain the peace along the border. Accordingly, the War Council President requested
the Grand Vizier’s cooperation and wanted him to send firm decrees to the Ottoman
border commanders to refrain from “unacceptable animosities and guerilla activities” and
not patronize the rebels banished by Vienna in violation of the “seventy-year” long peace.
If such precautions would be taken, which were the requirements of good friendship and
neighborliness between the two “sublime and powerful rulers,” Austria too would
withdraw the reinforcements deployed at the border and work to consolidate the peace.
When evaluated simultaneously with the instruction to which it was attached,
certain aspects of the letter made it a diplomatically and historically significant
document. The letter bore the signature of the Habsburg War Council President and
officially reflected the Habsburg policy toward the Ottoman Empire at the time. By early
1677, the Monarchy principally aimed to preserve the status quo on its eastern border and
avoid a war with the Ottoman Empire at all costs. To that end, Kindsperg was even
advised and allowed by Vienna to give a special gift, or bribe, to Kara Mustafa Paşa and
other individuals at the Ottoman court. In fact, Kindsperg’s instruction specifically
mentioned Alexander Mavrocordato and encouraged the ambassador to give gifts if the
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interpreter would contribute to the realization of the Austrian plans.386 Rhetorically, the
letter was quite deliberate and purposeful. The Austrian court neglected the monumental
confrontation between the two states at St. Gotthard in 1664 and directly referred back to
the Treaty of Zsitvatorok from 1606 as the beginning of the peace between the two states.
As an unquestionably intentional diplomatic gesture, the reference to Zsitvatorok
illustrated the willingness of the Habsburg Monarchy to forget the most recent hostilities
to renew the peace.
Austria insisted on renewing the peace with the Ottomans largely due to its
commitments in the west, but the recurrent peace requests and the Austrian’s readiness to
pay a high price for that peace must have influenced the long-term the decision-making
processes at the Ottoman capital. Only several months into Kara Mustafa Paşa’s term in
office, Austria appeared to be ready to make material sacrifices by disbursing gifts at the
Ottoman court. More significant were Vienna’s intangible concessions. Although the
diplomatic initiatives in Istanbul subtly synthesized the unremitting quest for cooperation
with a steadfast diplomatic posture, Vienna displayed itself as desperate, therefore more
vulnerable and fragile, than it would want to appear to the Ottoman statesmen. It is
probable that in the long term, the ever-intensifying peace inquiries of Vienna paved the
way in Istanbul for the formulation of an aggressive Central Europe policy that aimed to
take advantage of the seemingly desperate condition of the Habsburg Monarchy.
Despite the individual request of the Austrian War Council President from the
Grand Vizier to renew the peace and cooperatively abolish the “rebels,” Kara Mustafa
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Paşa continued to honor the Kuruc envoys as they frequented the Ottoman court. The
circumstances at the Porte were starting to get tougher for the Austrian ambassador.
Kindsperg’s next report, sent on May 28, 1677 from Constantinople, informed Vienna
that three Transylvanian “Haubt Rebellen” had again received an audience at the
Ottoman court on May 5.387 The delegation included two individuals named Melchiorn
Kezer and Gabriel Kende, and a third one who, along with his twelve servants, requested
to remain at the Porte as the Transylvanian ambassador. At the meeting with kahya,
according to Kindsperg’s report, the Transylvanians told him that since their “rebellion”
had begun eight years ago, all of their possessions had been spoiled by the “Germans.”
The Porte had promised to support their movement, but due to the lack of such support,
some of the Transylvanians had defected to the “Germans.” The majority, however, was
still loyal to the Ottomans and needed a place to take refuge in and protect themselves.
Kahya reported all this to the Grand Vizier, who then decided to send two ağas to the
border to gather information about all the border affairs. He also ordered the ağas to look
for a place for the “rebels” where they cannot be discharged or hurt. Kindsperg’s
“exclamations” were fruitless.388
Before the two ağas returned from the frontier, two couriers with complaints from
the paşas at Oradea and Eger arrived at Istanbul, as well as a commission from Debrecen
consisting of three persons who came with old and new complaints. Upon signing of the
Fogaras Accord in 1675, the Privy Council had taken precautions to preclude the
prospects of a French-Transylvanian alliance. Through Tamás Pálffy, Austria’s
Hungarian chancellor, Vienna approached Apafi Mihály I, the pro-Ottoman Prince of
387
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Transylvania, and offered to negotiate. The talks were fruitless. Apafi rejected Vienna’s
offers and stipulated his own conditions for the resolution of the ongoing problems.
Meanwhile, as another precaution, Graf von Strasoldo, the Monarchy’s captain-general of
Upper-Hungary, occupied Debrecen and “held it to ransom, as if to demonstrate that the
Habsburg emperor disposed of vastly greater forces than Apafi.”389 The Debreceners
reported to the Grand Vizier that a “German” regiment of 5,000 soldiers had plundered
the city and the territory around it. The “Germans” had done the same the previous year
and did not yet refund the loss. Kindsperg noted that, as a result of the reports and
complaints which were cemented with verbal indictments at the audience, Kara Mustafa
Paşa had gained a bad impression against the “Germans.”390 Before too long, Kindsperg
also received a summary of these complaints from the Grand Vizier.
When Apafi’s agent notified the Grand Vizier of the Austrian presence in
Debrecen, the latter was not happy about what he had heard. Kindsperg’s response to the
summary of the complaints was therefore very important. In response to the Grand
Vizier’s inquiry regarding the situation in Debrecen, Kindsperg reported that he was not
aware of the developments there. The Emperor’s most recent instruction from March 8th
had not mentioned the matter. Moreover, according to the same instruction, Graf von
Strasoldo had received sharp orders from Vienna to preserve the peace in his territory.
Nonetheless, Kindsperg stated that Debrecen was a “robber’s den” and the “rebels” there
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were robbing from the subjects of the Emperor.391 He didn’t believe that the Germans
would affront the Transylvanians without reason.392
Upon Kindsperg’s response, Kara Mustafa Paşa suggested to Kindsperg to
dispatch to the Emperor an express courier, who would be escorted by a Turkish guard
and use post-horses. What Kara Mustafa Paşa essentially wanted to learn was the reason
behind the Austrian incursions into Debrecen, a Transylvanian city, hence a protectorate
of the Sultan. Also, there were issues that awaited a response, such as whether the people
living in the area would be compensated for the harvest seized by the Austrians the
previous year.393 The Grand Vizier next gave a warning to the ambassador: if the
hostilities continued, if the subjects in Debrecen were not refunded for their losses, and if
they were further molested, all the Turkish fortresses along the border would be
commanded to carry out attacks across the border, such that everything would be in ruin
with fire and sword, as a prelude to war.394 In response to that open threat, Kindsperg
requested the Grand Vizier to wait until the aforementioned courier returned from Vienna
before sending such incursion orders to the Ottoman border paşas. Kara Mustafa Paşa
agreed to Kindsperg’s offer.
Meanwhile, there were other issues between the Transylvanians and the Ottoman
court. The agents of Apafi Mihály I had brought 2,000 ducats to Kara Mustafa Paşa and
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500 ducats to kahya, and they had certain requests from the Porte.395 They wanted the
paşa at Oradea not to intervene with subjects and territories belonging to the principality.
At the same time, Apafi wanted the Ottoman court to return Dávid Zólyomi to
Transylvania with all of his properties. The Ottomans rejected that request on the grounds
that Zólyomi was a guest at the Porte. In fact, Dávid Zólyomi was “kept in reserve as a
prince-in-waiting in Constantinople,” a precaution against Apafi Mihály I.396
Such disagreements between the Transylvanians and the Ottoman court, however,
did not change the fact that the two parties were becoming increasingly closer, severely
handicapping the Austrian ambassador’s mission at Istanbul. The next instruction sent
from Vienna only increased the pressure on Kindsperg, while also demonstrating that
Vienna, severely threatened by the operations of the Hungarian malcontents, wanted to
resolve the matter immediately. Dated June 18, Kindsperg’s instruction opened with a
broad analysis of the ambassador’s previous reports starting from January 1676.397
Through very sharp language, the Hofburg stated that the ambassador had numerous
times (on January 18, April 2, and July 5, 1676; March 16, 1677) reported that the
Ottoman border commanders had received orders from Constantinople to stop
aggressions and maintain good neighborliness. The ambassador had also written that the
new Grand Vizier was inclined to get rid of the “rebels.” However, many orders that were
allegedly sent to the Turkish commanders and “contestations” expressed by the Turkish
side did not have the “least effect” on the situation. The Hofburg was wondering if the
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Ottoman court was “outwardly” making “fictitious” promises, or whether the orders were
not observed by the court’s subordinates.398
The instruction then replicated the points emphasized in the instructions sent to
Kindsperg since November 1676. The disorderliness and excesses along the border would
ultimately result in the ruin of the subjects, and therefore necessitated a quick resolution.
As per the Zsitvatorok Treaty, which had been reconfirmed since 1606 and was known
throughout the country, the “rebels” could not be offered shelter (receptaculum), not only
along the Turkish border but also in Transylvania. The Hofburg emphasized one more
time that the Monarchy stoutly desired to preserve the peace with the Ottomans, in case
the latter did not cause any adversity. If, however, the hostile intentions continued to exist
and one would need to use arms in Transylvania and elsewhere as “the war became
close,” then, the instruction stated, “we want to be excused from all the evil.”
The instruction also touched upon, with further details and more precision, to a
previously considered method to convince the Grand Vizier for a renewal of peace: a
special gift or bribe. Kindsperg was authorized to give away as “adoration” to the Grand
Vizier sixty or more pouches of money or something else that will please him.399
Kindsperg’s orders were strict. The gift could be handed over on the condition that the
Austrian demands in Transylvania (the elimination of “robbers” and “rebels” and the
“bridling” of the Transylvanians) would be realized.
The instruction was written and signed, but before it was handed over to a courier,
Kindsperg’s report dated May 28 arrived at Vienna. As earlier emphasized, that report
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included Kara Mustafa Paşa’s inquiry regarding the Debrecen affair. The Viennese court
thereupon attached a postscript to the concluded instruction, an explanation of the
developments in Debrecen from the Austrian perspective. Vienna was surprised at how
passionately Kara Mustafa Paşa received the complaints coming from Debrecen, and how
“outraged” he was, unlike his predecessor, about the complaints.400 Kindsperg was
notified that the Grand Vizier was wrong regarding the Ottoman sovereignty in
Debrecen, but neither did Vienna claimed authority over the city, suggesting that the
Austrian presence was indeed a political and military precaution. Rather than making any
promises, the Hofburg expressed its optimism one more time about the renewal of peace.
In the meantime, the Porte received a report from the governor of Buda. The
report consisted of complaints from the Ottoman subjects at several frontier locations.
Kindsperg communicated those complaints to Vienna with a letter dated June 25,
1677:401 the Ottoman regiment commander in Simontornya was imprisoned at the
Austrian fortress of Raab; the garrison from another Austrian-held city, Komárom, was
inflicting damages to the Ottoman subjects nearby; and the hajduks based in Veszprém
were carrying out incursions as far as Osijek. In addition, a Hungarian “rebel” group of
200 cavalry were daily plundering the villages around Pest. There were also reports
arriving in the Ottoman capital about the Austrian activities. The Monarchy was
reportedly taking defensive precautions against a possibility of aggression from their
extended eastern frontier. For instance, the Ottoman paşa at Nové Zámky had informed
Istanbul about the construction of an Austrian fortress on Ottoman territory. When
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questioned about the matter, Kindsperg responded to the Ottoman court that the aforesaid
fortress was not new; it was an old castle and was only being renovated.
The letter of the paşa at Buda was not the only letter that arrived to the capital.
Apafi Mihály I was also sending letters one after another, seeking support from Kara
Mustafa Paşa. Through a letter, Apafi had informed the Grand Vizier about the new
Habsburg proposals.402 Emperor Leopold I, who had been repressing the Protestants in
Hungary for more than a decade, was now offering the Transylvanians to let them rebuild
their churches to appease their anger against Vienna. Apafi wrote to Kara Mustafa Paşa
that, if the promised Ottoman support would not be delivered soon, Transylvania would
make an agreement with Austria. According to Kindsperg, the letter still did not provoke
a definitive move by the Ottoman capital. Kara Mustafa Paşa kept on waiting for the
couriers he had dispatched to the frontier.
A month later, on July 23, Kindsperg composed another report.403 The Grand
Vizier’s couriers had finally arrived back from the frontier, but, to Kindsperg’s surprise,
they reported that everything was fine at the frontier, except the operations of the
“rebels.” The ambassador had a chance to discuss the matter with Kara Mustafa Paşa at
another audience. Kindsperg repeated the Austrian concerns one more time: the French
and Poles were the masterminds behind the trouble at the frontier, and they were planning
to seat a pro-French king on the Hungarian throne. Kara Mustafa Paşa reminded
Kindsperg one more time that Apafi could not take such initiatives by himself, and
neither did the couriers bring such news. When Kindsperg wanted to discuss the matter
further, Kara Mustafa Paşa interrupted the ambassador and asked him questions about the
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condition of the imperial army against France. Kindsperg attempted to open the matter
for a second time, but this time he was interrupted with the beverage service. Next, the
Grand Vizier left the room. Thus, Kara Mustafa Paşa still had not disclosed his intentions
in Hungary to the Austrian ambassador. Kindsperg later learned that the Grand Vizier had
ordered the court interpreter Alexander Mavrocordato to compose a letter to Apafi and
ask him to dispatch an envoy to the Porte, but the ambassador did not yet have any
information about the content of the letter.

“The Vizier has completely changed his mood and demeanor”
By the end of July 1677, Kindsperg still had not provided Vienna with any decisive
information regarding the Ottoman intentions in Hungary. There was a remarkable
inconsistency between the words and actions of the Ottoman court. Both the Grand Vizier
and the highest-ranked Ottoman bureaucrats were telling Kindsperg that the Ottoman
Empire’s intention was to extinguish the fire in Hungary. Yet, since his ascension to
office, Kara Mustafa Paşa was openly welcoming the rebels in Istanbul, raising
suspicions that could not be ignored by Vienna. Despite frequent written and verbal
remonstrations by the Austrian ambassador, the Grand Vizier did not change his attitude
toward the Hungarian malcontents. The discrepancy between the Ottomans’ verbal
pledges and their actions convinced the Hofburg that the circumstances in Hungary
would not change unless the Ottoman court’s interest in Transylvania waned and the
Grand Vizier stopped making assuring vows to the “rebels.” It was true that France and
the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth were also involved in the anti-Habsburg
402
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movement in Hungary, but the Ottoman Empire was the only patron situated suitably to
take full advantage of the setback. During the following months, the Habsburgs decided
to lure Kara Mustafa Paşa with material promises to prevent further Ottoman
provocations in Hungary. In the meantime, the Austrian ambassador found a Grand
Vizier who was becoming increasingly harder to deal with.
Kindsperg’s next report from the Ottoman capital was dated August 13.404 The
developments in Hungary were yet again the central issue covered in the report.
Kindsperg recently had a meeting with kahya and reisülküttab (chief of scribes) to whom
he complained once more about Apafi’s initiatives. The two courtiers reported to
Kindsperg that the aforesaid letter sent by Mavrocordato to Apafi asked the Prince to
terminate all the treaties signed with France and the Commonwealth and break up
relations with them. Apafi was also commanded not to mobilize without the Ottoman
Empire’s knowledge or order. Furthermore, the Ottoman courtiers hinted to Kindsperg
that they would also strive to convince Kara Mustafa Paşa to banish the “rebel” agents
from Istanbul. Kindsperg knew that letters had already been sent to the frontier, to no
effect. Likewise, the Ottoman courtiers’ optimism about the Grand Vizier’s tendency to
abolish the “rebels” was not conducive to any meaningful results for the Monarchy. In
order to convert the Ottoman court’s ostensible pledges into reality, Vienna had earlier
considered bribing the Grand Vizier. This time, Kindsperg proposed that Vienna also
reward the Ottoman courtiers who served the Austrian interests, and he dispatched to
Vienna a list of bureaucrats who could be bribed at the Ottoman court.
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Nonetheless, Kindsperg was negative against giving a special gift to the Grand
Vizier. Kara Mustafa Paşa was still “warm” to the idea of war due to the situation in
Debrecen, and was demonstrating “inhumane caprices” about the problem there.405 In
fact, the Grand Vizier’s capriciousness was not limited to the issues at Debrecen.
Kindsperg wrote that “the Grand Vizier has completely changed his mood and demeanor
since he arrived in Constantinople. He is vehement toward Christians and Turks, treats all
quite harshly and stubbornly; he satisfies no one; and argues with everybody. And, since
he is inclined to do evil, it can be assumed that he will find a cause and opportunity by
means of the [Transylvanian] rebels to break with the imperial majesties.”406
It is difficult to guess what might have led to such change in Kara Mustafa Paşa’s
attitude. At the very first audience, the Grand Vizier had treated Kindsperg in so friendly
manner that the ambassador thought Kara Mustafa Paşa was a friendlier and a more
straightforward character than his predecessor, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa. Only ten months later,
Kindsperg described the new Grand Vizier as a “vehement” individual who pleased no
one and quarreled with everybody. Perhaps the severity of the existing challenges at the
time, such as the situation in Transylvania and the unsuccessful Chyhyryn campaign, had
increased the pressure on Kara Mustafa Paşa, causing him to develop an irritable
disposition. However, it is also possible that what altered was not the Grand Vizier’s
disposition, but rather Kindsperg’s thoughts about him. By August 1677, the
ambassador’s mission to renew the peace with the Ottomans had turned into an
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exasperating struggle to discredit the Hungarian malcontents at the Ottoman court. The
contradiction between the verbal promises of the Grand Vizier and his actions must had
further frustrated the ambassador, leading him to simply denigrate the Grand Vizier in the
eyes of Vienna.
Although one can only conjecture about the real reason behind Kindsperg’s
changing description of Kara Mustafa Paşa in August 1677, during the following months,
there were developments the ambassador interpreted as the harbingers of an Ottoman
assault directed toward west. Kindsperg noted that a letter from Transylvania that had just
arrived at Istanbul “pleased” the Grand Vizier. The letter stated that the “rebels” had been
“fed” by the Porte for nine years already and should not be forsaken. Rather, the letter
proposed, the “rebels” should be supported by a paşa and 500 men, who along with
thousands of Hungarians would carry out surprise attacks and capture garrisons and
fortresses in the close vicinity of Eger. It would allegedly be easy, because there was only
limited military presence in the area. Thereby, the Ottomans and Hungarians would
establish a stronghold in the region without paying a price. The letter concluded that such
operations would be greatly beneficial to the Porte.
Kindsperg believed that the deliberation was written by the Turkish subjects
around Eger, where there were other places that the Turks contemplated attacking and
occupying. Although nothing was yet determined at the Sublime Porte, in the face of such
prospective threats Kindsperg urged Vienna to issue military emergency warnings and
deploy reinforcements in the area so that the "rebels" could not gain a foothold there.

195

A decisive moment: Kara Mustafa Paşa’s treatment of Jan Gninski
Kindsperg’s next letter confirmed the ambassador’s concerns about Kara Mustafa Paşa’s
changing complexion.407 In the mid-summer of 1677, the Polish envoy Jan Gninski, the
Voivode of Chelmno, visited the Ottoman capital with an entourage consisting of 300
men. The envoy had a special mission as part of the Polish King Jan Sobieski III’s
ambitions in central and northern Europe. As mentioned, the Polish-Lithuanian
Commonwealth and France had signed an accord in 1675 to cooperate in Transylvania.
Sobieski knew that designing the principality according to the Polish interests could not
be achieved without the approval of the Ottoman court. Besides, the King had other plans
in the Baltic area which could not be realized unless the southern border of the
Commonwealth was safe. Jan Gninski’s first objective in Istanbul was to strengthen the
assumed friendship between the Ottoman Empire and Poland, as the French-Polish
initiative was taking further steps in Transylvania. The reconfirmation of this amity
would contribute to the envoy’s second goal: safeguarding of the Commonwealth’s
southern frontier against the Ottoman aggressiveness before Sobieski embarked on his
operations in the Baltic. In the meantime, Gninski, as a third goal, was expecting to
integrate as much land as possible in Podolia back into the Commonwealth. The ongoing
skirmishes between the Porte and Muscovy must have appeared to Jan Sobieski as a
perfect opportunity to achieve these goals.408
Jan Sobieski, the so-called future “savior of the Christendom,” was fond of the
eastern culture; “positively disposed toward the Muslim neighbor;” he had no intentions
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to initiate hostilities with the Porte.409 He had once established close relations with the
Crimean Khan Islam Giray (1644-1654), and could reportedly speak Turkish, Arabic, and
Persian. He had belonged to a “fraternity of magnates” from Volhynia, a territory in the
southeast of the Commonwealth “the fortunes of which [were] irrevocably bound to the
prosperity of the frontier.” It has been argued that “the ‘oriental tradition’ held pride of
place” in Sobieski’s conduct of public affairs.410
Yet, Kindsperg’s reports to Vienna demonstrated that the Polish King’s cultural
familiarity with the Ottoman world did not ease his envoy’s mission at Istanbul. Gninski
stayed in Istanbul for more than a year. He was greeted with great suspicion by the
Ottomans due to the ongoing Polish-French “machinations” in Transylvania. Moreover,
to Kindsperg’s surprise, the Polish envoy was not considered a plenipotentiary (“Gross
Botschafter”); the Grand Vizier treated him quite highhandedly and with deliberate
disregard. His request to stay at a mansion that was formerly used by the Austrian special
envoy Walter Leslie was rejected on the grounds that Gninski was representing a king,
not an emperor. Instead, the envoy stayed at a small room inside an inn. Kindsperg noted
that Gninski was bedridden (“bethlägerig”) because of his frustration.411
Gninski’s actual negotiations would not be more promising. The first audience
with the Sultan took place on August 16, where, to the pleasure of Kindsperg, the Polish
envoy’s chair was placed further away from the Grand Vizier than where Kindsperg’s
chair had stood during the Austrian’s most recent audience. The first meeting between
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Gninski and the Grand Vizier took place a week later, on August 23. According to
Kindsperg’s account, Kara Mustafa Paşa became so angry upon the Polish envoy’s
complaints about Ottoman rule in Podolia and positive remarks about the French King
that the Grand Vizier abruptly ended the meeting. Nonetheless, Gninski stayed in Istanbul
during the rest of 1677 and much of 1678 and had other meetings with the Grand Vizier,
even though the treatment he received did not change. The major issue that the two
parties ostensibly disagreed about was the possession of two fortresses, Bar and
Międzybórz. Yet, Kindsperg believed, according to his report dated November 21, 1677,
that Kara Mustafa Paşa was intentionally delaying the talks, because he was probably
considering a new campaign against Poland.
Kindsperg actually had a chance to express that idea to Jan Gninski himself in
Istanbul, when, in a rare and remarkable moment Gninski and his fifteen servants visited
the Austrian ambassador for lunch, on October 23, 1677.412 The Polish envoy had
supposedly visited Kindsperg to exchange opinions about his ongoing negotiations with
Kara Mustafa Paşa. Upon Gninski’s statement that, despite many weeks he had spent in
Istanbul, the negotiations were fruitless, Kindsperg responded that Gninski should not
modify the conditions he stipulated for peace. However, the Austrian added, the Grand
Vizier’s intention was to drag the talks out until spring and act according to what the
conjuncture would necessitate then. In any event, Kindsperg concluded, Kara Mustafa
Paşa’s inclination toward Poland was not better than his approach to Muscovy. The
Hofburg, when notified about the meeting, recommended that Kindsperg be extra careful
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with Gninski for he was a “devious” man and eventually a subject of his king about
whom he would not hesitate to talk badly to uncover the Austrian’s mindset.413
Jan Gninski eventually returned to Poland after approving Kara Mustafa Paşa’s
conditions. His mission was a diplomatic calamity. He was unambiguously humiliated by
Kara Mustafa Paşa, for whom the visit was nothing more than a display of homage by an
inferior ruler. Gninski’s account of the journey and negotiations opened dramatically:
“Shall I speak, or merely weep?”414 He recorded in his diary a statement, with attribution
to the Crimean Khan, which summarized the Ottoman attitude toward him: “we do not
care about your anger or your plea; we will not regress a nail wide.” During the
audiences, when requesting rectifications along the border, he was told: “whatever you
want, take it yourself!”415 Gninski, who had traveled to Istanbul to renew the peace with
the Ottoman Empire, ultimately urged Sobieski to dispatch envoys to the Pope, Emperor
Leopold I, Louis XIV, and to Muscovy. A war with the Ottoman Empire was looming in
the horizon.
It is difficult to know whether Kara Mustafa Paşa’s manner toward Jan Gninski
was a result of the Ottomans’ recent encounters with the Poles. Ottoman-Polish relations
since the Peace of Andrusovo had been quite strained. Chronicler Hacı Ali Efendi
portrayed Kara Mustafa Paşa, the deputy grand vizier, as a lenient negotiator during the
peace talks before the Buczacz Treaty in 1672.416 Yet, when the Polish Sejm refused to
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ratify the treaty and war renewed, Kara Mustafa Paşa participated in the campaigns as a
commander. Jan Sobieski, who would eventually send Jan Gninski to Istanbul, had
become the Polish King mainly as a result of his success against the Ottomans during
these campaigns, especially his victory at Hotin in the fall of 1673. The campaigns
continued until Kara Mustafa Paşa became the grand vizier in the fall of 1676, shortly
after a peace was concluded between Poland and the Ottoman Empire. Several months
after Kara Mustafa Paşa’s assumption of the grand vizierate, Gninski met the Sultan’s
new “absolute deputy” in Istanbul to further ameliorate relations. One can only
conjecture that perhaps these personal connections to Polish affairs frustrated the Grand
Vizier and resulted in his contemptuous attitude toward Sobieski’s envoy. Another
possibility is that the Polish-French partnership in Transylvania about which Kindsperg
frequently complained further instigated Kara Mustafa Paşa’s anger toward Poland. Or,
perhaps, it was Jan Gninski’s attitude toward the Ottoman court. According to Dimitrie
Cantemir, the Polish envoy’s presumptuousness was the reason behind the Grand Vizier’s
attitude. Cantemir wrote that Gninski, before his entry to Istanbul, requested that the
grand vizier meet him at the city gate. When that unreasonable request was rejected,
Gninski allegedly delayed his entry. Later, the envoy made an ostentatious public entry to
the city “designed for his honor,” but, as Cantermir noted, by irritating the grand vizier, it
“turned to his disgrace.” When informed about the arrival of the Polish envoy along with
seven hundred persons, Kara Mustafa Pasha allegedly said that “if [Gninski] meant to use
so numerous a band to take Constantinople, his followers were very few; but if he
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intended to salute the lofty threshold of the Sublime Port, he had brought too many with
him.”417
One cannot know for sure whether one of the above explanations led to Kara
Mustafa Paşa’s highhanded demeanor toward Gninski. It is certain, nonetheless, that
neither the Ottoman Grand Vizier nor the Polish envoy knew in late 1677 that the
former’s treatment of the latter would eventually become a critical historical juncture and
pave the way for extraordinary outcomes in Central European history. Six years later, on
September 12, 1683, Jan Sobieski III, who had once willfully applied to the Ottoman
court to rebuild friendly relations, only to be neglected by Kara Mustafa Paşa, would
command the European coalition army that reversed at Vienna the centuries-long
Ottoman expansion into Europe.
Johann Christoph von Kindsperg’s reports, sent from the Ottoman capital between
November 1676 and December 1677, illustrated that during the thirteen months following
the transfer of the sultan’s seal from Fazıl Ahmed Paşa to Kara Mustafa Paşa, the
atmosphere at the Ottoman court had changed significantly, mainly as a result of the
alterations in Kara Mustafa Paşa’s disposition. The Polish envoy Jan Gninski was not the
only foreign representative suffering the results of Kara Mustafa Paşa’s altering
temperament. On September 13, 1677, Kindsperg notified Vienna that Kara Mustafa Paşa
was harassing all foreign representatives “through all kinds of inventions.” He was
treating everybody by simply saying “I want this; I order.”418 At the Ottoman court, there
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was neither “reasonable persuasion” nor “lenient treatment” nor “assistance” to the
foreign representatives. The Turks were ridiculing all the Christians, as the Christians
were humbling themselves against them.419 The delivery of the previously mentioned
special gift to the “eigensinnig Vesier” would be useless, because, given his manners, a
gift would have no effect. On October 16, 1677, Kindsperg wrote to Vienna that, sooner
or later, the Ottoman Empire would achieve its objectives against Poland and Muscovy. It
was certain that the Ottomans would then turn their face to Hungary.420 There, the air and
land was much familiar to them for they many times marched in and out of it, and,
therefore, they would fight more comfortably.421 For the first time since Kara Mustafa
Paşa assumed the grand vizierate about a year ago, Kindsperg was speaking with such
certainty about the possibility of an Ottoman campaign into central Europe.
Whether the very conditions that caused Kindsperg to write with such conviction
also situated the Ottomans expediently for a campaign on Hungary or Austria was highly
questionable. By December 1677, the Ottoman Empire was surrounding itself with
enemies throughout the entire western and northern frontier. There was an ongoing war
with Muscovy in the north. Poland, despite its willingness to renew the existing peace
with the Porte, had turned into a prospective enemy. The Grand Vizier’s attitude toward
Hungarian malcontents was dragging toward another war in Hungary, while Venice,

419

Ibid.
“... so ist gewiss und unfehlbar...”
421
“...Zum Fall Sie aber über kurz oder lang von Pohlen und Moscau völlig impegnirt und selbiger Orthen
der Rŭhe versichert sein, so ist gewiss und unfehlbar das die Türckhen sich immediate wider Ungarn
wende werde, weilen ihme daselbsten der Lufft und des guete Landt viel ännhlicher und zum Khrieg
bequemlicher als anderwerhs, wo sie sich mit langen hin und wider marchiern.” Johann Christoph von
Kindsperg, October 16, 1677, HHStA: Staatenabteilungen, Türkei I, Karton 147.
420

202

which had recently suffered the loss of Candia to the Ottomans, was waiting for an
opportunity to retaliate.
How did Kara Mustafa Paşa, only within a year after his assumption of office,
expose the Ottoman Empire to such threats? The recently growing “renewal of faith”
paradigm assumes that these circumstances were a result of religious revivalism that
supposedly guided important decision-making moments during the second half of the
seventeenth century. Accordingly, Kara Mustafa Paşa was motivated by a timeless
phenomenon of jihad against Christendom. This explanation, at the first glance, appears
reasonable, but it is actually quite misleading. As Kindsperg noted, Kara Mustafa Paşa’s
“vehemence” was not directed only toward the “Christian” representatives. The Grand
Vizier was harsh toward the “Turks,” too. Therefore, explanations based on religious or
ideological motives are rather reductionist.
Another possible explanation is that Kara Mustafa Paşa’s absentmindedness or his
capriciousness toward foreign envoys, about which Kindsperg had also complained,
trapped the Empire in that vulnerable position. Such an explanation, however, would
mean that Kara Mustafa Paşa was an unskillful, inexperienced leader. In fact, the Grand
Vizier had considerable experience as a statesman during his pre-grand vizierate career,
which must have equipped him with adequate knowledge in both domestic and foreign
policy issues. How do we, then, explain the Grand Vizier’s handling of the foreign
envoys and the resulting dangerous international conjuncture which actually indicated the
lack of long-term strategic intentionality?
It appears that the recurrent skirmishes in Podolia and the decade’s long tumult in
Transylvania inclined the Grand Vizier to find a definitive resolution to the frontier
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matters by fighting these enemies all together. However, such a decision could not be
made without underestimating the capabilities and resourcefulness of the existing and
prospective enemies, while overestimating the limits of the Ottoman Empire’s actual
radius of operational power in Central Europe. This assessment may seem to contradict
the foregoing statement about the
expertise of the Grand Vizier, but it was not so given that the Köprülü regime had
victoriously survived many similar threats. This double-sided miscalculation continued to
guide the Grand Vizier’s policies in Europe, especially in Transylvania
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CHAPTER 5: PERSISTENT AUSTRIANS VS. NEGLIGENT KARA MUSTAFA
PAŞA

Johann Christoph von Kindsperg’s reports from the Ottoman capital during the late
summer and fall of 1677 raised strong suspicions at the Hofburg about the likelihood of
an Ottoman campaign into Central Europe. The situation necessitated Vienna to maintain
the regular flow of information from Istanbul while retaining maximum watchfulness
along the border. In early 1678, Kindsperg received sharp orders to inform Vienna
regularly about developments at the Porte. However, the fortunes of the House of Austria
in the next several years would be partially tied to an insidious enemy: the plague. Within
two years following Kindsperg’s first severe warning about the possibility of an Ottoman
campaign into Hungary, four Austrian representatives including Kindsperg himself lost
their lives to the plague. That was before they could conclude the peace Austria strongly
desired. One can only speculate about whether Kara Mustafa Paşa or other courtiers at
the Ottoman court interpreted the coincidence “as a divine omen against renewing the
treaty.”422 Yet the Ottoman grand vizier’s manner during the same years left no room for
speculation concerning his intentions. Until the appointment of Georg Christoph von
Kunitz, the Consul of the Austrian Oriental Company, as the Habsburg
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ambassador in the winter of 1680, Kara Mustafa Paşa’s court did not take any initiatives
to extend the peace treaty with the Habsburgs. Likewise, they did not take any action to
stop the ongoing restlessness in Transylvania that had become the most important matter
Austria wanted to resolve along its eastern frontier.
During 1678, the Viennese court continued to send orders to Kindsperg and
commanded him to strive for the renewal of the peace with the Ottoman Empire. On
January 15, 1678, Kindsperg received new instructions.423 The Hofburg notified the
ambassador about the defensive preparations underway along the border which had
begun after Kindsperg’s reports in the fall of 1677. The preparations included inspection
of the weaponry and strengthening of the fortifications along the border as well as
deployment of reinforcements while maintaining strict vigilance. The Hofburg expected
Kindsperg to be alert and commanded him to maintain similar watchfulness. Yet, the
ambassador had to observe developments “with a grain of salt” for each party in the antiHabsburg movement in Transylvania, (“rebels,” Porte, Poland, and France) had different
goals and ambitions.
Kindsperg signed his first letter from 1678 on January 22.424 At the Ottoman
capital, there were opposition groups from Transylvania. Apafi Mihály’s agent, Cappi
Georgi, had recently brought his prince’s annual tribute to the Porte. Kara Mustafa Paşa
asked the agent about the general condition in Hungary. Georgi responded that
everything was in order except those who were “defending” themselves against the
Germans. Concurrently with Apafi’s agent, another Transylvanian envoy, Christoph
Pasco, had brought a letter to the grand vizier from a group of magnates. Pasco
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complained to Kara Mustafa Paşa about the initiatives of Apafi and Mihály Teleki, the
former’s chancellor and a key figure in the French ambitions in Transylvania.425 The
letter asked the grand vizier to stop the “rebels,” who, with the support of the Polish
troops, were planning to attack the Germans. Transylvanian magnates had neither advised
the “rebels” to attack the Germans nor had consent for such aggressive initiatives.
In his report, Kindsperg included an account of his meeting with Christoph Pasco
as an ordinary moment, suggesting that Pasco’s mission to the Ottoman capital was, most
likely, a combined initiative of the Hofburg and the pro-Habsburg magnates in
Transylvania, aiming to increase the negotiation power of Austria at the Ottoman court.
The Austrian advised the Transylvanian to ask the grand vizier to dispatch an ağa to
Transylvania with a written decree commanding the “rebels” to expel the Poles and
French from the land. Pasco also could demand the punishment of Teleki along with his
companions, or at least their banishment from the principality. Kindsperg promised that
he would verbalize these demands at his next meeting with the grand vizier. Thus, if the
Ottoman court would apply these measures, the problems along the border would end
without battle.
Further details in Kindsperg’s report illustrated that though the grand vizier
verbally declared a friendly position, due to his actual direct and indirect tolerance of the
Transylvanian “rebels” Vienna could not completely eliminate the possibility of an armed
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conflict between the two states. Indeed, Kara Mustafa Paşa’s response to Kindsperg at the
last audience, on December 22, 1677, must have given stronger impressions to regarding
the probable course of events in Hungary as long as the grand vizier possessed the
sultan’s seal. Upon Kindsperg’s words about Polish and French initiatives in
Transylvania and the Hofburg’s disapproval of these two nations’ presence in the
principality, Kara Mustafa Paşa responded that the Sultan was not responsible for the
actions of foreign sovereigns. The Ottoman court would neither ask foreign nations to be
involved in such actions nor could prevent them. Apafi and Teleki, on the other hand, had
already received two prohibitive commands. The grand vizier promised to send a third
one that forbid Apafi from hosting foreign agents in the principality and implementing
other modifications destructive to the land’s order; otherwise, he would be responsible
for the consequences. As per Kindsperg’s request, Kara Mustafa Paşa assured that he
would send this prohibitive command with an authorized ağa, lest Apafı and his courtiers
ignore the decree as they had previous ones. Kindsperg expressed his appreciation to
Kara Mustafa Paşa who responded that he, too, was glad to know that the emperor
approached the Ottomans peacefully.
The mutual gestures and friendly exchanges, however, did not dispel the tension
during the rest of the conversation. Kara Mustafa Paşa’s statement that the Ottoman court
had not initiated any adversity caused Kindsperg to oppose such a claim: The Ottoman
subjects in Oradea were collecting tribute, unlawfully, from villages under the
jurisdiction of Szatmár and Szabolcs, two counties reserved for the Monarchy according
to the second article of the existing peace treaty. The Ottoman subjects in Eger were
joining forces with the “rebels” and causing great damage to the countryside.
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Furthermore, the Ottoman paşa at Nové Zámky had ignored his troops’ attacks on
villages in the vicinity. Also, the Ottoman subjects living in Székesfehérvár and
Esztergom were committing similar atrocities.
To his remonstrations, Kindsperg received the typical dilatory response that he
was used to hearing from the grand vizier. Kara Mustafa Paşa said that he would send a
courier to Hungary to investigate who had initiated the aggression. If the initiatives of the
Ottoman subjects were in essence defensive, instigated by aggression from across the
border and performed out of necessity, he would act accordingly. If, however, the
Ottoman subjects committed any acts in defiance of the decrees previously dispatched by
the court, he promised to take action accordingly.
A detail that Kindsperg communicated to the grand vizier illustrated that the
Ottoman policy toward Hungary had gradually transformed since Kara Mustafa Paşa had
assumed the grand vizierate. Kindsperg told the grand vizier that the Ottoman
government had annually appointed a new paşa Nové Zámky who arrived as a poor
person to his seat. These paşas then sought ways to get rich; for instance, by unlawfully
forcing the villages belonging to Nitra to pay taxes to the Ottoman Empire. Kara Mustafa
Paşa disagreed with any such claim; yet the ambassador had personal examples. He
mentioned that one Yamalı Mustafa Paşa, a former commander at Nové Zámky, had
forced villages as far as in Moravia that never rendered homage to the Ottoman Empire to
pay tax. Reportedly, he also committed many other destructive excesses. Kindsperg
added that when he had formerly reported Yamalı Mustafa Paşa’s acts to the Ottoman
court, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa had deposed the commander. According to Kindsperg’s account,
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the same Yamalı Mustafa Paşa at the time was a member of Kara Mustafa Paşa’s
household. Therefore, the grand vizier was totally displeased to hear the complaint.
Indeed, such cloaked violations of the peace terms along the border by the
Ottoman commanders were enough to cause a major confrontation between the two
states. Kindsperg, who knew that such border encroachments were unacceptable under
any condition, had a simple demand from the grand vizier: The villages on the Ottoman
territory as determined in the last treaty should continue to pay tax to the Ottoman
Empire; whereas those that had never paid tax to the Ottomans should not pay any kind
of tax to the Ottoman garrisons. Kindsperg wrote that the conversation had “heated up”
both of them, but, ultimately, there was still no sign of a decisive solution for the
situation along the border. Mavrocordato told Kindsperg after the meeting that the grand
vizier, who was getting ready to march to Chyhyryn, did not want to meet with
Kindsperg again.
Kindsperg then had a private meeting with the chief of scribes.426 “I am here for
more than six years,” the Austrian said; “I have been sick for more than four years of that
time.” He added that he wanted to return to Christendom; yet he also wanted to conclude
his mission successfully by signing a peace treaty between the two great sovereigns
before he departed. To that end, he was ready to hand a special remuneration to the grand
vizier in case both parties agreed on eradication of the “rebels” and reinstitution of
tranquility along the border. The chief of scribes said that two decrees, one signed by the
Sultan and the other by the grand vizier, would be sent to the border. The decrees
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commanded the Turkish garrisons not to abet and assist “rebels.” Also the chief of scribes
asserted that the governor at Buda, İbrahim Paşa, had restored control in the principality.
Kindsperg knew that these verbal reassurances had no impact on the actual situation or
did not even provide palliative precautions. He requested from the Ottoman court a copy
of the decree that both the grand vizier and the chief of scribes mentioned. Along with his
report, Kindsperg dispatched to Vienna a copy of this decree in Ottoman Turkish.427
Apparently written by an Ottoman scribe, the long document listed numerous
border violations committed by Ottoman garrisons and subjects and the Transylvanian
“rebels” during the last year. Kidnappings, illegal tax collection, burning of villages and
harassment of villagers, and storming of Austrian fortresses without reason were some of
the infringements enumerated in the decree. The sultan had given his “glorious promise”
to the emperor’s representative at the Porte that such actions would come to an end. One
finds it difficult to determine whether Kara Mustafa Paşa government sent such an order
to the frontier paşas and commanders or whether the Ottoman scribes penned the decree
to hand it to the Austrian ambassador. Even if the Ottoman court dispatched such orders,
given Kara Mustafa Paşa’s general attitude, perhaps the Ottoman court sent them only as
a formality. By the winter of 1678, Kara Mustafa Paşa was continuing to welcome
Apafi’s representatives, as he did days before Kindsperg’s audience in December, 1677.
There were neither preparations to appease the Hungarian malcontents nor any indication
that the grand vizier had such a plan. In fact, the circumstances in Transylvania and Kara
Mustafa Paşa’s negligence about the Polish and French presence in the principality
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indicated the contrary. Though his intentions were not clear yet, as Kindsperg had stated
to Jan Gninski in the fall, he was deliberately delaying the talks. In fact, the penning of
such a decree by the Ottoman scribal office, only possible with the knowledge of the
grand vizier, indirectly meant the admission of accusations Kindsperg directed at the
Ottoman court. Therefore, most probably, this decree was written only to alleviate the
Austrian ambassador’s unremitting plea for peace and did not reflect the actual stance of
the grand vizier.
Kindsperg’s account ended with a brief evaluation of the Porte’s relationship with
Poland and Muscovy. Kindsperg wanted negotiations with the Poles would extend
indefinitely, leaving the Ottomans insecure, and prevent them from undertaking other
initiatives. He also hoped that Muscovy would defeat the Ottomans in the ensuing battle
for Chyhyryn. If that were to happen, then Poland and Muscovy could form an alliance
that the Ottomans feared and attack the Ottoman Empire.
In addition to the political and diplomatic situation, Kindsperg’s report revealed a
new impediment for the Hofburg: Kindsperg’s health condition was deteriorating. The
pestilence that must have contaminated the ambassador had already hit a Polish
delegation, who had lost 40 of the 60 individuals on their way to Istanbul to finalize the
new peace treaty. When the Hofburg received the news about Kindsperg’s failing health,
preparations began in Vienna to send a new envoy to the Ottoman capital. Kindsperg
stayed in the Ottoman Empire during much of 1678 and continued to send reports to
Vienna. The new representative, Peter Franz Hoffmann von Ankerkron, who was an
internuncio rather than an ambassador, received detailed instructions in February which
included tentative peace conditions.
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Meanwhile, the courier Adam Schönberger reported to the Hofburg the first
rumors of a planned Ottoman campaign against the Austrian capital.428 He had left
Vienna in October 26, 1677 for Istanbul. On his way back to Vienna, the governor of
Buda told Schönberger that as soon as the Ottoman army was victorious against
Muscovy, the same army planned to march through Transylvania to Vienna without
losing time with other fortresses. Such intelligence was the first news of a likely Ottoman
campaign on Vienna since Kara Mustafa Paşa had assumed office, yet it did not alert the
Viennese court. In fact, a brief War Council instruction from January 23 which
commanded Kindsperg to intensify remonstrations about the situation along the border
illustrated that preemptive diplomatic initiatives would continue to serve as the Hofburg’s
major instrument at the Ottoman capital.429

Peter Franz Hoffmann’s mission to Istanbul as internuncio
Peter Franz Hoffmann’s assignment to Istanbul marked the beginning of a two-year
period during which the regular flow of information from the Ottoman capital to Vienna
was interrupted due to the pestilence that would take the lives of many Austrian agents.
These unpredicted deaths caused Austrian peace initiatives in Istanbul to severely lose
their momentum between the spring of 1678 and the beginning of Georg Christoph von
Kunitz’s ambassadorship in February 1680. Meanwhile, Kara Mustafa Paşa spent much
of 1678 with the campaign against Muscovy. During the next year, the Ottoman court
again sent orders to the provinces for another campaign to the north, but 1679 would
lapse without military action when the news of a Russian peace delegate’s departure from
428
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Moscow arrived in Istanbul. Thus, three major causes, including the epidemic that took
the lives of Austrian agents between the spring of 1678 and February 1680, Kara Mustafa
Paşa’s extended absence from the capital, and the uncertainty of the Ottoman-Muscovy
relations throughout 1679 resulted in two lost years for Habsburg diplomacy.
The same period also marked gradual deepening of the tension between the
Habsburg and Ottoman courts. Kara Mustafa Paşa, whose stance on the Transylvanian
matter had been rather ambiguous and at times contradictory during 1677, adopted a
more supportive stance toward malcontents. However, he also avoided declaring open
war on Hungary or Austria, leaving room for the Hofburg to maintain the position that
the peace with the Ottomans could be renewed. Accordingly, the new internuncio
Hoffmann’s directions did not include any modification of issues that necessitated urgent
resolution for the Habsburg Monarchy.430 Essentially, Hoffmann’s instructions essentially
compiled the grievances that Kindsperg had been vehemently expressing to Kara Mustafa
Paşa. Yet, the instructions deserve special attention; the Hofburg clearly saw Hoffmann’s
expedition as a new opportunity to delineate these grievances collectively. In the
following years, the instructions Vienna dispatched to the subsequent Habsburg envoys in
Istanbul often referred to “Hoffmann’s instructions” and asked them to negotiate with
Kara Mustafa Paşa based on the conditions outlined by them.
The instructions stated that Hoffmann’s mission was an indication of the
Monarchy’s “love of peace and good neighborliness.”431 Many “machinations” had
occurred that upset the peace between the two states. The French were continuing to
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provide assistance to the Poles and Transylvanian “rebels” in Upper Hungary. The
French intention was to crown the Polish Queen’s brother or another pro-French
candidate in Hungary. The King of France was so ambitious that he wanted to rule over
the sultan and emperor’s villages, leaving “no other ruler in the world.” The Hofburg had
raised the issue during the talks with the previous grand vizier and ministers: together the
French and the Poles would cause trouble along the Ottoman borders. The sultan and
emperor had to keep especially the “restless” French nation away from their borders at all
times. The Porte had to consider its own convenience and stop offering shelter and
quarter to the French, Poles, Transylvanian “rebels,” and any other affiliates. At the same
time, the Ottoman garrisons in Hungary had to stop collecting tax from the villages in
Habsburg territory. These were the conditions of a fair peace since the Zsitvatorok
settlement. The Porte could realize all this using its authority, if it wanted to arbitrate
Transylvanian affairs. In case these remonstrations yielded the outcome the Hofburg
desired and the Ottomans agreed to extend peace, a 20-year settlement would be the most
beneficial.
Vienna also commanded Hoffmann to meet in Istanbul with the representatives of
all Christian nations that did not intend to break with Austria. The Hofburg wanted the
internuncio to be extra cautious with the Polish envoy and not trust him, as an earlier
communication from January 15 had also notified Kindsperg. In the meantime, Hoffmann
had to collect surveillance regarding the Ottoman army and its motives in the next spring,
while also observing the developments in Ottomans’ relations with Poland and Muscovy.
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As Hoffman was on his way to Istanbul, the Ottoman court’s war preparations
against Russia continued during the spring. The Sultan’s banner that marked the
declaration of war to Muscovy began to wave at Davut Paşa in early March. Although the
declared destination of the army that summer was Chyhryn, the aftermath of the
campaign deeply concerned Kindsperg. His report from March 28 reflected his
anxiety.432 Kindsperg noted that a Russian ambassador who had just arrived and asked for
peace boosted the Turks’ ambition and pride. The ambassador believed that once the
Ottomans defeat Muscovy, their plan was either to winter at Oradea to eradicate the
Germans from the area or, as many suspected, they could directly march on Komárom
and Győr. What especially fed Kindsperg’s fear were the recent orders of Kara Mustafa
Paşa for shipment of ammunition and provisions to Belgrade, the main Ottoman supply
center for European campaigns. Kindsperg asserted that the Ottomans’ intentions to
march into Hungary were so strong that it would be impossible to ward off the campaign
through diplomacy or treaties. Only God’s hand and a reunion of Christendom with a
general peace could thwart and crush the Ottoman army. Kindsperg recommended that
such a treaty should be signed as soon as possible and the allied army should attack the
arrogant enemy on its own soil in Belgrade.
On April 24, Vienna had sent a letter to Kindsperg stating that a new ambassador,
Johann Maximilian Sattler, was on his way to Istanbul.433 Yet Sattler died in Belgrade
before he could even reach the Ottoman capital. Vienna did not name another person to
replace Sattler, extended Kindsperg’s commission, and notified him that Peter Franz
Hoffmann was on his way to Istanbul as internuncio. As this instruction was on its way to
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the Ottoman capital, on May 7, Kindsperg sent another report to Vienna which showed
that Kara Mustafa Paşa’s support to the “rebels” was gradually becoming evident. Apafi
and Teleki had sent six representatives to Istanbul, all Calvinist and Arianer. They said to
Kara Mustafa Paşa that as long as the Turkish flags waved in Hungary, the entire land
(including Catholics) had to submit to the Sultan. Just as several months ago, a proHabsburg group was also in Istanbul. They requested from the Ottoman court the
replacement of Apafi with David Zolyomi, whom the Ottomans held as prince-in-waiting
prisoner in Constantinople, a typical Ottoman policy to secure loyalty of the sultan’s
central European vassals. In response, Kara Mustafa Paşa ordered the imprisonment of
Apafi’s opponents. At the same time, Apafi was apparently informed about the journey of
his opponents to the Ottoman capital and had sent 200,000 Thaler to Kara Mustafa Paşa.
Having witnessed Kara Mustafa Paşa’s unequivocal support to the “rebels,” Kindsperg
increased the tone of his warnings compared to his previous report in January. There was
no time to lose against the “Erbfeind.” The Emperor had to immediately take all the
required precautions in Hungary, though not in open violation of the peace with the
Ottomans, but as “the harrowing events of the time” necessitated. He added that the
arrogance had risen to such a height inside the Ottoman court that one could even
presume, “what goodness!,” a march on the imperial capital, Vienna. This time, Kara
Mustafa Paşa’s chief steward, Süleyman, had also verbalized the idea to the Austrian
ambassador.
In early May, Hacı İbrahim Çavuş, a Turkish courier from Buda, visited Vienna
and notified the Habsburg court of the Ottomans’ desire to maintain good neighborliness
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with the Monarchy but, given the circumstances, the Hofburg must have interpreted the
visit at best as a duplicitous formality. Now that Kara Mustafa Paşa openly supported the
malcontents in Hungary and Apafi openly submitted to the Ottoman sovereignty, the
Austrian ambassador suspected every move at the Ottoman capital and potential
consequences. On May 23, Kindsperg notified Vienna of the arrival of a new French
ambassador, Gabriel de Guilleragues, to Istanbul.434 Despite the low esteem the former
French ambassador, Marquis de Nointel, had in the eyes of Kara Mustafa Paşa and the
uneasy relations between France and the Ottoman Empire in general, Kindsperg highly
suspected Guilleragues’ objectives in Istanbul. Kindsperg noted that one could even
suspect the setting up of an alliance between the two states as Süleyman I and Francis I
had established a century and a half ago.
An opinio recorded during a War Council meeting and attached to Kindsperg’s
report showed that the news finally induced the the Hofburg to consider non-diplomatic
action against the Turks.435 The council recommended that the court contact the Papal
nuncio in Vienna, Francesco Buonvisi, and ask for Rome’s help to further uncover the
“track of France’s foolish deceitfulness.” This initiative could be considered the first step
of a general peace “worthy of praise” across Christendom. However, since the Emperor
could not take such actions by himself, he had to convince other princes at the
Regensburg diet and, through the Pope’s aid, ask for reinforcements from other Christian
potentates. Approximately two months later, the end of the Dutch War and the beginning
of the peace negotiations in western Europe multiplied the Hofburg’s hopes to realize a
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“universal” peace and union against the Turks. The War Council reported this “useful”
information to Kindsperg, apparently assuming that such information would give the
ambassador an edge in the peace negotiations. Then the Monarchy could turn its face
fully to the east.436
Nevertheless, the closing of the western front did not mean that the Hofburg was
now ready to militarily challenge the Ottoman Empire. By July, the sultan relocated to
Adrianople. According to Ottoman customs necessitating foreign ambassadors to follow
the sultan’s pavilion, Kindsperg and Hoffmann followed the sultan to Adrianople. There
they had received the War Council’s instruction which stressed that Vienna was
cognizant of the potential consequences of an Ottoman victory against Muscovy. Vienna
expected the Austrian agents to work diligently to ward off the plausible disadvantages of
an Ottoman victory. To that end, through third persons, Kindsperg and Hoffmann had to
contact the Russian envoys at the Porte and tell them that it would be “unseemly and
disgraceful” to leave the Ukraine to the Ottomans; it was unheard of among the Christian
nations to leave such important land to the Turks. Vienna also hoped that the war would
last years, expecting the Turkish troops to perish due to the cold climate of the north and
revolt. Moreover, Vienna believed that the Greeks, due to religious parity between them
and Russians, would also revolt if there were a Russian victory.
Yet the Hofburg’s expectations were not fulfilled on the battlefield. On September
13, Kara Mustafa Paşa’s letter which notified the Ottoman court of the capture of
Chyhyryn arrived at the capital.437 The Ottoman victory at Chyhryrn and the Polish
envoy’s recent approval of the Ottoman conditions for peace meant for Vienna that the
436

Hofkriegsrat [to Constantinople], July 8, 1678, HHStA: Staatenabteilungen, Türkei I, 148.

219

Ottomans would soon disengage themselves from their commitments in the north and
turn to Hungary, as many Austrian agents in Istanbul expected. The situation necessitated
the House of Austria to continue employing preemptive diplomacy, their most effective
tool. The rest of 1678, however, passed without any major talks between the Austrian
agents and Kara Mustafa Paşa’s court. During the absence of the grand vizier in the
summer and fall, Kindsperg and Hoffmann continued to submit complaint letters through
the deputy grand vizier, Kara İbrahim Paşa, and the Ottoman court interpreter, Alexander
Mavrocordato.438 By mid-October, the grand vizier and the sultan had returned to
Adrianople where Kindsperg and Hoffmann were waiting to submit their complaints to
him in person.439
Perhaps, the greatest loss of 1678 for the Viennese court at the Ottoman capital
was the demise of Johann Christoph von Kindsperg. Hoffmann reported to Vienna on
December 16 that Kindsperg died on December 14 from a stroke and was buried at the
Ragusan Church in Adrianople.440 Kindsperg had arrived in Istanbul in 1672. He
witnessed the transfer of power from Fazıl Ahmed Paşa to Kara Mustafa Paşa in the fall
of 1676. One may argue that, among other reasons, Kindsperg’s positive and promising
reports about Kara Mustafa Paşa during the earliest months of his term in offıce had an
important role in setting the tone for the Habsburg policy toward the Porte. The death of
Kindsperg meant for the Hofburg the loss of an experienced and well-connected resource
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at the Ottoman capital. Time showed that the scope of the Hofburg’s negotiation power in
Istanbul diminished after the death of Kindsperg until a new ambassador was appointed.
While Kindsperg was near death, the internuncio Hoffmann was aware of the
necessity to establish personal connections with the Ottoman courtiers. He also knew that
inside the Ottoman court, delivery of gifts often marked the beginning of such personal
connections between a foreign ambassador and a courtier.441 Accordingly, he notified
Vienna that he had presented 300 ducats to Mavrocordato as a welcome gesture and
requested him to arrange an audience with the sultan and the grand vizier. The meeting
took place on December 7 before the death of Kindsperg, during an open ceremony at the
Ottoman court. No formal negotiations took place because Kara Mustafa Paşa told
Hoffmann that he wanted to speak privately with the internuncio at another meeting.
Another lesson the internuncio quickly learned at the meeting with Kara Mustafa
Paşa was the grand vizier’s tactics to gain time. He wrote to Vienna that, due to the high
risk in delay of negotiations, a new ambassador with full credentials had to be dispatched
to Istanbul. He added that Georg Christoph von Kunitz, the Consul of the Austrian
Oriental Company, would be the most suitable person for the position. Kunitz knew the
Ottoman lands and was experienced in Turkish affairs; thus, he had the qualities an
imperial ambassador at the Porte needed.
As Hoffmann was waiting for the arrival of a new ambassador, again the epidemic
struck the Austrian diplomacy in Istanbul. The internuncio became sick in December
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1678 and remained almost bedridden henceforth. Indeed, he participated at a meeting in
the presence of the Sultan on December 27, followed by another brief talk with Kara
Mustafa Paşa on January 30. However, due to his sickness, he could not report the
meetings to Vienna until May 17.442 Despite this considerable delay in communications,
there was not any significant development. At the audience with the sultan in December,
Hoffmann stated that the peace and friendship between the two rulers had been
maintained. The emperor had dispatched the internuncio for preservation of such peace,
despite so many machinations that had taken place and upset the good neighborliness
between the two mighty sovereigns. The House of Austria wanted a definitive end to all
these problems. Cognizant of Kara Mustafa Paşa’s deliberate disregard for the
Monarchy’s peace initiatives, Hoffmann also contended in the presence of the sultan that
he also wanted to meet the grand vizier. He requested from the sultan that the grand
vizier listen to him with good will. 443
At the meeting between the internuncio and Kara Mustafa Paşa at the end of
January, the two discussed the border issues Vienna had previously outlined in
Hoffmann’s instructions. Kara Mustafa Paşa’s neglectful manner and dilatory resolution
offers about the complaints and requests of the Austrian agents had not changed: He
denied the accusations directed at the Turkish garrisons, but he promised to investigate
the situation. Upon Hoffmann’s statement that the House of Austria desired to extend the
Vasvár peace for another 20 years, the grand vizier responded that the issue required
great consideration, and he had to discuss the conditions Hoffmann stipulated with the
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sultan and ministers. The courtiers, too, echoed the grand vizier’s remarks and promises.
Süleyman, the grand vizier’s kahya (chief steward), reported to Hoffmann after the
meeting that a Turkish courier recently had arrived at Istanbul from Nové Zámky and
asked the court’s opinion regarding the presence of Austrians in close vicinity to the
town. According to the kahya, the court returned the courier to Nové Zámky with sharp
orders to avoid animosity with Austria.
Kara Mustafa Paşa’s negligence was not the only difficulty for Vienna.
Hoffmann’s health condition continued to deteriorate. He wrote to Vienna that a new
ambassador should soon go to the Ottoman capital, because he could not stay any longer
in the Ottoman Empire without risking his life. Indeed, the Austrian couriers had already
notified the Hofburg about Hoffmann’s condition. The Viennese court, through the
courier Adam Schönberger, had dispatched on April 5 a letter to the internuncio about the
assignment of a new ambassador who would depart from Vienna within the next 14 days.
The appointment was not Kunitz, as Hoffmann had recommended. Vienna had named
Johann Carl Terlingo von Guzman as the new resident ambassador to the Ottoman
Empire. The internuncio wrote that he wished Guzman left earlier and hoped that the
paşa at Buda would not delay the new ambassador’s journey with “intentional malice” as
he did to Hoffmann the previous year.
Guzman was on his way to replace Hoffmann, but the internuncio, as ordered by
Vienna, met the grand vizier once again on June 3, 1679 and reported the meeting to
Vienna on June 11.444 This time the grievances were not limited to Apafi and Teleki. The
paşa at Buda and the Turkish garrisons, the princes of Wallachia and Moldavia also were
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committing atrocities. Again, the grand vizier did not surprise Hoffmann. He responded
that Apafi could not engage in actions he was accused of without the Ottoman’s court
consent. He promised to send orders to the border to prevent Turkish garrisons from
assisting the “rebels.” The grand vizier added that the Ottoman court had a peaceful
approach to Vienna. Hoffmann, in response, said that he hoped these orders would finally
be effective.
Despite Kara Mustafa Paşa’s unmistakable reluctance to extend peace and his
support to the Hungarian malcontents, his intentions remained unclear. The Austrian
agents had hitherto reported three possible campaign objectives: the environs of Oradea,
the strategic strongholds Komárom and Győr which protected Vienna from direct Turkish
assaults, and the imperial capital itself. The Hofburg’s peace initiatives continued during
the following months, but the severity of threat led to preparations in Istanbul what could
be interpreted as preliminary peace overtures between the enemies of Kara Mustafa Paşa.
On June 19, Hoffmann sent a letter to Vienna and solicited further instructions
concerning visitations to the representatives of Christian nations that did not intend to
break with the Monarchy.445
Hoffmann’s next report, dated August 19, illustrated that the Hofburg would
benefit from such visitations.446 The Ottoman court interpreter, Mavrocordato, had
recently met Hoffmann at the internuncio’s residence who remained ill at the time.
Mavrocordato reported to Hoffmann that the Ottoman court decided to defer talks about
peace conditions that the Monarchy stipulated, including the renewing of the Vasvár
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treaty for 20 years. The ambiguity of ‘deferring’ the talks notwithstanding, this was the
first response Austria had received to the relentless push to extend peace since Kara
Mustafa Paşa assumed the grand vizierate. The answer unambiguously meant that the
Ottoman court was considering various alternative strategies.
Mavrocordato also had a question for the internuncio about the developments in
Vienna. The Ottoman court interpreter said that the Ottomans had recently heard about
the visitations of Polish and Muscovite envoys to Vienna, reportedly to establish a “liga”
with the emperor against the Turks. Hoffmann responded that the emperor never intended
to break the peace with the sultan. The internuncio knew about the Muscovite envoy’s
visitation and added that the visit had solely complimentary purposes. Yet he did not
have any information regarding the visitation of the Polish envoy.
Mavrocordato’s inquiry meant that Kara Mustafa Paşa’s court, which had hitherto
avoided renewing the peace with Austria, was now also implying that the Viennese court
was not friendly toward the Ottoman Empire. Hoffmann and Mavrocordato’s
conversation must have indicated to decision-makers in Vienna that the negotiations in
Istanbul would become even more difficult in the future. In fact, a postscript note
Hoffmann had attached to his report conveyed to Vienna a little optimism for the first
time in months. Recently a Transylvanian “rebel” envoy, Russai Andreas, had met the
new French ambassador, Guilleragues, in Istanbul and asked for protection during the
talks with the Ottoman court. Allegedly, Guilleragues, responded to Russai Andreas that
France had just signed a peace treaty (Nijmegen) with the emperor; he added, according
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to the internuncio’s formulation, that the “rebels” should submit themselves to the
emperor’s graciousness.447
However, given that the Ottoman court also had begun to hint at an Austrian
offensive, neither optimism nor arrival of the new ambassador in Istanbul at the end of
July promised any possibility of altering the obstinacy of the Ottoman court. In addition,
Guzman was already sick when he arrived in Istanbul. There he found a bedridden
internuncio who, on August 25, had sent an apology to Vienna for the previous
interruption in communication between December 1678 and May 1679.448 Nonetheless,
despite his sickness, Hoffmann dutifully solicited another meeting with the grand vizier
which took place a week later on September 2.449 As per the “revised and approved”
articles Guzman had brought from Vienna, Hoffmann submitted Austria’s protests due to
the ongoing restlessness in Transylvania, emphasizing that the emperor wanted to extend
the existing peace with the Ottoman Empire.
Kara Mustafa Paşa, who by then was habitually deferring talks with Austria, this
time answered that signing of a peace was “not a matter of one, two, or three days; it
required a long time for scrutiny.” Hoffmann responded to Kara Mustafa Paşa that the
Hofburg had already analyzed the suggested articles at length. The articles were based on
the previous treaties. They were only modified according to the conjuncture at the time; if
the grand vizier wished to examine the former capitulations, he would not be able to find
anything different. The most urgent issue the Monarchy wanted to resolve through the
peace renewal was the open and secret assistance and shelter offered to the “rebels” in
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Transylvania by the Ottoman court and Turkish garrisons along the frontier. Austria
would not give up its right to militarily confront “rebel” infiltrations into the emperor’s
territory, while also expecting the Ottoman authorities to forestall incursions into the
sultan’s territory. Unless these issues were resolved, a definitive peace was impossible.
The news that the couriers recently transmitted from Istanbul to the Austrian
capital was not welcomed by the Hofburg, except for the brief note about the French
ambassador’s recent refusal of a Transylvanian rebel’s protection inquiry. As Vienna’s
next instruction illustrated, dated September 17, the last War Council meeting had paid
special attention to the brief note about Guilleragues’ reaction to the Transylvanian
envoy. It emphasized that France’s political withdrawal from Transylvania would be a
new opportunity to extinguish the fire in Hungary.450 Yet Vienna actually knew that as
long as Kara Mustafa Paşa refused to extend the peace, where the French positioned
themselves in Istanbul did not have much importance.
On October 14, the Hofburg dispatched new instructions to Istanbul which
demonstrated that the Viennese court was quite suspicious about Kara Mustafa Paşa’s
intentions.451 The soberly written directive emphasized that if the grand vizier were
willing to renew the peace treaty, he immediately would offer a meeting with the new
ambassador, Terlingo von Guzman. The Hofburg stated that Austria only wanted to
maintain the peace with the Ottoman Empire and always observed requirements for it.
The most recent War Council meeting had emphasized yet again that the expulsion of the
“rebels” from Turkish soil was an essential condition for peace. Otherwise, a resettlement
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in Hungary was impossible to expect. Yet the Hofburg doubted that such a resettlement
would ever occur. The directive stated that the last meeting of Hoffmann with Kara
Mustafa Paşa, unlike the previous, was unfriendly. At the time, the Turks wanted to keep
the status quo and intentionally delayed the peace talks so that they could judge the
outcomes of the current situation and move according to their own best interest. Most
probably, the instruction stated, once Muscovy and the Porte would conclude the peace,
Kara Mustafa Paşa’s intention was to smash the peace and bring desolation to the
Erblande. Vienna was aware that the Ottomans’ best interests and Kara Mustafa Paşa’s
ambitions could be detrimental for Austria.
As all these concerns coming from Istanbul were requiring maximum attention,
the plague once again hit the Austrian diplomats. Terlingo von Guzman was already
sickly when he had arrived in Istanbul. In Guzman’s assignment the urgency of the
situation and lack of an authorized ambassador at the Ottoman capital prevented the
Viennese court from making a judicious decision. The directive from September 17 had
briefly discussed Guzman’s condition. Terlingo von Guzman was old and already
physically in poor condition when Vienna decided to assign him to Istanbul. “His misery
and meagerness are so great,” wrote Vienna, “that we believe if he continues his mission
it will only cause further inconvenience for him.”452 Yet the continuation of the directive
showed that an early modern diplomat’s life was a matter of secondary importance
compared to his state’s interests and his sovereign’s orders. “Terlingo von Guzman is
already in position,” the instruction continued. “He got there by great expense, so we do
not think, as discussed in the recent War Council, he will be completely incapable.”
451
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Vienna believed that Hoffmann’s “indigence” was more urgent and required his recall
home. Hoffmann, however, never saw Vienna again. The internuncio died on September
27, 1679, twenty days prior to the penning of the above statements in Vienna. The
internuncio had become the third high-ranked Austrian diplomat, after Sattler and
Kindsperg, who lost his life within the last year and a half.
Terlingo was not only sick but considerably inexperienced in Ottoman affairs.
What he could achieve under such circumstances was questionable. In a report dated
November 22, 1679, he notified Vienna that he was sick and unable to meet the grand
vizier; once fully recuperated, he would request a meeting with the grand vizier to discuss
peace conditions Hoffmann had presented to the Ottoman court.453 Yet, unlike what both
Vienna and the ambassador hoped, his condition became worse in the following weeks.
Only two days after Terlingo’s first report as the ambassador, Johann Baptista Bodesta, a
member of the Austrian delegation in Istanbul, penned another report (dated November
24) stating that whether Terlingo would recuperate at all was doubtful.454 The Venetian
Bailo’s doctor had checked Terlingo’s health and said that “although god is all-powerful,
it would be very difficult for Terlingo to gain his health again.”
As both Vienna and the Austrian delegation in Istanbul were preparing for
Terlingo’s ensuing death, the Hofburg’s diplomatic initiatives at the Ottoman court had
come to a standstill. Yet the epidemic could not stop the restlessness along the border. On
November 18, the Habsburg captain at Komárom reported to Vienna that Turks from
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Esztergom had attacked a trade caravan, killing three and taking eight captives.455 Vienna
urgently needed to solve the representation crisis in Istanbul to restart diplomatic talks
and to maintain regular flow of information. On December 31, 1679, the Hofburg sent a
communication to the Ottoman capital addressed to Terlingo von Guzman.456 The
instruction was asking for information regarding the most recent situation at the Ottoman
court and whether Kara Mustafa Paşa was continuing to preserve peace with the emperor.
Preparations in Belgrade were already quite suspicious, but the decision-makers at the
Hofburg were particularly curious this time, because they had recently received a report
from one of the Austrian interpreters at the Ottoman capital, Marco Antonio, who had
participated at Hoffmann’s last audience with the grand vizier in September. Marco
Antonio’s account included details that Hoffmann had ignored. Accordingly, at the last
meeting, Kara Mustafa Paşa had asked Hoffmann why there was an Austrian army in
Transylvania; Hoffmann responded that they were looking for “rebels.” The answer had
incensed the grand vizier who fulminated that it was a worthless talk and abruptly ended
the audience. Vienna believed that the dismissal of the internuncio was emblematic of
intentions deeply embedded in the mind of the grand vizier. The directive commanded
Terlingo to gather information through third parties and learn why the grand vizier had
treated the internuncio harshly. At the end of the instructions, the Hofburg also notified
the Austrian delegation about its plan if Terlingo were unable to perform his mission.
Vienna authorized Georg Christoph von Kunitz to take over the ambassadorial duties
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from Guzman, as the internuncio Hoffmann had recommended to Vienna the previous
year.
Johann Carl Terlingo von Guzman, who died on January 13, 1680, never saw the
directive addressed to him.457 Kunitz, along with his authorization letter, had also
received a copy of that instruction. In his acknowledgement letter addressed to the
Hofburg, the new ambassador wrote: “I, obediently and subserviently, express my
gratitude…I will diligently, eagerly, and loyally serve my emperor.” He added that he
would immediately deal with the issues mentioned in Terlingo’s last instruction and learn
if the grand vizier were planning a campaign to Hungary the following spring.458
Until Kunitz was fully settled at the Ottoman capital, the Hofburg relied on the
narrative accounts of the interpreters among the Austrian delegation in Istanbul. Marco
Antonio sent one such report to Vienna that narrated the developments between
September, 1679 and January of 1680.459 A significant message the interpreter
communicated to Vienna was dissatisfaction a Polish envoy recently verbalized at the
meeting with the grand vizier. Also, the envoy had submitted a list of complaints to the
Ottoman court concerning violations along the Ottoman-Polish border. Marco Antonio
added that he learned that many members of the szlachta were considering annuling the
treaty with the Porte. Regarding Hungary, another passage in the report showed that the
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Ottoman subjects themselves were quite anxious due to the commotion the “rebels” were
causing. The grand vizier had admitted a Turkish group from Eger who complained about
the “rebels” and Germans. Kara Mustafa Paşa told them to be patient; soon their
problems would be solved.
The Hofburg still did not know what the grand vizier’s plan for resolution, but the
decision-makers in Vienna were resolute to ameliorate the condition in Transylvania
through diplomacy. In fact, reports the couriers delivered to Vienna since Kara Mustafa
Paşa took over the sultan’s seal frequently mentioned that the Ottomans were strongly
considering a military intervention in Hungary, prompting Vienna to take precautions
along the Ottoman border. A directive Vienna dispatched to Kunitz in April, 1680 had
again emphasized Vienna’s acknowledgement of the military threat.460 It asserted that the
Porte would not have any barriers if they wanted to march into Hungary, once they
signed a peace with Muscovy at the end of the ongoing negotiations. Therefore, the army
had to be ready; fortress walls had to be strengthened and supplies replenished. Vienna
could apply additional security measures depending on the new ambassador’s reports.
Yet these preparations, by the spring of 1680, lacked a state of emergency. Even
after the signing of the Nijmegen Treaty and the closure of the western frontier in the
summer of 1679, Austria continued to use diplomacy as its main policy instrument in the
east. Time would show whether the ‘primacy of diplomacy’ would pay off during
Kunitz’s ambassadorship in Istanbul.
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CHAPTER 6: FAILED PREEMPTIVE DIPLOMACY

Georg Christoph von Kunitz, the last resident Austrian ambassador in Istanbul during the
grand vizierate of Kara Mustafa Paşa, began to dispatch reports to Vienna in May of
1680. Kunitz was the former council of the Austrian Oriental Company; he was not new
to the Ottoman court’s unpredictabilities. The ambassador’s task in Istanbul was
determined by the Hofburg’s pressing needs to protect the status quo along the
Monarchy’s eastern frontier. In the spring of 1682, the Hofburg reinforced Kunitz with
Alberto Caprara, a special envoy authorized to make last minute offers to Kara Mustafa
Paşa. Just as their predecessors, Kunitz and Caprara incessantly worked to extend the
armistice with the Ottomans. Their initiatives continued until August of 1682, when Kara
Mustafa Paşa declared war on Austria. Within the broader trends of seventeenth century
Habsburg and Ottoman history, the last two years of negotiations between the Austrian
agents and the Ottoman court were remarkably illustrative of the two empires’ distinct
administrative structures and governmental mindsets. The Hofburg, governed through
multi-layered consultative bodies, was not able to modify its established policies in
Istanbul despite the ever-increasing warnings of the ambassadors. The Ottoman court also
maintained a considerably linear, albeit aggressive, policy, as it moved with utmost
determination toward war in 1683.
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On April 28, 1680, Kunitz had his first public audience with the grand vizier who treated
him politely. The ambassador’s first private audience took place on May 20 when he also
presented his credentials to the Sultan. Kunitz did not hold any peace negotiations during
these meetings, but he believed that the sultan and the grand vizier’s kind attitude
indicated that they were willing to extend the peace.461
While waiting for an invitation by the Ottoman court to begin peace talks in June,
Kunitz met the Polish ambassador, Samuel Proski. Especially due to the Polish crown’s
involvement in the Transylvanian affairs in cooperation with France, relations between
Austria and Poland were tense at the time. Proski introduced himself to Kunitz as a loyal
servant of Austria in a manner that could be considered a preliminary alliance overture.
The Polish envoy asked the Austrian why Emperor Leopold had completely withdrawn
his support from Poland. Kunitz responded that the emperor had many good reasons: For
instance, the Polish Queen, a sister-in-law of the emperor, was badly treated by the Poles.
Also, the French faction in Poland had been a source of trouble for the Monarchy. Proski
did not object to Kunitz’s explanations. Yet, he added, the loss of Poland for the emperor
would not be beneficial to Austria. When Kunitz responded that Poland willingly fell into
that situation, Proski allegedly confessed that French money had corrupted the szlachta.
Kunitz knew that for a rapprochement between Austria and Poland, both countries
needed more than a resentful conversation between their respective ambassadors at the
Porte, where Kunitz’s primary mission was to convince the grand vizier to a peaceful
resolution. What Kunitz did not know at the time was that the rest of the year would pass
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without any significant progress in peace negotiations. Kara Mustafa Paşa, who had
mastered procrastination tactics against Austrian ambassadors’ requests, delayed the talks
until the beginning of 1681. In the meantime, Kunitz continually remained in contact
with the Ottoman court. Yet all he heard was uncertain promises and at times
contradictory rumors that he continued to report to Vienna.
On June 18, Kunitz notified Vienna that, reportedly, Sultan Mehmed IV was
willing to sign a treaty with Austria. The sultan asked the grand vizier whether he would
soon hold peace talks with Kunitz.462 Expecting an audience, the Austrian ambassador
did not let his courier leave Istanbul until early July. Yet the reisülküttab (chief of
scribes) told Kunitz that the grand vizier was overwhelmed with many important issues
and would not be able to hold a meeting for a while.463 One of these important issues was
the news that an Ottoman courier from Nové Zámky had brought to the court.
Accordingly, hundreds of villages around the town had stopped paying tribute to the
Ottoman Empire. Kunitz reported the complaints that the courier brought to Vienna as an
ordinary development. He was unaware that the grand vizier would soon take advantage
of this news and treat the issue as if it were the greatest problem for the two empires to
resolve.
During the next month, Kara Mustafa Paşa had a new reason to defer talks: the
ambassador’s credentials. The grand vizier communicated to Kunitz through his
interpreter that he had doubts about the ambassador’s authority to negotiate. Kunitz knew
that it was only a pretext to gain time; the grand vizier was intentionally delaying the
talks because he did not want to take any action against Austria before he finalized the
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Polish and Muscovy matters.464 In fact, Kunitz’s next report mentioned another obvious
indication of the grand vizier’s intentions. Kara Mustafa Paşa had instructed the border
generals to retaliate against any incursions.465 The ambassador, however, continued to
wait, expecting to reinitiate the peace talks based on the articles Peter Franz von
Hoffmann had presented to the grand vizier. Toward that end, the interpreter Marco
Antonio was soliciting audiences from the Ottoman court. By the end of August, all
Kunitz had heard from the court was that Kara Mustafa Paşa was planning to meet the
ambassador soon. Once again, he notified Vienna that both the sultan and grand vizier
wanted to renew the treaty with Austria.466
Since early spring, Kara Mustafa Paşa was waiting for the arrival of the
Muscovite envoy who had already departed Moscow. Yet the envoy died on his way to
Istanbul, prompting the Ottoman court to begin preparations for a new campaign against
Muscovy. In his reports from October and November, Kunitz feared that this army could
at any time divert its path into Central Europe. For Kara Mustafa Paşa, the delays only
meant that he would have more time to consider his plans. He again postponed the
meeting with Kunitz and declared that he would like to talk with the ambassador in
Edirne, where the Ottoman army would gather before winter. Actually, Kunitz would not
be able to meet the grand vizier until the end of December. The ambassador, for the first
time, was losing his optimism about the possibility of renewing the peace. On December
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18, he reported to Vienna that whether the grand vizier wanted to sign a treaty with
Austria was uncertain.467
The new year did not bring the good news the Viennese court wanted to hear. In
reality, developments in 1681 marked a turning point in peace negotiations and
eventually prompted Austria to send a special envoy, Alberto Caprara, to Istanbul.
Caprara’s task was to dissuade the grand vizier from his undisclosed intentions. On
January 3, 1681, the Ottoman Empire and Muscovy signed a peace accord. Andreas
Bokow Wobdonowich, a secretary in the Muscovite delegate, had taken over the
deceased envoy’s duty and continued the journey to the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman
Empire and Muscovy signed the Treaty of Bakhchisarai and agreed to a 20 year truce.468
The Muscovite campaign was abolished and a general order was issued for the sultan and
court’s return to the capital.469
Day after the signing of the treaty Kunitz wrote that Kara Mustafa Paşa was
displeased about the dispersal of the army. He tried to convince the sultan about the
necessity of a campaign into Hungary.470 The Austrian added that many people rumored
that the grand vizier had sent one of his clients to the paşa at Buda and instructed him to
provoke the Austrians to initiate a conflict. Thus, the grand vizier expected to convince
the sultan about a new campaign. In fact, agents of the Turkish subjects and Hungarians
from Oradea and other locations along the border had visited the Ottoman court in
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January and submitted complaint letters. Yet these were not legitimate reasons for a
campaign.471
Meanwhile, despite such discouraging developments, Kunitz continued to expect
to change the grand vizier’s mind. Kara Mustafa Paşa, relieved about the Muscovite
question (the two states still had not yet exchanged ratified copies of the treaty), finally
gave an audience to the Austrian ambassador on January 27, 1681.472 The meeting was
simply another fruitless step that served nothing but Kara Mustafa Paşa’s objectives. As
usual, Kunitz asserted that the Monarchy resolutely wanted to renew peace with Austria.
The grand vizier, who had been stubbornly ignoring such pleas, set forth another concern.
He said that he first wanted to have a translation of the proposed articles from Latin to
Turkish so that he could see if the articles were actually based on and modified from
former treaties. Kunitz responded that nothing in the treaty was new except two articles
and added that independent directives could resolve these matters. These explanations
had no importance to Kara Mustafa Paşa; his only goal was to gain time. He wanted
interpreters Alexander Mavrocordato and Marco Antonio to meet together with the
reisülküttab (chief of scribes) and work on a translation of the Latin text.
Before the report of the last meeting arrived in Vienna, the Hofburg sent an
instruction based on the Kunitz’s reports from December, 1680 and January, 1681.473 The
instruction clearly demonstrated that the decision-makers in Vienna suspected the
rumored aggression toward Hungary and Austria to become reality. Perhaps, the
instruction stated, the shipment of provisions and ammunition to Belgrade was part of a
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regular supply distribution. Nonetheless, it continued, the last War Council meeting had
discussed the urgent need to communicate with Christian nations, because a cumulative
analysis of the recent news from Istanbul erased all questions regarding the Ottomans’
intentions. Within a year after Georg Christoph von Kunitz’s appointment as ambassador,
the hopes of the Viennese court to extend the armistice with the Porte was vanishing. The
last instruction showed that the Hofburg was greatly concerned about the news. However,
as the continuation of the communication between Vienna and Kunitz showed, the
Habsburg court continued to hope that diplomatic initiatives would achieve a
compromise with the grand vizier.
As the level of anxiety in Vienna rapidly escalated, the Austrian and Ottoman
interpreters gathered in Istanbul according to Kara Mustafa Paşa’s request. They
discussed the proposed treaty’s translation but to no avail. At the end of March, Kunitz
penned an encoded letter. He notified Vienna that at this meeting the reisülküttab had
stated that the grand vizier, who was dissatisfied with the translation, wanted to discuss
articles one by one.474 Kunitz again indicated that, most probably, this was just another
delaying tactic; the grand vizier’s real desire was to march on to Belgrade, in defiance of
the sultan’s orders to disperse the army.
By the spring of 1681, Kara Mustafa Paşa’s desire to carry out a campaign into
Central Europe had become common knowledge. His objections to the Austrians did not
aim at resolving matters; he simply wanted to gain time to deal with other issues.
Therefore, it should not have surprised the ambassador when the grand vizier, at the next
audience on March 12, ignored his concerns regarding the articles. Instead, Kara Mustafa

239

Paşa raised a new dispute that soon became the most important problem for the two
empires. As noted above, in June of 1680, a courier reported to the Ottoman court that
many villages around Nové Zámky had stopped paying tribute to the Ottoman garrison in
that city. At the meeting on March 12, the reisülküttab presented a list of 133 villages to
the Austrian ambassador and said that these locations were required to pay tribute to both
sides.475 The grand vizier was overly concerned about the problem because Nové
Zámky’s income had fallen by 30,000 Thaler. Kara Mustafa Paşa argued that the
cessation of payments was a result of the Austrian troops’ presence in the area and their
pressure on the villagers to stop paying tax to the Ottoman garrison. The grand vizier
stipulated the repayment of the deficit to the Ottoman tax authorities if Austria wanted to
pursue talks.
Kunitz, however, strongly disagreed with the grand vizier. The ambassador
argued that Nové Zámky was a recently built fortress and did not have any tributary
village. When Kara Mustafa Paşa responded that Buda, Pest, Eger, and Timișoara had
tax-paying peasantry and asked how Nové Zámky could not have such a resource, Kunitz
responded that those four cities had historical possession over their villages. However, he
added, Nové Zámky’s district consisted of its walls and bastion; the villages around the
town belonged to Levice and Nitra. Upon that response, Kara Mustafa Paşa asked the
ambassador how the garrison at Nové Zámky could maintain itself. According to
Kunitz’s report, the ambassador answered that the emperor could retake the garrison if
the Ottoman court was not able to sustain it. An ambassador probably could not speak so
comfortably in the presence of the grand vizier. Nevertheless, whatever answer given by
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Kunitz, it instigated the grand vizier to respond that if the ambassador did have authority
to sign a treaty that mandated the aforesaid villages to pay tribute to both empires, they
would continue the talks.
Historically, Kunitz’s argument was not supported. The Ottomans had captured
the city in 1663 and had prepared detailed tax-registers of its surroundings. Non-payment
of taxes was not a novelty in the area. After the capture of the city, the Ottoman troops
carried out punitive campaigns in 1669, 1673, and 1675 within the environs of Nové
Zámky when villages ceased to pay taxes to the town.476 In reality, the situation appeared
to be a typical (and tragic) early modern borderland dilemma: the people of the area were
victims of the two empire’s struggle to control a strategic region. The courts in Vienna
and Istanbul were more concerned about their prestige vis-à-vis the other party than the
condition of the unfortunate frontier settlers. They forced the peasantry in the region to
pay taxes to both states. Yet the people, overburdened by heavy taxes, often failed to pay
their duties to either side.
Regardless, Kara Mustafa Paşa’s plans left no room for bargaining about the
matter. He said to Kunitz that if the ambassador did not have authority to accept the
Ottomans’ conditions, the reisülküttab could hand him a specification to be forwarded to
the emperor. The Viennese court would have to respond to that specification in 60 days.
More interesting than the dispute itself was that Kunitz ended his account of the meeting
with an optimistic remark, contradicting some of his earlier observations. Kunitz wrote
that Kara Mustafa Paşa could still agree to an extension of the accord, despite his
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manifest tendency to obstruct peace talks for a yet-to-be revealed plan. He wrote that at
the public audience in January the sultan had ordered the grand vizier to agree to a
renewal of the accord. Furthermore, the army had been dispersed and no individual could
reliably predict for at least a year a hostile move on the Ottomans' part. The Hofburg was
not impressed by Kunitz’s optimism. Those in power in Vienna were sure that the grand
vizier did not intend to renew the peace. The War Council that had met urgently upon
Kunitz’s account of the audience emphasized that, if the Ottomans had intended to extend
the peace, they would have agreed upon the former articles.477
Indeed, the developments in April 1681 escalated the years-long tension between
Vienna and Istanbul over Hungary to a new level as both courts took significant steps. On
April 18, the Ottoman court issued an ahidnâme, or charter, addressed to Apafi. In return
for yearly tribute, Istanbul offered protection and free elections to Hungary as well as
religious freedom.478 Vienna, on the other hand, gave significant concessions to the
Kingdom at the Sopron Diet that convened on April 28. The move attempted to attract the
malcontents along with the rest of Hungary, but it also showed that the Hofburg’s
willingness to resolve matters diplomatically did not mean that they would surrender their
dominions in Hungary. Through this well-known enterprise in Habsburg and Hungarian
scholarship, the Viennese court abolished the gubernium in Hungary, restored Hungary’s
autonomy, and largely reaffirmed religious freedoms.479 Both courts knew that these were
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irrevocable moves that could be undone only through mutual concessions or through a
major military showdown. As hostilities continued to mount, the course of events showed
that the latter was a greater possibility. In fact, military confrontations had already
occurred earlier in April between the Ottoman forces and Habsburg regiments consisting
of Croatian, Hungarian, and German soldiers.
While such skirmishes slowly set the stage for Kara Mustafa Paşa’s unrevealed
master plan, he also tried to secure support of the Ottoman tributaries in Europe. He held
negotiations with Hungarian, Transylvanian, and Moldavian agents in Istanbul.480
Although these steps were gradually dissolving possibility of a diplomatic resolution, the
House of Austria’s insistence to resolve the matter through diplomatic channels
continued. Kunitz received another audience on July 14.481 The main issue they discussed
was again the condition of the peasantry around Nové Zámky and Székesfehérvár. Both
sides presented lines of arguments parallel to their earlier stance. On August 1, another
meeting took place at the reisülküttab’s private house office. In the absence of Kara
Mustafa Paşa, Mavrocordato and a mektubcu (correspondence officer) accompanied the
reisülküttab, while the interpreter Marco Antonio joined Kunitz. Against the demands of
the Ottoman court, Kunitz asserted that the emperor would not give away any villages
because the Ottoman Empire, at the time, had only de facto control on them: “Nové
Zámky, neither by law nor by virtue of capitulation, could claim the aforesaid villages as
tributaries.”482
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Kara Mustafa Paşa’s alter ego: Imre Thököly
These exchanges only led diplomatic talks to a stalemate as the military tension escalated.
Recently, Kara Mustafa Paşa’s initiatives had resulted in the formation of an Ottoman
contingent. It consisted of Ottoman troops from the European provinces, supported by
Moldavian and Wallachian companies. Also, Transylvania was represented, not only by
Apafi Mihály I’s 500 men but also 15,000 soldiers of a young Kuruc leader, Imre
Thököly. The centrality of this aspiring Hungarian commander to the malcontents’
movement and Kara Mustafa Paşa’s policies during the remainder of the grand vizier’s
career is well-known.
Thököly’s rise to prominence in 1680 and 1681 was a result of his ambitious and
uncompromising personality. Compared to the hesitant Apafi Mihály who prioritized
balance and compromise in his policies, Thököly was an unruly commander with an
expansionist and aggressive agenda.483 When his father, István Thököly, died in combat
against the Habsburg army during the heyday of the Magnate Conspiracy, Imre Thököly
had escaped to the Transylvanian sanctuary. By 1680, at the age of 23, his name was
already known in Europe due to his successful operations in Upper Hungary. These
operations played a significant role in the Hofburg’s decision to offer concessions to the
Kingdom of Hungary at the Sopron Diet, where Thököly’s pro-Habsburg brother-in-law,
Pál Esterházy, was elected the palatine of Hungary. In 1682, Thököly married Francis
Rákóczi’s widow, Ilona Zrínyi, and secured through the Rákóczi estates the much needed
financial basis for his enterprise.484
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Days before the aforementioned Ottoman contingent executed operations in
Hungary, a Thököly agent met the grand vizier on July 21, 1681. Kara Mustafa Paşa’s
response to the agent was clear: “Our door is open to requesters; your demands will be
fulfilled as long as you keep your promises.” Commands to the Ottoman frontier generals
to act according to Thököly’s wishes followed this welcoming remark.485 Apafi,
foreseeing that he could fall out of favor due to the ambitious and bold Thököly,
attempted to negotiate with him. Their agents held a meeting in May 1681 and sought
common ground, but Thököly “refused to be subordinated to the prince.”486 For Apafi,
his fall from grace would be unjustifiable. He had loyally submitted his yearly tribute to
the Ottoman court since his election as prince in 1661 with Ottoman support. Although
he paid the tribute regularly, he was fully aware that becoming a victim of the Ottoman
state’s sublime interests was an omnipresent possibility. To lower risks, according to a
note in Kunitz’s report from September 27, Apafi had regularly sent “gift” money to the
court interpreter Mavrocordato. In return, the interpreter reportedly helped the prince
survive the whims of the Ottoman court. Neither the tribute nor the gifts protected Apafi
as Thököly’s reputation spread.
By July of 1681, Kara Mustafa Paşa’s interest in Thököly was clear. Apafi was
unhappy with the shift in the grand vizier’s interest toward this novice in Hungarian
affairs. As a result of his resentment, Apafi abandoned the aforementioned Ottoman
contingent following the successful operations in September 1681. Thököly, who was
also present in the army, followed suit with his men, causing an unplanned dispersal of
Ottoman forces. The incident had occurred without the grand vizier’s knowledge or
485
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permission. Furthermore, the army’s dispersal enabled the Habsburg troops to recapture
several strategic fortresses that they had lost to the Ottomans the previous month. Kara
Mustafa Paşa, who was in the final phases of designing his master plan in Hungary,
condoned these disobedient acts. He replaced the governor in Oradea who had
commanded the operations.487
In the meantime, Apafi could not easily leave the stage to Thököly. He continued
to send the yearly tribute to the Ottoman capital. In November 1681, along with the
tribute, the Transylvanian prince sent 12,000 ducats to the grand vizier, hoping to cajole
him into electing his son, Michael II Apafi, as the new prince of Transylvania. To the
same purpose, Mavrocordato received another 2,000 ducats.488 These moves did not save
the unfortunate Apafi; the matter had long been decided by the Ottoman court. At the end
of December of 1681, three agents of Imre Thököly (Ladislaus Szekely, Georgius
Gazoky, and Stephanus Miko) arrived at the Ottoman capital. They met the grand vizier
on January 9, 1682. Kunitz wrote to Vienna that Kara Mustafa Paşa promised to the
agents to declare Imre Thököly the new king of Hungary. In return, the Porte expected
the yearly tribute and the submission of the entire kingdom within two years.489 Thus,
Kunitz added, the Ottoman court had completely discarded Apafi.
Kara Mustafa Paşa had found his alter ego in the young Imre Thököly, whose
ambitious, uncompromising, and bold personality greatly resembled the Ottoman grand
vizier. Although Kara Mustafa Paşa’s intentions were not yet disclosed, Thököly’s traits
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suited his aggressive style. Thököly could serve the grand vizier as a fireball that set the
stage for the latter’s master plan in Hungary. Similarly, the young prince could rely on
his formidable patron who sympathized with his strong anti-Habsburg sentiments.
Whether Thököly could achieve his ultimate objective, a Hungarian Kingdom free from
the oppressions and whims of the courts in Vienna, Istanbul, or elsewhere, was a concern
for the future.

Alberto Caprara’s journey to Istanbul as internuncio
During the fall of 1681, the Ottoman court diverted its attention to a crisis with France,
while the Austrian ambassador Kunitz expected new instructions from Vienna.490 Instead
of the directives expected by Kunitz, a new internuncio with special instructions departed
from Vienna at the beginning of 1682. Alberto (or Albrecht) Caprara was a Bolognese
who had held a moral philosophy professorship at the University of Bologna. His former
diplomatic experience included carrying non-diplomatic communications between courts
and serving as an envoy in Flanders during the peace negotiations in that city as part of
the Nijmegen treaties. His new mission was even more challenging. Caprara went to
Istanbul to extend the peace that would expire in 1684. To that end, he was authorized to
make last minute offers to dissuade the grand vizier from his intentions.491 Emperor
Leopold gave a farewell audience to Caprara and the delegation on January 14, 1682. Yet
Caprara delayed his departure until February 3 because “warmly blowing southeastern
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winds,” portending the difficult mission awaiting him in the same direction, had caused
snow in the neighboring mountains to melt and flood the Danube.492
The news from Kunitz was even more discouraging than the flooded Danube.
Caprara’s trip had already been heard in Istanbul, where the ministers were advising the
grand vizier to renew peace with Austria.493 Kunitz’s optimism about Kara Mustafa Paşa
was replaced by total pessimism and disregard for the grand vizier. In an encoded
passage, Kunitz compared Fazıl Ahmed Paşa and Kara Mustafa Paşa. He remarked that
the former had treated everyone humanely; the latter governed tyrannically without
reason. The grand vizier ignored his ministers and recently gave orders for shipment of
more ammunition to Salonica. Moreover, as military preparations were underway, he sent
orders to the paşa of Buda and wanted newly built Austrian fortresses be demolished.
Furthermore, he commanded the paşa to force the villages that had stopped paying tax to
the Ottoman garrison to renew paying their dues.494 In addition, Wallachia, Moldavia,
and Transylvania received orders to prepare their forces to join an army of 50,000 men.
Szatmár, Komárom, and Győr were potential targets. Kunitz added that the House of
Austria’s ever-intensifying plea for peace increased the pride and arrogance of Kara
Mustafa Paşa.
For the Hofburg, the news was hardly surprising as they had been predicted.495 At
the time, the question for the Viennese court was whether Caprara could finally change
the course of action. The internuncio arrived in Istanbul on April 11. His first public
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meeting with the grand vizier occurred on May 12. Then Caprara presented his
credentials, but no negotiations occurred. Before the actual negotiations between the
Austrian delegation and the Ottoman courtiers, Caprara met the sultan at the palace on
June 9. He said to the sultan that he was sent to see whether the Ottoman court wanted to
extend the armistice; it was the only way to give solace and relief to poor subjects and
prevent their misery and arduousness. Reportedly Mehmed IV responded to the Italian
“bene, bene”496 and directed the internuncio to his statesmen to begin peace talks.497
Mehmed IV’s referral of Caprara directly to his courtiers was illustrative of the
administrative dynamics inside the Ottoman court. Mehmed IV was in the thirty-fourth
year of his reign, but despite his long rule he was fully detached from the decisionmaking mechanism. The grand vizier had fully seized power at the expense of Mehmed
IV’s nominal rule. In theory, a grand vizier was the mere deputy of his master, but Kara
Mustafa Paşa’s role as the grand vizier had exceeded all practical limits that existed for
the sultan’s absolute deputy.
On June 22, the delegation which included both Caprara and Kunitz met with
Ottoman representatives formed of reisülküttab, Alexander Mavrocordato, the chief of
janissaries, and another high-ranking officer. The meeting revealed that Caprara’s
mission was more difficult than Vienna hoped. The Ottomans had new stipulations. They
argued that Austria had broken the peace by building new fortresses. If Austrians wanted
to renew the peace, they had to pay war reparations for all the damage inflicted along the
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border since the Vasvár Treaty.498 Benaglia judged that the Ottomans were inconsistent
and unreasonable with their demands. He wrote that the Ottomans were seeking excuses
to start a war rather than seek peace. Their demand for compensation which “would
remove Austria’s [purported] guilt” was unacceptable. Benaglia added that the Ottomans
did not intend to renew the peace; they were only wasting the Austrians’ time. The
ambassador’s report of the meeting echoed Benaglia. Kunitz wrote in an encoded letter
that the grand vizier, in addition to his former claims regarding tax collection from
villages near Nové Zámky and demolition of several Austrian fortresses in the area, was
now stipulating that Vienna pay a large sum for all the damages inflicted on the Ottoman
borders during the last 20 years.499
The possibility of renewing peace was slowly vanishing. The Austrian delegation
celebrated Archduke Joseph’s birthday on July 26, but that was only a transient
enjoyment. On August 6, 1682, the sultan’s horsetail banners were set up in front of the
Gate of Felicity (Bâbüssaâde) at Topkapi Palace, marking the announcement of war on
Austria. Caprara discovered that in all the mosques of the Ottoman capital, people were
praying for victory; their clamor was becoming louder every next day.500 The operations
in Hungary had already begun in early July. Imre Thököly and his 40,000 men,
accompanied by Ottoman regiments, captured strategic fortresses in Upper Hungary,
including Košice and Fiľakovo. On September 6, 1682, İbrahim Paşa, the governor of
Buda and the commander of the Ottoman forces, crowned Thököly King of Hungary with
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attendant regalia.501 At the end of 1682, Kara Mustafa Paşa told Kunitz and Caprara that
if the Monarchy wanted peace, it had to recognize Thököly as the King of Hungary. This
was unacceptable for the Viennese court. Having realized that all hope for a renewal of
peace evaporated, Caprara and Kunitz asked for permission to leave, but the grand vizier
did not allow their departure. On April 1, 1683, the Ottoman army began its march into
Central Europe. From that moment, the Austrian ambassadors were technically captives
of the grand vizier although were not physically confined. They marched with the
Ottoman army into Hungary. On July 14, 1683, the second Ottoman siege of Vienna
began. Two-months later, on September 12, 1683, a European coalition army inflicted a
humiliating defeat on the grand vizier’s forces. A new episode had begun not only in
Habsburg and Ottoman history, but also for entire Europe and the Islamic world.
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EPILOGUE

1683: an imperial break in Vienna and Istanbul
The Ottoman debacle at Vienna in 1683 was homemade. The siege certainly was a
product of conjunctural factors and strategic goals, as well as personal ambitions of Kara
Mustafa Paşa which John Stoye, Thomas Barker, Walter Leitsch, and Zygmunt
Abrahamovicz have examined.502 Their works, however, were based largely on European
sources and their narratives were severely handicapped by orientalist caricaturization of
the Ottoman grand vizier. Because of their monodimensional approach, they failed to
contextualize the Hofburg’s Ottoman policy and Kara Mustafa Paşa administration within
the broader comparative framework of governmental understandings in Vienna and
Istanbul. Beyond stately concerns, Austria’s incessant push for a peace renewal and Kara
Mustafa Paşa’s obstinate negligence toward those requests were emblematic of two
distinct decision-making mechanisms; the confrontation in Vienna in 1683 was a
competition between two statecrafts and administrative mindsets. The governmental
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divergence between the two early modern capitals was formed within peculiar historical
frameworks and geopolitical conditions.
At the same time, 1683 became the onset of bureaucratic and institutional changes
in Vienna and Istanbul. Modern historiography is almost always tend to interpret the
result of a major war in history between two parties as emblematic of improvement and
success for the winning party or decline and collapse for the losing side. This falsification
is essentially rooted in a basic premise of the modern age that a person or an entity
prospers with wins and gains and fails with defeats and losses. In historical context, this
is a deceptive dichotomy conducive to reductionist assessments especially about the
defeated party at a war. 1683 was a decisive victory for the Habsburgs and a humiliating
defeat for the Ottomans, yet it paved the way for parallel developments in Vienna and
Istanbul with similar motives and purposes, albeit different in nature.

Habsburg statecraft
Although the House of Habsburg fought and won many decisive wars until the modern
era (such as Marchfeld in 1278, White Mountain in 1620, and Vienna in 1683), the
family relied on negotiation, compromise, and consensus throughout much of its history.
This was not an intentional decision; rather it was a natural outcome of the Monarchy’s
medieval and early modern geopolitical idiosyncrasy shaped by historical contingencies.
The monarchical center at Vienna was neither strong enough to threaten the balance in its
surroundings nor too weak to encourage potential violators. Thus, the European
international community for centuries preserved the Habsburg counterpoise between
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western and eastern Europe. With similar motives, the German princes elected the
Habsburgs to the German crown; hence the Czech historian František Palacký’s
statement that if the Monarchy did not exist, it would have to be created.
The Habsburgs could effectively maintain such a precarious balance only through
rigorous consultative processes and vigilant diplomatic hyperactivity. This was an
especially pressing need against the Ottoman Empire. The diplomats in Istanbul were
essentially tentacles of an advisory committee that subjected each report arriving at the
capital to careful cross-examination. During the critical episode of peace talks in Istanbul
with Kara Mustafa Paşa’s government, the Privy Council and its Deputized Council
(Deputierte Räte) of key ministers directed the system.503
Diplomatic processes were carefully supervised by these bodies, which often
meant persistency in objectives. Yet the presence of such deliberative bodies did not
necessarily guarantee efficiency of the Austrian statecraft. There were many decisionmakers but no lines of responsibility. The Privy Council and the Privy Conference were
designed to complement each other, but they were not partners; they competed with each
other for prestige inside the Hofburg.504 There were often difficulties in modifying
previously made decisions. During the five and a half years preceding the declaration of
war by the Ottoman court in August of 1682, the Hofburg continuously urged the
ambassadors and special envoys commissioned in Istanbul to renew peace. War with
France and the recalcitrance of anti-Habsburg Hungarians during much of the 1670s was
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an important hindrance to defying the Porte militarily. However, even after the treaty of
Nijmegen (1678) and despite the increasingly pessimistic reports coming from Istanbul,
the Viennese court did not modify its eastern policy and asked for peace along the eastern
border. Such obstinacy to maintain the peace with the Ottomans was partially due to the
vanity contest between the chanceries. In addition, there was a rivalry between the
factions of “westerners” and “easterners” who disagreed about the Monarchy’s
geopolitical priorities.505 Courtiers had different priorities for various reasons, making
unanimity in foreign policy very difficult.
The existence of different geopolitical perspectives in the Viennese court, to
emphasize once again, was a natural result of the Habsburgs’ compulsory adherence to
the international status quo and intra-monarchical dynamics. The Monarchy’s
geopolitical peculiarity frequently necessitated toleration of the Ottoman court’s
pretensions. Not everyone inside the court was happy about tolerating the Muslim
neighbors, but the stakes were high for Vienna. Situated only 60 miles away from the
Ottoman border, the imperial capital had very little lead time between the emergence of a
potential threat in the east and its realization. Nor did Vienna have ample resources or
decision-making flexibility possessed by the Ottoman capital. The Monarchy could
mobilize only through a series of cumbersome negotiation processes and consultation
with German princes. Factions inside the court often quarreled about how to overcome
these challenges. As a result, decision-making bodies in general adopted an institutional
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apprehensiveness, avoided new adventures, and strived to protect the status quo. In the
meantime, the Ottoman grand vizier fanned the flame in Hungary.
The uneasiness in the Hofburg’s decision-making patterns and statecraft had
significantly influenced ambassadors. As the level of anxiety escalated in the Ottoman
capital between 1676 and 1682, the ambassadors began to oscillate between optimism
and pessimism. This was especially evident in Kunitz’s self-contradictory reports. To a
certain extent, optimism was a requirement for the Austrian agents, because the Hofburg
constantly instructed them to find a way to extend the armistice with the Porte. Their
pessimism, on the other hand, was a reflection of their frustration due to the
unpredictability of the grand vizier and the Ottoman court. Unable to strike a balance
between the two ends, the ambassadorial reports wavered between idealistic optimism
and realistic pessimism.
The early modern Viennese court’s dependence on the existing political
conjuncture—as long as it did not threaten the empire’s integrity—was also evident in
Vienna’s exceedingly legalistic diplomatic posture. This was partially a consequence of
the post-1648 European order where the preliminary indications of neutralization in
confessional animosities were underway. Although religious conflict was far from over, a
more legalistic and procedural understanding of international relations were gaining
momentum.506 Among all the polities involved in the Thirty Years’ War, the Habsburgs
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were most affected by these new perceptions. The diplomatic documents sent to and from
Istanbul between 1676 and 1682 were illustrative of such a change. The reports of the
agents in Istanbul and the instructions Vienna penned during these years frequently
referred to the former peace treaties signed between Austria and the Ottoman Empire.
These retrospective references extended as far back as Zsitvatorok (1606), although many
treaties had been signed between the two states. The Hofburg clearly expected from Kara
Mustafa Paşa’s court the same literal adherence to the previous accords. Upon the grand
vizier’s compensation demands, Kunitz and Caprara carefully examined the claims
within the framework of relevant articles in former treaties. They deemed that Austria
had not infringed on any articles previously agreed upon between the two sides.507 What
the Viennese court failed to appreciate was that the Ottoman central administration was
guided by a diametrically different mindset that did not address Austria’s concerns.

Ottoman statecraft
The Ottoman central government possessed theoretical supremacy over all executive subbranches across the empire. The dîvan (imperial council) was technically a consultative
chancery, but the sultan or a grand vizier could easily override other members. There
were neither other consultative chanceries nor a pressing need for them in the absence of
immediate security threats from outside of the empire. Sultans often enjoyed only de jure
theoretical supremacy in the system. Except for a few of them, who were absolute
arbiters in state affairs, executive authority was often in the hands of a grand vizier.
Georg Christoph von Kunitz and Alberto Caprara, “2te Conferenz,” July 7, 1682, HHStA:
Staatenabteilungen, Türkei I, 152.
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Recent research has convincingly shown that the system’s reliance on a grand vizier
and/or a larger group of courtiers became especially evident after 1600. This gradual shift
from sultanic rule to a bureaucracy-based government was a natural result of the
expansion of the “political nation,” that is, “the body of people who could influence or
play a legitimate role in the government.”508 In other words, post-1600 Ottoman sultans
seldom possessed powers the Weberian trope of sultanic rule assumed existed in the premodern Islamic states, just as early modern European rulers rarely enjoyed executive
powers attributed to them by the “myth of absolutism.”509
Once a grand vizier assumed office, he always relied on a larger political hâne
(household) and appointed loyal members of his hânehalkı (household) to key positions
inside and outside the court to safeguard themselves against rival political factions.510
One may assume that unlike the sultans, whose primary concern was the royal household,
grand viziers often prioritized the longevity of the empire. To that end, they strived to
“improve imperial finances, strengthen the military, and end religious and military threats
to the empire’s authority.”511
Compared to the Hofburg, the power’s accumulation in the hands of a single
individual meant that the early modern Ottoman court could make swift decisions and
take immediate action. Nevertheless, a new problem emerged as the scope of grand
vizieral authority multiplied at the expense of sultans’ control over executive processes:
The administrative power was becoming more susceptible to individual ambitions. An
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able and prudent grand vizier could efficiently use courtly power to rehabilitate the
empire; whereas an opinionated or overly ambitious one could easily pull the state into a
precarious position. This is where the difference between the first two Köprülü grand
viziers and Kara Mustafa Paşa was evident.
Under Kara Mustafa Paşa’s predecessors (1656-1676), the possessor of the
sultan’s seal had become a major catalyst inside the Ottoman court. In 1656, Köprülü
Mehmed Paşa received the sultan’s seal following a tumultuous period of political
instability in the capital and across the empire. The septuagenarian grand vizier reasserted
control of the court in the empire, but he was challenged in his authority. Nonetheless, he
successfully established an aggressive and uncompromising governing pattern. When
Köprülü Mehmed Paşa died, his elder son, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa, assumed his father’s post
in 1661 mainly by virtue of his father’s achievements. Building upon the legacy of his
father and fully benefiting from critical decision-making moments during his career, Fazıl
Ahmed Paşa expanded the scope of authority and independence retained by the
incumbent grand vizier in all aspects of state affairs. The executive authority that Fazıl
Ahmed Paşa diligently accumulated would furnish Kara Mustafa Paşa (Köprülü Mehmed
Paşa’s adopted son) with an unforeseen supremacy over the decision-making processes
from the first day he ascended to the grand vizierate.
The result was Kara Mustafa Paşa’s becoming a sâhib’ül-seyf (master of sword).
Contemporary Ottoman chroniclers (especially those who had witnessed the tumultuous
decades before the 1650s) used this appellation when describing the ideal statesman who
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is expected to provide effective leadership and restore authority in the empire. In their
eyes, Köprülü Mehmed Paşa was a sâhib’ül-seyf. In reality, the second Köprülü deserved
the title more than his father. Kara Mustafa Paşa, the third representative of the Köprülü
regime, also possessed similar traits. He was another sâhib’ül-seyf par excellence, mainly
as a result of the Köprülü legacy he inherited. It is true that the power Kara Mustafa Paşa
possessed was severely handicapped by his unrestrained ambitions; historians who have
researched the motivations of Kara Mustafa Paşa in undertaking the siege of Vienna have
justifiably stressed the grand vizier’s character. Yet no scholar to date has contextualized
this significant strategic move within the broader framework of Köprülü regime and
decision-making patterns Kara Mustafa Paşa inherited from his predecessors. The latter’s
personal ambitions and decision-making patterns that resulted in the declaration of war in
1682 and the siege of Vienna the next year were essentially corollaries of the
unprecedented executive power the first two Köprülüs accumulated and turned over to
Kara Mustafa Paşa. No other grand vizier in the history of the empire were as powerful as
Kara Mustafa Paşa from the first day of his term.
Kara Mustafa Paşa made the decision to campaign against Austria singlehandedly as the most powerful man and the absolute arbiter of state affairs. Some lesser
known details that showed Kara Mustafa Paşa’s unchallenged position are worthy of
mention. The siege decision was made in defiance of the Sultan’s decree, which
commanded an attack on two strategic border fortresses; it went against the opposition of
the majority of commanders who warned Kara Mustafa about a probable crusade-like
reaction across Europe. Chronicler Silahdar, who personally joined the Vienna campaign
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in the summer of 1683, was especially critical of the grand vizier’s ambitions. Silahdar
criticized Kara Mustafa Paşa for being provocative, aggressive, prideful, avaricious, and
arrogant.512 He wrote that Kara Mustafa Paşa subtly prepared the ground to declare a war
on Austria. Complaint letters coming from the Austrian border were prearranged by him,
through the help of his loyal men whom he had appointed to border fortresses and
instructed to send to Istanbul false reports of incursions by the Austrians.513 The
information was confirmed by the ambassador Kunitz’s report, dated January 4, 1681,
which had notified Vienna that the grand vizier was asking the governor of Buda to take
to justify a campaign against Austria.
With the lack of astute counselors, it appears that Kara Mustafa Paşa was
surrounded with obsequious aide-de-camps who inflamed his ambitions. Many of them
were reportedly slaves of Central European origin who had converted to Islam. Most
probably, the grand vizier recruited them to his household hoping to benefit from their
knowledge about the laws and customs of new territories he planned to conquer.514
Among them was a certain clerk named Mustafa, plausibly a French convert. Silahdar
noted that this clerk fueled the passionate grand vizier during the march to Vienna before
the siege decision. Allegedly, he told the grand vizier that it would be pointless to march
on Győr, the original target of the campaign and a fortress already surrounded by
Ottoman garrisons. Mustafa said to his master that if he directly advanced on the Austrian
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capital and captured the city, his power would be equal to that of the Persian King
Khosrow I (531-579), whose richness was possessed only by a handful of rulers
throughout history. A noteworthy detail in the clerk’s speech is that he also assumed that
once Vienna, the imperial capital, surrendered to the grand vizier’s army, the German
princes would come under his rule. Thus, Kara Mustafa Paşa would expand his
sovereignty to the western spheres of Holy Roman Empire and would provide another
income source to Istanbul’s treasury equal to that of Egypt.515 The authenticity of the
narrative is questionable. One could only be elected to the German crown. Besides, such
narratives in Ottoman chronicles are usually a reflection of the chronicler’s personal
political agenda. Silahdar may have fabricated the story to criticize the grand vizier
posthumously. One may also suspect the extent of a clerk’s influence on the grand vizier.
Notwithstanding such suspicions, the purported over-ambitious image of Kara Mustafa
Paşa coincides with many similar narratives recorded in contemporary chronicles about
his ambitions.516
Although Kara Mustafa Paşa had inherited a practically unlimited decisionmaking power, the incessant plea of the Austrian diplomats to extend the peace accord
with the Porte must have been an important catalyst in Kara Mustafa Paşa’s ambitious
decision. One lacks evidence to definitively determine when Kara Mustafa Paşa may
have first conceived to besiege the Habsburg capital. Rumors were reported to Vienna as
early as the late 1677, only a year after the grand vizier’s assumption of office. During
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the following years, however, Austria portrayed itself as vulnerable and desperate by
condoning the grand vizier’s welcoming attitude to the Hungarian malcontents and his
other open aggressions in Hungary. The Austrian ambassadors (as a feature of the
Monarchy’s aforesaid reliance on the status quo) repeatedly referred to an assumed
friendship between the two courts since Zsitvatorok. That attitude must have indirectly
suggested to the grand vizier that Austria was ignoring the Ottoman court’s recent
encroachments due to its desperate condition.
Also, one may argue that the last phases of the negotiations must have reinforced
any supposition in the grand vizier’s mind that the time was ripe to conquer the imperial
capital. According to a note recorded by chronicler İsazade, Caprara’s last offer included
payment of an annual sum to the Ottoman court as did Austria during the times of
Süleyman the Lawgiver (1520-1566). The Austrian communication did not include any
information about whether Caprara was authorized to make such an offer. İsazade,
however, added that upon that offer Kara Mustafa Paşa ordered the chief of scribes,
Telhisizade Mustafa Efendi, to hide the offer. Instead, as per the grand vizier’s orders, the
chief of scribes reported to the sultan that Austria wanted to extend the peace in case the
Porte wanted the same; if the Porte desired a war, then Austria was ready to take up
arms.517 Scholars of Ottoman and Habsburg history know the end of the story: the cost of
Kara Mustafa Paşa’s ambitions was his life. On December 25, 1683, he was strangled in
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Belgrade on the orders Sultan Mehmed IV. The chief of scribes also faced the same fate
when his role in the grand vizier’s plot was revealed.

1683: onset of imperial reforms in Vienna and Istanbul
How important a turning point was the year 1683 in the transformation of Habsburg and
Ottoman administrative patterns and structures? As two early modern states, the
Habsburgs and Ottomans did not greatly differ from each other in terms of institutional
problems and governmental challenges they faced by the end of the seventeenth century.
The year 1683, despite being a victory for the Habsburg Monarchy and a heavy defeat for
the Ottomans, marked the onset of institutional reforms in Vienna and Istanbul. By the
end of the eighteenth century,
The glorious Habsburg victory in Vienna and the recovery of Hungary from the
Ottomans by 1699 was not the product of ongoing reformatory processes; in fact, they set
the stage for the reforms of the next century. By the end of the seventeenth century, the
political and economic privileges of estates were still handicapping the Monarchy. At
times of severe existential threats such as in 1683, the Habsburgs relied on support from
estates and foreign allies as long as they, too, were threatened by the same conditions.
Without full control of resources in the Monarchy and Erblande, the Habsburgs were not
able to develop independent foreign policy. Bureaucratically, Leopold’s court was a
clumsy decision-making body. Many of his courtiers owed their positions to old courtly
customs such as personal favors or courtly intrigues. By the end of Leopold’s reign, his
ministers were becoming less and less efficient. Leopold’s son, Joseph I (1705-1711),
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strived to overcome the problems of his father’s court through administrative and
financial reforms. He diminished the size of Privy Council and abolished the Privy
Conference. Yet his initiatives were incomplete, nor did his younger brother, Charles VI
(1711-1740), managed to complete these reforms.518
Five decades after Carlowitz, Empress Maria Theresia (1740-1780) finally
implemented reforms that truly transformed the early modern Habsburg state.519 Under
Maria Theresia and his son Joseph II (co-rule: 1765-1780; single-rule: 1780-1790)
Austria became a new state, primarily as a response to the threat posed by Prussia. The
most important goal of the Theresian reforms were to eliminate the incompatibilities
between the Austrian chancelleries (Bohemian, Austrian, Hungarian, and Transylvanian),
which were directed by nobles who primarily observed their own interests. Unlike her
grand-father Leopold who followed traditional customs of loyalty when selecting his
courtiers, Maria Theresia adopted a more meritocratic approach in choosing the
statesmen who served her and staffed the newly created bureaucratic offices accordingly.
The masterminds of the Theresian reforms were Haugwitz and Kaunitz, who significantly
increased Vienna’s control in financial and administrative arenas at the expense of the
privileges of provincial nobility.
The Ottoman Empire also experienced a similar developments after Carlowitz,
but one can appreciate what happened in the post-1683 Ottoman Empire only if one
condones his eyes to what happened on the battlefield and focuses on the developments
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in the court, bureaucracy, and diplomacy. Analyzing institutional changes and reforms in
the courtly and bureaucratic structure of the Ottoman state is not easy. Early modern
Ottoman reforms were often like a silent film; they were improvisations depending on the
circumstances without detailed plans or projections. They did not leave behind any traces
or marks except historical facts. The only way of overcoming the problem is to employ as
many sources as possible to outline the characteristics of an era and make inferences from
a variety of perspectives.
Kara Mustafa Paşa was the last Ottoman man of sword standing whose fall
ignited another silent reform process in the empire. The grand vizier was a bold,
ambitious, and passionate man who aspired to maintain the Ottoman Empire’s venerable
custom of conquest; he was neither an historical anomaly nor a deranged fanatic. He was
a man of sword representing the empire’s single-man oriented governance tradition
rooted in the classical era. Also, he belonged to an age where monarchs and statesmen
across Europe firmly believed that both their personal reputation and the longevity and
prosperity of the states they ruled hinged on successful wars. These understandings
gradually disappeared in the post-1683 period as a more inclusive and rational
bureaucratic system replaced the single-man oriented structure.
As emphasized earlier, the expansion of the political nation in the empire had
begun with the strangulation of Osman II by the janissaries. The Köprülü regime restored
authority, but the Köprülü viziers’ achievement in essence was to accumulate power
again in the hands of self-assured individuals. In other words, the Köprülü regime was a
reconstruction; it was not a transformation. However, there were indications of a real
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shift in the Ottoman administrative edifice after Kara Mustafa Paşa’s death, from an
individual-oriented system to a new one characterized by a more inclusive bureaucratic
setting. This change occurred as an increasing number of individuals from kalemiyye
(men of letters) began to take key positions in the decision-making bodies with the turn
of the eighteenth century.520 Two decades after Kara Mustafa Paşa’s execution, Rami
Mehmed Efendi, a former chief of scribes and the leading Ottoman negotiator at
Carlowitz in 1699, became the grand vizier. By the mid-1700s, Koca Ragip Pasa, a
rational statesmen who held the Ottoman Empire out of the Seven Years War, occupied
the grand vizier post. Such developments were signs of transition from military state to
bureaucratic state.521
Another significance of the post-1683 era was the transformation of Ottoman
diplomacy from a unilateral understanding to a bilateral one with increasing reliance on
negotiation. Only several years after Kara Mustafa Paşa’s uncompromising diplomatic
manner resulted in the debacle in Vienna, the Ottomans accepted English and Dutch
mediation to sign a settlement with the Holy League.522 In the eighteenth century, the
Ottomans more frequently followed a peace-oriented strategy and prioritized alliances

520

About the increasing influence of kalemiyye in Ottoman bureaucracy at the turn of the eighteenth
century, see Ekin Emine Tusalp Atiyas, “Political Literacy and the Politics of Eloquence: Ottoman Scribal
Community in the Seventeenth Century” (Ph.D., Harvard University, 2014).
521
Virginia H. Aksan, An Ottoman Statesman in War and Peace: Ahmed Resmi Efendi, 1700-1783 (Brill,
1995), 15.
522
Colin Heywood, “Heywood, Colin. ‘English Diplomatic Relations with Turkey, 1689-1698,’ in William
Hale and Ali İhsan Bağış (eds.), (,” in Four Centuries of Turco-British Relations, ed. William Hale and Ali
İhsan Bağış (North Humberside: The Eothan Press, 1984), 26–39; Colin Heywood, “An Undiplomatic
Anglo-Dutch Dispute at the Porte: The Quarrel Between Coenrad van Heemskerck and Lord Paget (1693),”
in Friends and Rivals in the East: Studies in Anglo-Dutch Relations in the Levant Form the Seventeenth
Century to the Early Nineteenth Century, ed. Alastair Hamilton, Alexander H. De Groot, and Mauritz H.
Van Den Boogert (Leiden; Boston; Köln: Brill, 2000), 59–94.

267

and mediation rather than aggressions.523 Diplomatic initiatives gradually replaced wars
in convincing enemies, resulting in the establishment of first Ottoman permanent
embassies in Europe by the end of the eighteenth century.524
This brings us to a final matter: Was the Vienna campaign religiously motivated?
Religious ideologies were definitely still strong in early modern world, but I think that an
inquiry into religion’s role in undertaking of the Vienna campaign cannot simply be a
matter of Kara Mustafa Paşa’s personal religiosity. Whether the grand vizier was
religiously motivated in 1683 is only a small portion of a much larger and complex
problematic about the role of religion in shaping entire periods and eras in Ottoman
history. Many Ottomanists have recently hypothesized an Islamic pietistic revivalism in
the early modern Ottoman Empire and have argued that the early modern Ottoman
processes of state and social formation partook in the Mediterranean age of
confessionalization. As evidence, these scholars have indicated the increasing number of
conversions to Islam or the proliferation of Islamic catechisms in the seventeenth century.
Within such a framework, one scholar called the Vienna campaign “the failed final
jihad.” Such arguments present two major problems.
First, these arguments assume that religion in early modern world was essentially
distinct from politics and economics and that it had an inclination to promote violence.
One cannot deny that religious ideologies have propelled political, social, and economic
processes under certain conditions. However, I agree with William Cavanaugh that the
contention that pre-modern states were driven by supposedly transhistorical and
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transcultural religious motives is primarily a product of present-day secular ideology.
Cavanaugh argues that modern secularism positions itself such that secular, state-driven
violence is considered a product of rational decision-making, and, hence, necessary. On
the other hand, the assumed religious motivations of pre-modern states render their
violence (or warfare) irrational and absolutist. Such a divide then serves—in the abstract
level—the legitimation of modern state’s actions. The question of how one differentiates
political or economic objectives from religious ones is ignored in the process. The
Ottomanist “renewal of faith” literature did not present any awareness of these conceptual
discussions.525
The second problem relates to historiography and debates within Ottomanists
scholarship. The comparative use of the confessionalization paradigm in the Ottoman
historical context is welcome, but certain qualifications are in order. First,
confessionalization is a well-documented theme in early modern Europe. Propaganda,
censorship, coercion, and many other instruments were common across Europe during
the age of confessionalization; together they reached to the effect of a widespread social
phenomenon. In the Ottoman context, however, several narratives of conversion and
catechisms, notwithstanding their significance, simply do not amount to a confessional
age. Historians need many more and diverse evidence from across the empire to articulate
an Ottoman confessionalization. Second, once such evidence is demonstrated, contextual
links have to be detected between decision-making processes and purported confessional

Virginia H. Aksan, “War and Peace,” in The Cambridge History of Turkey. Later Ottoman Empire,
1603-1839, ed. Suraiya Faroqhi, vol. 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 81–117.
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ideas. In confessional Europe, hundreds of scholars affiliated with different
denominations were actively involved in confessional policies of monarchs. There is a
solid interconnectedness between actual policy-making processes and religious-political
literature. Nevertheless, the Ottoman “renewal of faith” paradigm is built upon weak
connections between the contemporary literature and politics; it focuses mainly on the
topics of legitimation and ethics.526 Third, in mainstream European historiography, the
age of confessionalization along with absolutism and Enlightenment are believed to have
set the stage for the emergence of the modern state. Accordingly, early modern states and
churches have cooperated in strict observation of social and economic behaviors such as
obedience to public rules or payment of taxes. According to the European master
narrative, these obligations have gained a fully secular character over decades and
sidelined divine duties, resulting in the emergence of centralized modern states. Thus, the
confessionalization paradigm is one of the building-blocks of the progressive European
narrative. In the Ottoman historical context, however, the concept has so far conveyed a
pejorative tone. Negating its explicative origins, it is used to present the Ottoman Empire
almost as a malevolent fanatical project. Finally, fourth, the use of religion-based
paradigms to explain critical decision-making moments such as the Vienna campaign and
the nature of Ottoman statecraft represents a regression from the criticisms of earlier
studies which had indicated that Islam in the Ottoman Empire was subordinated to the
state’s interests.

525

The backdrop for this paragraph is William T. Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular
Ideology and the Roots of Modern Conflict (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). See
introduction and chapter 3, entitled “the creation myth of wars of religion.”
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A full comprehension of early modern state’s nature can be achieved in two
intertwined steps: The first step requires a thorough analysis of tangible processes such as
strategic objectives of states or the personal goals of statesmen; and second, by
contextualization of those processes within the broader historical and geopolitical
framework that produced them. Any ideological motive that fed into these processes will
be understood only after these first two steps are taken properly.

The same problem was detected in an examination of political literature in Darling, “Political Change
and Political Discourse in the Early Modern Mediterranean World,” 506.
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